Lyons v. U.S. Marshals

• Citation: 840 F.2d 202
• Decision Date: 29 February 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-5421,87-5421
• Parties: LYONS, James, Appellant, v. U.S. MARSHALS; Carlson, Norman, Director; Unknown Defendants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

Page 202

840 F.2d 202

LYONS, James, Appellant, v. U.S. MARSHALS; Carlson, Norman, Director; Unknown Defendants.

No. 87-5421.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Oct. 6, 1987.

Decided Feb. 29, 1988.

George E. Schumacher, Federal Public Defender, James V. Wade (argued), First Asst. Federal Public Defender, Harrisburg, Pa., for appellant.

James J. West, U.S. Atty., Timothy B. Haney (argued), Asst. U.S. Atty., Harrisburg, Pa., for appellees.

Before WEIS and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, and COHILL, District Judge ^*.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant James Lyons instituted this suit while he was a pretrial detainee at the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (Lewisburg). The suit, brought under the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), seeks damages and injunctive relief for the transfer of Lyons to Lewisburg from a New Hampshire prison, as well as for the conditions faced by Lyons as a pretrial detainee at Lewisburg. The district court granted the defendants' summary judgment motion on the ground that Lyons had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1982). Because we find that there are triable issues of fact concerning whether Lyons was excused from satisfying the exhaustion requirement, we will reverse.

I.

On April 2, 1986, Lyons was arrested in Massachusetts on federal drugs and firearms charges. Lyons was then taken to Rhode Island for arraignment, and on May 2, 1986, was indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Because of overcrowding in the Rhode Island detention facility, Lyons was transferred to Concord State Prison in New Hampshire as a federal pretrial detainee on July 1, 1986. While imprisoned there, Lyons instituted a civil suit protesting the conditions for pretrial detainees.

On August 25, 1986, Lyons was transferred to the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Lyons alleges that this transfer occurred in retaliation for his filing the lawsuit in New Hampshire and for his publicizing the conditions for pretrial detainees in the local newspapers. Lyons remained at Lewisburg for over two months, until November 4, 1986, at which time he was transferred to a Massachusetts facility. Lyons subsequently returned to Lewisburg from November 10 until November 14. Since November 14, 1986, Lyons has not returned to Lewisburg.

Like all other pretrial detainees at Lewisburg, Lyons was classified as an "unsentenced holdover," segregated from the general population of prisoners, and placed in the Special Housing Unit on Administrative Detention status. Lewisburg segregates pretrial detainees from the general prison population for the detainees' own protection, as well as for the security of the institution. The detainees are placed in an administrative detention unit because Lewisburg does not have other segregated facilities designed to house pretrial detainees.

Lyons contends that conditions for pretrial detainees in Lewisburg's Special Housing Unit were unconstitutionally harsh, and in particular, worse than those for sentenced inmates. According to Lyons, he was typically locked in his cell 23 to 24 hours per day. He got a maximum of three showers and five hours of recreation per week. In addition, Lyons claims he was not allowed to make a telephone call until almost a month after he arrived at Lewisburg, and thereafter was allowed only one other call, which was not successful. Other alleged conditions include insufficient clothes and linens; inadequate law library materials and restricted use of the main prison library; interference with mail and legal materials; restricted allotment of stamps, paper, pens, and envelopes, combined with a prohibition on commissary purchases; inadequate food served in the cell rather than in the prison dining rooms; and inadequate lighting, air, quiet, and space in the cells.

On September 5, 1986, while at Lewisburg, Lyons filed this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages for his allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement and for his allegedly retaliatory transfer to Lewisburg. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that Lyons had not exhausted his administrative remedies. This timely appeal followed. ¹

II.

We exercise plenary review over grants of summary judgment motions to determine whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the party opposing the motion. Equimark Commercial Fin. Co. v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs. Corp., 812 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir.1987). We must view all facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Betz Laboratories, Inc. v. Hines, 647 F.2d 402, 404 (3d Cir.1981).

Federal prisoners ordinarily must exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking injunctive relief from conditions of confinement. Waddell v. Alldredge, 480 F.2d 1078, 1079 (3d Cir.1973). If a federal prisoner seeks only money damages under Bivens for violation of his constitutional rights, exhaustion is not required. Muhammad v. Carlson, 739 F.2d 122 (3d Cir.1984). If, however, a prisoner's suit seeks both injunctive relief and damages, the exhaustion requirement ordinarily must still be met. Veteto v. Miller, 794 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir.1986).

This court has identified several policies underlying the exhaustion requirement:

First, adherence to the doctrine shows appropriate deference to Congress' decision, embodied in statute, that an independent administrative tribunal, and not the courts, should serve as the initial forum for dispute resolution....

Second, the exhaustion doctrine illustrates respect for administrative autonomy by forbidding unnecessary judicial interruption of the administrative process. This autonomy allows the administrative tribunal to exercise its own discretion, apply its own special expertise, and correct its own errors, thereby promoting administrative responsibility and efficiency and minimizing the frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes which could weaken the tribunal's effectiveness.

* * * Third, the exhaustion requirement fosters judicial economy both by permitting the administrative tribunal to vindicate a complaining party's rights in the course of its proceedings, thereby obviating judicial intervention, and by encouraging the tribunal to make findings of fact on which courts can later rely in their decisionmaking.

Republic Indus., Inc. v. Central Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290, 293 (3d Cir.1982) (citations and footnote omitted).

Consistent with these policies, this court has stated that the exhaustion doctrine is not supposed to preclude judicial relief, but merely postpone the timing of the judicial determination. Muhammad, 739 F.2d at 124. Moreover, we have noted several exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. Exhaustion is not required if administrative remedies would be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if the administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable injury. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1138 (3d Cir.1979).

In this case, the administrative remedy identified by the defendants as not being exhausted is described in 28 C.F.R. Secs. 542.10-542.16 (1987). First, "[i]nmates shall informally present their complaints to staff, and staff shall attempt to informally resolve any issue before an inmate files a request for Administrative Remedy." Id. Sec. 542.13(a). Second, "[i]f an inmate is unable to informally resolve his complaint, he may file a formal written complaint, on the appropriate form, within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date on which the basis of the complaint occurred." Id. Sec. 542.13(b). The Warden has fifteen days to respond. See id. Sec. 542.14. Finally,

[i]f an inmate is not satisfied with the Warden's response, that response may be appealed on the appropriate form to the Regional Director within twenty (20) calendar days of the date of the Warden's response. If the inmate is not satisfied with the Regional Director's response, that response may be appealed on the appropriate form to the General Counsel within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the Regional Director's response.

Id. Sec. 542.15. The Regional Director and the General Counsel each have thirty days to respond. See id. Sec. 542.14.

The defendants introduced the affidavit of Warren Kann, a case manager at Lewisburg, which represents that this administrative remedy is generally available to pretrial inmates. According to Kann, pretrial inmates

may file an administrative remedy appeal if they wish to complain about the conditions of their confinement. Specifically, they may obtain these forms from any unit team staff member who tours the Special Housing Unit. Upon receipt of these forms, the inmate may write his complaint on these forms, and, submit these forms to the Administrative Remedy Clerk via institutional mail or, by giving the same to a staff member for delivery to that clerk.

App. at 382-83. Kann also states in his affidavit that "although I have no specific recollection of [Lyons] ever requesting administrative remedy appeal forms from me, I would have provide[d] them to him, had he requested them." App. at 383.

Lyons admits in his complaint that he has not exhausted this remedy. App. at 10. Nevertheless, he claims that he has presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to...