Lyons v. Labor Relations Com'n

• Decision Date: 08 May 1986
• Citation: 492 N.E.2d 343,397 Mass. 498
• Parties: , 31 Ed. Law Rep. 1250 Joseph K. LYONS v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 343

492 N.E.2d 343

397 Mass. 498, 31 Ed. Law Rep. 1250

Joseph K. LYONS v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 9, 1986.

Decided May 8, 1986.

Bruce N. Cameron, Springfield, Va., for plaintiff.

John B. Cochran (Jean Strauten Driscoll, Boston, with him), for Labor Relations Com'n.

Brian A. Riley, Boston, for intervener, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LIACOS, Justice.

The plaintiff, Joseph K. Lyons, is a public school teacher employed by the Whittier Regional Vocational District School Committee. Lyons is within a collective bargaining unit represented by the Whittier Regional Teachers Association (union), but he is not a union member. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union covering the 1982-1983 school year, nonunion employees within the collective bargaining unit were required to pay an agency fee equal to union membership dues. ² Failure to pay the agency fee was cause for dismissal under the terms of the agreement.

In early 1983 the union sent a letter to Lyons demanding that he pay an agency fee of $217 for the period September 1, 1982, to August 31, 1983. A copy of the regulations of the Labor Relations Commission (commission) relating to agency fee assessments and challenges thereto was enclosed. See 402 Code Mass.Regs. §§ 17.00-17.16 (1982). Lyons objected to the amount of the fee. He placed the entire amount demanded in an escrow account and filed a prohibited practices charge with the commission asking it to determine the appropriate amount of the agency fee. The commission dismissed Lyons's complaint without a hearing. 402 Code Mass.Regs. § 17.06(2) (1982). ³ In response to Lyons's request for reconsideration, the commission affirmed its dismissal of his complaint.

Lyons filed a notice of appeal to the Appeals Court. G.L. c. 150E, § 11. The commission, however, refused to assemble the record for transfer to the Appeals Court, taking the position that dismissals of charges are not final orders under G.L. c. 150E, § 11, and therefore are not subject to judicial review. Lyons thereafter filed a motion with a single justice of the Appeals Court to obtain an order requiring the commission to assemble the record for appeal. The single justice denied the motion. Lyons appealed from that decision. The Appeals Court reversed the single justice's denial of Lyons's motion. Lyons v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 562, 476 N.E.2d 243 (1985). It held that the commission was required to assemble the record and, further, that the Appeals Court had jurisdiction over Lyons's appeal. Id. at 564-569, 476 N.E.2d 243. It went on to consider Lyons's contention that the forty-five day limitation period for filing agency fee challenges was unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. ⁴ The court concluded that this contention was without merit and affirmed the commission's dismissal of Lyons's complaint. Id. at 564, 569-572, 476 N.E.2d 243. We granted the parties' cross-applications for further appellate review. Mass.R.A.P. 27.1(a), as amended, 367 Mass. 920 (1975).

1. Judicial review of prehearing dismissal. General Laws c. 150E, § 11 (1984 ed.), provides, in pertinent part: "When a complaint is made to the commission that a practice prohibited by section ten has been committed, the commission may issue an order dismissing the complaint or may order a further investigation or a hearing thereon. The commission may dismiss a complaint without a hearing if it finds no probable cause to believe that a violation of this chapter has occurred or if it otherwise determines that further proceedings would not effectuate the purposes of this chapter.... Any party aggrieved by a final order of the commission may institute proceedings for judicial review in the appeals court within thirty days after receipt of said order. The proceedings in the appeals court shall, insofar as applicable, be governed by the provisions of section fourteen of chapter thirty A [the State Administrative Procedure Act]."

The commission contends that G.L. c. 150E, § 11, vests it with broad discretionary authority to dismiss prohibited practice charges prior to hearing, and that such dismissals are not final orders within the meaning of the statute. The commission maintains that judicial review of its discretionary authority to dismiss prohibited practice complaints without a hearing is limited to the questions whether it has exceeded its statutory authority or abused its discretion. Thus, in the instant case, the commission avers that its dismissal of Lyons's agency fee challenge prior to hearing as untimely filed was not properly reviewable in the Appeals Court under the standards set forth in G.L. c. 30A, § 14 (1984 ed.). We disagree.

Public employees who are not union members may be required, as a condition of their employment, to pay an agency fee to their collective bargaining representative to support the costs of the bargaining process, contract administration, and grievance adjustment. School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 72-73, 431 N.E.2d 180 (1982). Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225-226, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1794, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). Those public employees have a constitutional right grounded in the First Amendment, however, to "prevent the Union's spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative." Id. at 234, 97 S.Ct. at 1799. There is, therefore, a constitutional basis for such an employee's challenge to the amount of an agency fee on the ground that the fee is in excess of the employee's pro rata share of the legitimate costs of collective bargaining activities.

The constitutional nature of such agency fee complaints necessarily informs our interpretation of the term "final orders," as appearing in G.L. c. 150E, § 11. We must, if possible, construe the statute to avoid the constitutional difficulty that would attend an interpretation permitting only limited judicial review of claims predicated on the First Amendment rights of dissenting employees. See School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, supra 385 Mass. at 79, 431 N.E.2d 180. Accordingly, we conclude, as did the Appeals Court in Lyons, supra 19 Mass.App.Ct. at 569, 476 N.E.2d 243, that any decision by the commission, including a prehearing dismissal, which effectively determines the outcome of a constitutionally based challenge of an agency fee is a final order under G.L. c. 150E, § 11, subject to judicial review pursuant to the provisions of G.L. c. 30A, § 14. ⁵

Our interpretation of G.L. c. 150E, § 11, is consistent with the view we expressed in School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, supra 385 Mass. at 82, 431 N.E.2d 180. We recognized there that, out of concern for the constitutional rights of dissenting employees, the United States Supreme Court has placed on the collective bargaining representative the burden of justifying its agency fee assessment when the agency fee payor objects to the amount of the fee. We went on to state that this burden "is only meaningful if legitimacy is proved before a neutral tribunal and subjected to judicial review" (emphasis supplied). Id. The Supreme Court said much the same thing in a recent opinion. Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 106 S.Ct. 1066, 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986). The Court held, as we did in Greenfield, supra 385 Mass. at 82, 431 N.E.2d 180, that an internal union procedure for adjudicating agency fee challenges was constitutionally inadequate, stating that dissenting employees must be afforded a prompt decision before a neutral decision maker, and that "the courts remain available as the ultimate protectors of constitutional rights." Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Hudson, supra 106 S.Ct. at 1076 n. 20.

The commission's protestations notwithstanding, we do not think that subjecting prehearing dismissals of constitutionally based agency fee challenges to judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14, involves any significant encroachment on the commission's discretionary authority. The commission still may dismiss agency fee complaints prior to hearing if it finds, after investigation, that there is no probable cause to believe that the fee is excessive, if it determines that further proceedings would not effectuate the purposes of c. 150E, or if the complainant has not complied with procedural regulations governing the filing of complaints. Such decisions, however, may be overturned on review if, inter alia, they are in violation of constitutional provisions, in excess of the statutory authority or the jurisdiction of the commission, or made on unlawful procedure, or are arbitrary, capricious, or constitute an abuse of discretion. See G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7). Commission decisions which legitimately fall within its discretionary powers will be sustained on review; its statutory authority therefore remains intact.

2. Validity of 402 Code Mass.Regs. § 17.06(2). Pursuant to its authority under G.L. c. 23, § 9R, the commission promulgated regulations to implement the provisions of G.L. c. 150E, § 12. See 402 Code Mass.Regs. §§ 17.00-17.16 (1982). Under § 17.06(2), quoted at note 3 supra, a challenge to the assessment of an agency fee must be filed within forty-five days after the bargaining agent has made a written demand. All other prohibited practice charges are governed by a six-month limitation period. 402 Code Mass.Regs. § 15.03 (1981). Lyons attacks the validity of the forty-five day limitation period for agency fee challenges. He contends that it is arbitrary and capricious, violative of arts. 6 and 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and repugnant to the equal protection and...