Lyon v. Charleston & W.C. Ry.
Decision Date | 10 July 1907 |
Citation | 58 S.E. 12,77 S.C. 328 |
Parties | LYON v. CHARLESTON & W. C. RY. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Greenwood County.
Action by A. B. Lyon against the Charleston & Western Carolina Railway. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.
See 56 S.E. 18.
S. J Simpson and McGhee & Richardson, for appellant.
Grier & Park, for respondent.
The vital question in this case is whether the circuit judge erred in refusing a motion for a nonsuit and for new trial.
The plaintiff, a flagman on defendant's freight train, while attempting to uncouple a moving car, fell on the track and had his leg crushed. He brought this action for damages and recovered judgment, alleging the accident was due to the defendant's negligence. Without taking up the exceptions in detail, we consider whether there is evidence to support any one of the several charges of negligence as a proximate cause of the injury. The case depends principally on the testimony of the plaintiff, who gave this account of the accident on his direct examination: On cross-examination he says:
1. Negligence as a proximate cause of the injury is charged against the conductor, in that he "ordered, required and directed this plaintiff to get upon and uncouple the said cars while in motion, and get upon and apply the brakes to the trailing cars while in motion, and in leaving the train without seeing that his orders were carried out and the train operated with due care, without a sudden increase of the speed of the train." The plaintiff's own account shows clearly the accident was due to his act of leaning over the corner of the moving car and uncoupling it by pulling a lever at the side; but there is no evidence whatever that the conductor ordered the plaintiff to get upon the moving car and uncouple it from that position, or even saw him when he did it. There is evidence of an order from the conductor to uncouple the moving car, but a lever was provided on each side of the car as a means of uncoupling from the ground. That the plaintiff, as well as New, understood the order to mean that the lever should be used from the ground, is conclusively shown by his evidence that they went about the uncoupling in that manner; New handling the lever and the plaintiff mounting the car in order to leap over on another car and put on the brakes as New uncoupled. New, the brakeman, made an unsuccessful effort to use the lever on his side from the ground, and then the plaintiff, without giving any signal to stop the train or attempting to use the lever on the other side from the ground, or even reporting to the conductor or receiving any order from him, of his own volition, without even giving notice to any one in control of the motion of the train of his intention, attempted the perilous feat, of stooping over from the moving car and pulling the lever below him. There is no ground for saying the order of the conductor required or contemplated such peril. Without doubt, when an order is given, it is the duty of the servant to take the safe way of carrying it out, if one is provided; and, if that fails, he cannot, except, perhaps, in cases of emergency arising from the fault of the master, charge the master with the result of using a dangerous method not in the purview of the order. If the order of the conductor could in any reasonable view be regarded as suggesting to the plaintiff to stand on the flat car and uncouple from that position, then there might be ground for saying that the defendant could not escape liability for a condition of things produced by its order to him, in which on a sudden impulse he took a dangerous course, resulting in his injury. But it would be beyond all reason to say the order contemplated mounting a flat car as the plaintiff did, with the intention of stepping or leaping from that to the following car, in order to apply the brakes to that car, or the attempt to use the lever while stooping from the end of the flat car. Here, then, was a general order from the conductor to uncouple, and there was a lever provided for the purpose to be used from the ground, and, if it had been used as intended by the defendant, the plaintiff could not have been injured by falling from the car. This distinguishes the case from Carson v. Railway, 68 S.C. 55, 68, 46 S.E. 525, 529; for in that case the court said: "It was shown, or rather there was testimony offered tending to show, that the conductor ordered this servant, the plaintiff, to couple those cars; that such conductor in this matter represented the master; that the servant called to such conductor to hold fast the train until he signaled; that this servant did not signal the conductor to move the train; that it was under these circumstances the train was moved so that the two cars bumped against each other, thus causing his injuries; that, when the cotter pin was out of its place, it would be necessary for a servant to go between the cars to arrange it; that it was necessary to go between the cars to open the instrument by which the coupling was made." The conductor's position at the time of the accident does not appear from the evidence, and therefore there could be no finding of negligence on the ground that he was not present to direct the details of the uncoupling and the movements of the train. The plaintiff's testimony shows that he clearly understood the manner in which the lever was to be used, without any instruction or direction. That the master is not liable for any injury which results from the use of a safe appliance in an unsafe and dangerous manner not contemplated by him seems too obvious to require a particular citation of...
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