Lyons v. Teamsters Local Union No. 961, 93CA1915

• Decision Date: 10 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93CA1915,93CA1915
• Parties: 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2687 Annette Y. LYONS, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 961, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Derl FORBIS, Third-Party Defendant and Counterclaimant-Appellee. . IV
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 1214

903 P.2d 1214

150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2687

Annette Y. LYONS, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 961, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Derl FORBIS, Third-Party Defendant and Counterclaimant-Appellee.

No. 93CA1915.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. IV.

Aug. 10, 1995.

Andrew T. Brake, P.C., Andrew T. Brake, Lee T. Judd, Denver, for plaintiff-appellee and cross-appellant.

Berenbaum, Weinshienk & Eason, P.C., Martin D. Buckley, Stephen K. Schutte, Denver, Steven M. Segall, Lakewood, for defendant and third-party plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee.

William E. Myrick & Associates, William E. Myrick, David Hollar, Denver, for third-party defendant and counterclaimant-appellee.

Opinion by Judge KAPELKE.

In this wrongful discharge action, defendant, Teamsters Local Union No. 961 (Union), appeals from the judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding damages to plaintiff, Annette Y. Lyons. The Union contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss Lyons' claims because they were preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act (the LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 141, et seq. (1978). The Union also appeals from the judgment entered against it and in favor of third-party defendant and counterclaimant, Derl Forbis. In a cross-appeal, Lyons challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to amend the complaint and the denial of her request for an award of attorney fees. We affirm.

In her complaint, Lyons alleged that the Union hired her in 1989 as a secretary and bookkeeper. Upon her hiring, Lyons was not included within any bargaining unit or collective bargaining agreement that the Union had entered into with various employers on behalf of its membership. However, Lyons alleged that the Union, through Forbis its president, promised that her employment would be subject to the same terms and conditions as were contained in collective bargaining agreements the Union had negotiated, including the National Master Freight Agreement and the Western States Area Supplemental Agreement. With respect to employment termination, the collective bargaining agreements themselves contained a progressive disciplinary scheme, a just cause requirement, and a protest and grievance procedure.

In December 1990, the members of the Union elected a new president to succeed Forbis, and in January 1991, Forbis retired. The new president became Lyons' supervisor.

In May 1991, the Union terminated Lyons. Her termination letter stated that she had been discharged "for reasons including, but not limited to, insubordination, willful neglect and damage to the [Union's] property and interest, [and] careless and shoddy work." After filing a protest and grievance pursuant to the procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreements, Lyons filed her complaint alleging that the Union had terminated her without just cause and that the Union had violated various discharge provisions as contained in the collective bargaining agreements.

In its answer, the Union maintained that Lyons was not covered by the collective bargaining agreements and that she was not a party to any other employment contract with the Union. The Union thus claimed that Lyons was an "at-will" employee who could be discharged without notice or cause. Alternatively, the Union contended that, even if the terms of the collective bargaining agreements applied to Lyons, there was sufficient cause for her termination.

The Union filed a third-party complaint against Forbis, alleging that he breached his fiduciary duty to the Union by promising Lyons that the terms of the collective bargaining agreements would govern her employment with the Union and by binding the Union to a contract with Lyons that extended beyond Forbis' term of office. Forbis filed a counterclaim for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Lyons on her breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims against the Union. In addition, the jury found against the Union on its claims against Forbis and in favor of Forbis on his counterclaim against the Union.

The trial court thereafter granted Forbis' application for costs, interest, and attorney fees pursuant to § 13-17-102, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A). The court denied Lyons' request for an award of attorney fees.

I.

The Union first contends that the trial court erred in denying the Union's motion to dismiss Lyons' claims for wrongful discharge and promissory estoppel. More specifically, the Union contends that Lyons' claims are preempted by the LMRA and that the trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We disagree.

Section 301 of the LMRA provides, in pertinent part:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties....

29 U.S.C. § 185 (1978). As interpreted by the courts, this provision does not preempt state court jurisdiction. Rather, state courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over actions involving the construction or enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Alexander v. Standard Oil Co., 53 Ill.App.3d 690, 11 Ill.Dec. 402, 368 N.E.2d 1010 (1977).

Section 301 was intended to authorize federal courts to develop a body of substantive federal law to address disputes arising out of union labor contracts and to ensure national uniformity in this area. Ferris v. Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Union, Local 26, 867 P.2d 38 (Colo.App.1993). Thus, while state courts may exercise jurisdiction over federal claims brought under the LMRA, § 301 preempts state law claims arising out of union labor contracts. Teamsters Local No. 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1963).

While the interest in uniformity is a basis for determining whether a state law claim is preempted, "not every claim which tangentially involves an agreement is preempted." Ferris v. Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Union, Local 26, supra, 867 P.2d at 43. The preemption issue must be determined on a case by case analysis of whether resolution of the claim depends on the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Lingle v. Norge Division, Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985).

In order to invoke jurisdiction under § 301, a litigant must allege a breach of a contract between an employer and a labor organization or of a contract between labor organizations in an industry affecting commerce. See Painting & Decorating Contractors Association of Sacramento, Inc. v. Painters & Decorators Joint Committee of the East Bay Counties, Inc., 707 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir.1983). Section 301 does not apply to a breach of contract action based on a purely private agreement between an employer and an individual employee which does not actually involve enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement. Alexander v. Standard Oil Co., supra.

Here, Lyons does not allege a breach of a contract between an employer and a union or of a contract between unions. Rather, she contends that the Union breached its private employment contract with her and that certain of the terms of that contract were derived from the form of collective bargaining agreements between the Union and certain signatory employers. Thus, she contends, the contract between the Union and Lyons is not a collective bargaining agreement as such, but rather a private employment contract between the Union and one of its employees. She urges that the terms contained in the collective bargaining agreements served as the equivalent of an employee manual.

In Cunningham v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1222, 149 Cal.App.3d 296, 196 Cal.Rptr. 769 (1983), a factual situation almost identical to the one here culminated in an action by the discharged employee, who alleged that the union had breached the oral or implied contract governing the conditions of her employment. A jury found in favor of the employee, and the union appealed, contending that her claims were preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.

In rejecting the union's arguments, the California Court of Appeal concluded:

We do not agree this action is for a breach of a collective bargaining agreement. The dispute is between a union and one of its employees for breach of an implied or oral employment contract. The union and [the outside employers] negotiated a collective bargaining agreement setting forth such conditions of employment as wages, hours, vacations and pensions. Cunningham was not a party to the contract, although its benefits inured to her by virtue of oral promises and written policies of the local's executive officers. Although Cunningham seeks to enforce such terms and conditions with regard to termination similar to those in a collective bargaining agreement, the damages do not arise out of enforcement of that agreement but emerge from her ... contract with the local union as an office employee....

This case involves interests unique to Cunningham and adjudication of these interests does not affect federal labor policies or cause conflict in remedies such that the doctrine of preemption come into play.

Cunningham v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1222, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at 304, 196 Cal.Rptr. at 774.

Thus, the California court held that the case fell "within those categories of cases where the possibility of conflict with federal policy is too contingent or too remote to exclude the state from adjudicating the dispute." Cunningham v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1222, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at 302, 196 Cal.Rptr. at 772.

Here, an identical analysis applies and leads us to the same conclusion that the Cunningham court reached. Accord Alexander v. Standard Oil...