Lyons v. Desotelle

• Decision Date: 03 May 1878
• Parties: John Lyons v. Alfred Desotelle
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

124 Mass. 387

John Lyons v. Alfred Desotelle

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

May 3, 1878

Argued September 25, 1877

Hampden. Tort for injuries to the plaintiff's horse caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant. Trial in the Superior Court, before Bacon, J., who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows:

It appeared in evidence that the plaintiff hired a horse and carriage on Sunday, August 1, 1875, for the purpose of going from Chicopee to Springfield, to attend a camp-meeting. Upon reaching the camp-ground, the plaintiff hitched his horse at the side of the road behind the defendant's buggy, and the injury was caused by the defendant's horse backing the buggy against the plaintiff's horse. The evidence was conflicting as to whether this backing was caused by the defendant's negligence, or by his horse being suddenly frightened by a buffalo robe hanging from a seat of a passing wagon.

The defendant requested the judge to instruct the jury as follows: "1. If the jury believe that the accident happened through the negligence of the defendant, while the plaintiff was unlawfully travelling on the Lord's day and that the accident would not have happened if the plaintiff had not been so travelling, he cannot recover."

"2. If the plaintiff was travelling for pleasure on the Lord's day, and such travelling contributed to the injury which befell him, he cannot recover."

"3. If the jury believe that the accident happened through the negligence of the defendant, not resulting from the wilful conduct of the defendant, while the plaintiff was unlawfully travelling on the Lord's day, the plaintiff cannot recover."

The judge refused so to instruct the jury, but did instruct them as follows: "It makes no difference whether the plaintiff was then in violation of the law relating to the Lord's day or not. If I am travelling on the wrong side of the road, contrary to law, and a man carelessly and negligently runs into me, I can recover, unless my carelessness contributed to the injury. If the plaintiff went up there for pleasure and received injuries by the defendant's negligence, he can recover, unless his own carelessness or negligence contributed to the injury." The judge gave general instructions on the matter of negligence, to which no exceptions were taken. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and found specially that the plaintiff did not go to the camp-meeting with a bona fide intention of attending religious services there. The defendant alleged exceptions.

Exceptions sustained.

C. L. Long, for the defendant.

G. D Robinson, for the plaintiff. 1. The plaintiff was not travelling at the time of the injury to his horse. The illegal act, if any, was over, and he was as much entitled to recover, as if an assault had been committed personally upon him, after he had returned to his home.

2. If the plaintiff was in violation of law at the time, his act did not contribute to the injury in any legal sense, and he is entitled to recover. It is no answer to this position to say that the injury would not have happened if he had not been travelling. This is not what the law means by "contributing to the injury." Thus in Welch v. Wesson, 6 Gray 505, the fact that the plaintiff was illegally trotting his horse against the defendant's horse was held not to prevent recovery for an injury caused by the defendant's wilfully running into him. So, driving on the wrong side of the street, or standing on a street, though acts in violation of law, do not prevent the plaintiff from recovering while so driving or standing. Spofford v. Harlow, 3 Allen 176. Steele v. Burkhardt, 104 Mass. 59. Kearns v. Sowden, 104 Mass. 63, note. See also Hall v. Ripley, 119 Mass. 135. In all these cases the injury would not have happened had not the plaintiff been illegally where he was. Smith v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 120 Mass. 490, is not an authority against this position, for there, as stated by the judge delivering the opinion, it was conceded at the trial that the travelling of the plaintiff was a cause directly contributing to his injury.

3. As the plaintiff was attending a religious meeting, he...