Lyons v. Donahoe
| Decision Date | 16 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:14-cv-21-WHR |
| Parties | ANGELA LYONS, Plaintiff, v. PATRICK R. DONAHOE, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Plaintiff Angela Lyons ("Plaintiff" or "Lyons") alleged that employees of Patrick R. Donahoe, who is being sued in his official capacity as Postmaster General ("Defendant"), subjected her to racial discrimination (Count I), disability discrimination (Count II) and retaliation (Count V) on four occasions between April, 2011, and May, 2011, while she was employed by the United States Postal Service ("USPS"). Plaintiff claims that Defendant's actions violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. ("Rehabilitation Act")1; and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution () and Ohio Rev. Code § 411 2.01 et seq. Doc. #1. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability (Count II), subjected her to a hostile work environment (Count III) and committed a breach of public policy (Count IV). Id. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367. Defendant now moves for summary judgment. Doc. #20. For the reasons set forth below, his motion is SUSTAINED IN PART WITH PREJUDICE AND OVERRULED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment must be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existenceof an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.265 (1986). The moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323; see also Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir. 1991).
Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must present evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact making it necessary to resolve the difference at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the burden of production has so shifted, the party opposing summary judgment cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations. It is not sufficient to "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 LEd.2d 538 (1986). Rule 56 "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings," and present some type of evidentiary material in support of its position. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Michigan Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir. 1994).
"Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a court must assume as true the evidence of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Id. at 255. If the parties present conflicting evidence, a court may not decide which evidence to believe. Credibility determinations must be left to the fact-finder. 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3d, 2726 (1998).
In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a court need only consider the materials cited by the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). "A district court is not . . . obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim." InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). If it so chooses, however, the court may also consider other properly presented materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
Evidence offered under Rule 56 in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment "need not be in admissible form, but its content must be admissible." Bailey v. Floyd Cty. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.3d 135, 145 (6th Cir. 1997))(emphasis in original); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (). In other words, the Court will not exclude an affidavit or other evidence, such as deposition testimony, simply because such items would not normally be admissible at trial in lieu of live testimony. However, the Court will exclude such materials if their contents would be inadmissible at trial, e.g., the statements contained in the affidavit are not based on personal knowledge, or the statements in the deposition testimony or exhibits are themselves inadmissible hearsay.
Additionally, for evidentiary materials to be considered by the Court, they must be properly authenticated; that is, the offerant must "produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is." Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). "[T]he party arguing for admission bears the burden of establishing the proper foundation for the admissibility" of the proffered evidence. Liadis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 01-3230, 47 F. App'x 295, 303 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Mitroff v. Xomox Corp., 797 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1986)).
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Defendant attached as exhibits what purport to be the November 19, 2012, testimony of Vivian Carpenter("Carpenter"), Doc. #20-1, Karen Garber ("Garber"), Doc. #20-3, and Michael Mudhenk ("Mudhenk"), Doc. #20-5, before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") administrative law judge ("ALJ"), who was conducting a hearing relating to Plaintiff's Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") charge of discrimination and retaliation. Defendant also filed the deposition of Plaintiff taken by Defendant's counsel in this lawsuit, along with its exhibits. Doc. #22, 22-1.
"All deposition transcripts filed with the Clerk must include . . . the certificate described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(f)." S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 5.4(a). Also, to be considered by the Court, the transcripts normally must be properly authenticated. "A deposition or an extract therefrom is authenticated in a motion for summary judgment when it identifies the names of the deponent and the action and includes the reporter's certification that the deposition is a true record of the testimony of the deponent." Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 560 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 774 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Carroll v. Holder, No. 09-3093-CL, 2011 WL 7091804, at * 3 (D. Ore. Sept. 30, 2011) ().
Plaintiff's deposition and each excerpt of EEOC testimony included the name of the action and identified the name of the deponent. Doc. #20-1, PAGEID #75; Doc. #20-3, PAGEID#119; Doc. #20-5, PAGEID #143; Doc. #22, PAGEID #161. However, Defendant did not attach the cover sheet from the ALJ hearing. Nor didDefendant attach the court reporter's signed certification for either the ALJ hearing or Plaintiff's deposition. Defendant's failure to attach the certification sheets means that his filings failed to comport with S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 5.4(a).
The Sixth Circuit does not mandate the exclusion of non-certified transcripts when, as in this case, the non-offering party does not question the authenticity of the transcripts. Alexander, 576 F.3d at 560. However, it is within the Court's discretion to do so, and other courts have excluded transcripts when, as with the proffered EEOC testimony, the offerant did not attach the cover sheet or the reporter's certification. Carroll, 2011 WL 7091804, at * 3 (EEOC ALJ hearing); Snelling v. Chapin, No. 1:09-cv-340, 2010 WL 5125579, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2010) (deposition). Moreover, Plaintiff herein did not sign a copy of the deposition, nor did she agree to waive signature. Doc. #22, PAGEID #180.
Considering the above, the Court concludes that Defendant has...
To continue reading
Request your trial