Lyon v. Morris

• Decision Date: 31 July 1854
• Docket Number: No. 67.,67.
• Citation: 15 Ga. 480
• Parties: John Lyon, Solicitor General, and another, plaintiffs in error. vs. James Morris, defendant in error.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

15 Ga. 480

John Lyon, Solicitor General, and another, plaintiffs in error. vs. James Morris, defendant in error.

No. 67.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

JULY TERM, 1854.

Rule, &c. in Randolph Superior Court. Decision by Judge Perkins, April Term, 1854.

The recognizance of James Morris, as bail for J. A. Satter-white, was forfeited, and judgment rendered in favor of the State, for the amount thereof. The Legislature of 1853-4, passed an Act discharging Morris from liability thereon, and ordering the proper officers to enter the same satisfied. In return to a rule requiring the Solicitor General and Clerk to enter the judgment satisfied, or show cause to the contrary, those officers showed that they had orders granted for costs in insolvent cases, to an amount greater than that of the judgment, and that their right to the amount thereof, was vested, and could not be divested by the Legislature. The Court below over-ruled this showing, as insufficient, and this decision is assigned as error.

Lyon, for plaintiff in error.

Kiddoo & Tucker, for defendant.

By the Court.—Lumpkin, J., delivering the opinion.

By the 4th section of the 14th division of the Penal Code, it is provided that the fees due the Attorney and Solicitor General, and other officers of the Court, shall, when examined and allowed by the Court, be paid out of any moneys, received, for fines inflicted by the Court or collected on forfeited recognizances. (Cobb's Dig. 833-4.)

Until moneys for fines, then, are received, or on forfeited recognizances are collected, we are clear that these penaltiesmay be remitted—we should be loth to hold otherwise. To tie up the hands of the Governor and Legislature, from granting relief in proper cases, the right to do so should be unquestionable. To suppose that the other two departments of the Government are under restraints, thus self-imposed, the point should be free from all doubt.

Suppose that a fund, arising from a particular tax, should be designated by law, for the payment of these fees, cannot another fund be substituted? We know nothing in the nature and tenure of public offices, which are created under our Government, for the benefit of the body politic, to justify the assumption upon which this writ of error is founded.

In the case of the State vs. Dews, (R. M. Charlton's R. 397,) it was held, in what Chancellor Kent has been pleased, and we think justly, to compliment as "the very able and elaborate opinion delivered by Judge Nicoll", (3 Kent's...