Lyons v. Municipal Court

• Decision Date: 07 December 1977
• Citation: 75 Cal.App.3d 829,142 Cal.Rptr. 449
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Arthur Michael LYONS, Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT of California, CENTRAL ORANGE COUNTY JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Respondent; PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 17629.

Page 449

142 Cal.Rptr. 449

75 Cal.App.3d 829

Arthur Michael LYONS, Appellant, v. MUNICIPAL COURT of California, CENTRAL ORANGE COUNTY JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Respondent PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 17629.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

Dec. 7, 1977.

As Modified Dec. 16, 1977.

Hearing Denied Feb. 1, 1978.

[75 Cal.App.3d 834] Paul M. Bell, Anaheim, Joseph G. Hall, Santa Ana, and Norma M. Scott, Anaheim, for appellant.

Cecil Hicks, Dist. Atty., Michael R. Capizzi, Asst. Dist. Atty., Oretta D. Sears and Thomas H. Wolfsen, Deputy Dist. Attys., for real party in interest.

OPINION

MORRIS, Associate Justice.

This appeal is from the denial by the superior court of appellant's petition for writ of prohibition/mandate challenging the jurisdiction of the municipal court in a prosecution of the appellant for violation of Penal Code section 270 (failure to provide for minor children).

On February 24, 1975, a criminal complaint was filed in the municipal court against appellant Arthur Michael Lyons charging him with a violation of Penal Code section 270 (failure to provide), a misdemeanor.

On October 1, 1975, appellant entered a plea of guilty and was placed on probation for three years on the condition that he violate no law and pay child support as ordered.

On August 20, 1976, appellant was found to be in violation of probation and was ordered to serve 90 days in jail. Execution was stayed until October 21, 1976.

Appellant is a party to a dissolution proceeding in the superior court and has existing orders in that court for the support of his minor children.

On October 20, 1976, appellant filed the petition for a writ of prohibition/mandate that is the subject of this appeal.

The appellant makes the following contentions, which will be considered seriatum:

1. Superior court jurisdiction of matters dealing with child support precludes municipal court jurisdiction over such matters.

2. Prosecution of appellant under Penal Code section 270 denies him equal protection of the law in violation of the federal and state Constitutions.

3. Imprisonment for violation of section 270 constitutes imprisonment for a debt in violation of California Constitution, article I, section 10.

4. The title of Penal Code section 270 is so vague and uncertain that it violates California Constitution, article IV, section 9.

5. The failure to charge the mother (the custodial parent) at the same time as the father (the non-custodial parent), appellant herein, subjects appellant to invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and of article I, sections 11 and 21 of the California Constitution. (Now art. IV, § 16, subd. (a) and art. I, § 7, subd. (b) of the Cal.Const.)

6. The language of the complaint renders the prosecution of appellant unconstitutional.

Jurisdiction

Article VI, section 10, of the California Constitution prescribes the original jurisdiction of superior courts. After providing for original jurisdiction for extraordinary writs, the section provides as follows: "Superior courts have original jurisdiction in all causes except those given by statute to other trial courts."

Article VI, section 5, of the state Constitution provides in part: "The Legislature shall provide for the organization and prescribe the jurisdiction of municipal and justice courts."

Appellant concedes that the effect of these constitutional provisions is to grant to the Legislature the authority to determine generally the jurisdiction of the trial courts within the state.

The Legislature has provided, in Penal Code section 1462, as follows: "Each municipal and justice court shall have jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor, where the offense charged was committed within the county in which such municipal or justice court is established except those of which the juvenile court is given jurisdiction and those of which other courts are given exclusive jurisdiction. . . ." (Pen.Code, § 1462, emphasis added.)

Appellant is charged with a misdemeanor, and the case would therefore presumably fall within the purview of the municipal court. Nevertheless appellant contends that by virtue of various statutes and rules (particularly Civ.Code, §§ 245, 247, 4351, 4700, 4702, 4703; Cal.Rules of Court, rule 1217) the Legislature has conferred exclusive jurisdiction over matters of dissolution, child custody, child support, guardianship and juvenile matters on the superior court and did not intend the municipal court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over misdemeanor failure to provide cases under Penal Code section 270. In support of this contention appellant refers us to the exception provided in Penal Code section 1462 where jurisdiction is given to other courts.

Appellant misreads section 1462. Clearly the exception refers to " criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor" of which the juvenile court is given jurisdiction and "criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor" of which other courts are given exclusive jurisdiction.

While it is true that the Legislature has confirmed jurisdiction in the superior court over various civil cases concerning the status of marriage, child custody, and child support, and that such civil cases may involve some factual matters similar to those involved in a failure to provide prosecution, the Legislature has not invested the superior court with jurisdiction over misdemeanor criminal cases involving such matters and thus there is no occasion to invoke the Penal Code section 1462 exception. Moreover, there is nothing in the statutes relied on by appellant that is inconsistent with the Legislature's action in prescribing penal sanctions for wilful violation of a parent's duty to support minor children. The People of the State of California have a legitimate interest in enforcing this duty apart from any interest they have in providing civil remedies for the protection of rights deriving from the relationship of parent and child.

In support of his contention that the jurisdiction of the superior court over the above-mentioned matters precludes the municipal court from exercising jurisdiction over a misdemeanor failure to provide prosecution, appellant relies on Kresteller v. Superior Court (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 545, 56 Cal.Rptr. 771. In that case a superior court had granted a divorce and awarded custody of a minor child to the mother. The mother then commenced an action for child support in a superior court of a different county. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of prohibition restraining the second court from hearing the action. The Kresteller decision is inapposite; it dealt with the priority of jurisdiction between two courts, each of which had concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter. In the instant case there is no concurrent jurisdiction; the question is which court has jurisdiction. (See 1 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Jurisdiction, §§ 304-307, pp. 846-851.)

The Legislature has quite clearly conferred upon the municipal court jurisdiction over "criminal cases amounting to misdemeanor" within the ambit of Penal Code section 270.

Finally, appellant contends that the Swann-Gilbert doctrine (People v. Swann (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 447, 28 Cal.Rptr. 830; People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580) precludes municipal court prosecution, in that California Code of Civil Procedure section 1209.5 is a special statute that precludes conviction under Penal Code section 270. ¹

The Swann-Gilbert rule is well articulated in People v. Ruster (1976) 16 Cal.3d 690 at page 694, 129 Cal.Rptr. 153 at page 155, 548 P.2d 353 at page 355 where the court stated, "Prosecution under a general statute is precluded by a special statute when the general statute covers the same matter as, and thus conflicts with, the special statute. (Citations.) However, a special statute does not supplant a general statute unless all of the elements of the general statute are included in the special statute. (Citations.)"

Appellant would have us compare apples and oranges.

Here, the general statute does not even cover the same matter as, and does not conflict with, the special statute, so there is no occasion to analyze the coincidence of the elements of the two statutes. (It is apparent, however, that the elements are dissimilar. For a description of the elements of Penal Code section 270, see CALJIC (Misdemeanor) No. 16.150 (1st ed. 1971) p. 46, and for Code of Civil Procedure section 1209.5, see 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Enforcement of Judgment, § 160, p. 3522.) Section 270 of the Penal Code defines a crime, i. e., wilful failure of a parent to provide for his minor children. Section 1209.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the other hand, defines no crime at all. The section merely specifies the facts that, if proven, shall constitute prima facie evidence of contempt of a child support order, thus shifting the burden of producing evidence upon the contemnor. (See Oliver v. Superior Court (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 237, 241-242, 17 Cal.Rptr. 474; see generally, Martin v. Superior Court (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 412, 95 Cal.Rptr. 110; 5 Witkin, Cal Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Enforcement of Judgment, §§ 157-165, pp. 3519-3528.)

Furthermore, an examination of the statutes reveals that the Legislature intended that there be no exception to Penal Code section 270 such as that suggested by appellant. Whether a special statute supplants a general statute is primarily a question of legislative intent. (People v. Ruster, supra, 16 Cal.3d 690, 694-696, 129 Cal.Rptr. 153, 548 P.2d 353; People v. Gilbert, supra, 1 Cal.3d 475, 479-480, 82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580; Warne v. Harkness (1963) 60 Cal.2d 579, 588, 35 Cal.Rptr. 601, 387 P.2d 377.) The controlling principles are set forth in In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, at page 654, 276 P.2d 593, at page 594 as follows: " 'It is...