Lyons v. Eldridge
| Decision Date | 26 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-cv-11199-DJC |
| Parties | JAMES LYONS, et al., Plaintiffs v. JAMES ELDRIDGE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Plaintiffs James Lyons, Evelyn Curley, Henry Barbaro, Christine Doherty and David Lunger (together “Plaintiffs”) bring this suit against Defendants James Eldridge (“Eldridge”), Jonathan Paz (“Paz”) Wesley McEnany (“McEnany”) and Maura Healey (“Healey”) alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count I), seeking declaratory and equitable relief for violations of 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101(b), 10307(b) (Count II) and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count III). D. 1. Defendant Healey has moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief should be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). D. 9. Defendants Paz and McEnany also moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to serve Defendants under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim for which relief should be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). D. 21. For the reasons discussed below, the Court ALLOWS Healey's motion to dismiss, D. 9, and the Court ALLOWS Paz and McEnany's motion to dismiss, D. 21.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “[T]he party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court carries the burden of proving its existence.” Murphy v. United States, 45 F.3d 520, 522 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Taber Partners, I v. Merit Builders, Inc., 987 F.2d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). When confronted with such a motion, “the district court must construe the complaint liberally, treating all well-pleaded facts as true and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1209-10 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Murphy, 45 F.3d at 522). The Court, however, may widen its gaze and look beyond the pleadings to determine jurisdiction. Martinez-Rivera v. Puerto Rico, 812 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2016). Further, “[w]hen faced with motions to dismiss under both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), a district court, absent good reason to do otherwise, should ordinarily decide the 12(b)(1) motion first.” Ne. Erectors Ass'n v. Sec'y of Lab., 62 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 1995). Most relevantly for our purposes here, “[t]he First Circuit has observed that it is appropriate to consider mootness challenges as challenges to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and that ‘[t]he proper vehicle for challenging a court's subject-matter jurisdiction is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).'” Trafford v. City of Westbrook, 669 F.Supp.2d 133, 140 (D. Me. 2009) () (quoting Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362-63 (1st Cir. 2001)).
It is well established that “that a judgment rendered in the absence of personal jurisdiction is a nullity.” Vazquez-Robles v. CommoLoCo, Inc., 757 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2014). “The existence of such jurisdiction normally depends on legally sufficient service of process.” Id. “[Al]hough personal jurisdiction and service of process are distinguishable, they are inextricably intertwined, since service of process constitutes the vehicle by which the court obtains jurisdiction.” United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st Cir. 1992).
“When a defendant seasonably challenges the adequacy of service, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that service was proper.” Vazquez-Robles, 757 F.3d at 4. “A return of service generally serves asprima facie evidence that service was validly performed.” Blair v. City of Worcester, 522 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 2008). A defendant, however, may provide “rebuttal evidence to refute any presumption of valid service.” Id. at 111-12.
“To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain ‘sufficient factual matter' to state a claim for relief that is actionable as a matter of law and ‘plausible on its face.'” MIT Federal Credit Union v. Cordisco, 470 F.Supp.3d 81, 84 (D. Mass. 2020) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Reading the complaint “as a whole,” the Court must conduct a two-step, context-specific inquiry. Garda-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 103 (1st Cir. 2013). First, the Court must perform a close reading of the claim to distinguish the factual allegations from the conclusory legal allegations contained therein. Id. Factual allegations must be accepted as true, while conclusory legal conclusions are not entitled credit. Id. Second, the Court must determine whether the factual allegations present a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged.” Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011).
The following factual allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint, D. 1, are accepted as true for the purposes of resolving the motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs were seeking to repeal An Act Relative to Work and Family Mobility, Mass. St. 2022, c. 81, which allows applicants without proof of lawful presence in Massachusetts to be eligible for a Massachusetts license. D. 1 ¶¶ 1-5, 11. On June 15, 2022, Plaintiff Evelyn Curley and others filed a referendum petition seeking to repeal this law by placing it on the November general election ballot. Id. ¶ 12. On June 27, 2022, the Attorney General's Office approved the referendum for signature collection. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs were required to collect 1.5 percent of the votes cast in the previous governor's race, amounting to 40,120 signatures. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs James Lyons, Henry Barbaro, Christine Doherty and David Lunger were involved in the signature gathering effort. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3-5. To collect signatures, Plaintiffs set up tables outside Cabela's, Market Basket stores and other locations across the Commonwealth. Id. ¶ 18.
Plaintiffs allege that they met “organized resistance” in their effort to collect signatures. Id. ¶¶ 21-32. As alleged, this organized effort, a “[d]ecline to [s]ign” campaign, harassed and assaulted potential signatories, physically blocked access to the signature tables and, on at least one occasion, ripped signature petitions in half. Id. ¶¶ 22-24, 28. Plaintiffs allege that protestors' efforts “shut down” signature-gathering in Berlin, Tewksbury, Waltham, Haverhill, Plymouth, Hudson and other locations. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs allege that the protestors' behavior forced several volunteers to decline to be part of signature gathering efforts. Id. ¶ 26.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Eldridge and Paz were “leaders” of the effort to protest their signature gathering. Id. ¶¶ 35, 38, 39. Eldridge “appeared on several occasions to obstruct, harass, and intimidate voters and signature gatherers.” Id. ¶ 35. Eldridge stood three feet from the signature table to obstruct potential signatories from approaching to sign the petition. Id. ¶ 36. Paz's “group” “formed a picket line” about five feet in front of the signature table. Id. ¶ 39. McEnany also “appeared on at least one occasion” to prevent Plaintiffs from gathering signatures by allegedly blocking and preventing voters from access to the signature collection efforts. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiffs also allege that several other unnamed people have organized efforts to obstruct access to the signature collection. Id. ¶ 44.
Plaintiffs assert that despite making “public pleas for protection,” Healey, then the Attorney General of Massachusetts, took no “reasonable diligence” to prevent Defendants' conspiracy to stop their signature collection effort. Id. ¶¶ 64, 66, 69. On September 9, 2022, the Secretary of the Commonwealth certified that the referendum petition was supported by a sufficient number of signatures.[1] D. 22 at 3. Plaintiffs' referendum became question four on the statewide ballot. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that Eldridge, Paz and McEnany conspired to interfere with their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count I), as well as 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101(b), 10307(b) (Count II). Plaintiffs allege that Healey's failure to act to prevent Eldridge, Paz and McEnany's conspiracy amounted to a violation of 42 US.C. § 1986 (Count III).
Plaintiffs instituted this action on July 25, 2022. D. 1. Healey now moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). D. 9. Defendants Paz and McEnany also moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to serve Defendants under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim for which relief should be granted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). D. 21. The Court heard the parties on the pending motions and took the matter under advisement. D. 25.
First the Court considers Paz and McEnany's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' voter intimidation claims under 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101(b), 10307(b) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “The Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101 et seq., was enacted for the broad remedial purpose to eliminate racial discrimination in voting.” Duran v. Lollis, No. 1:18-cv-01580-DAD-SAB, 2019 WL 691203, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2019) (). Bot...
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