Lytle v. Airborne Aviation, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | CAAP-18-0000933 |
| Parties | ANASTASIA LYTLE, Plaintiff-Appellant v. AIRBORNE AVIATION, INC.; AIRBORNE AVIATION, LLC; and CHRISTOPHER KIM, Defendants-Appellees, and ALAN CARPENTER and SUSAN COURTNEY CARPENTER, Plaintiffs, and JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; and DOE ENTITIES 1-10,Defendants |
| Court | Hawaii Court of Appeals |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT (CIVIL NO 15-1-0131 JKW).
On the briefs:
Mark K. Haugen for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Calvin E. Young, David J. Hoftiezer, and Deirdre Marie-Iha (Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel) for Defendants-Appellees.
This appeal arises out of a dispute involving a helicopter accident. The State of Hawai'i (State) engages in regular clean-up operations in the Napali Coast State Wilderness Park on Kaua'i. The remote location requires helicopters to pick up and remove trash bundles via sling lines attached to the helicopter. The State periodically hires private helicopter companies for this purpose. During one of these operations, Plaintiff-Appellant Anastasia Lytle (Lytle) was a passenger in a helicopter operated by Defendants-Appellees Airborne Aviation, Inc., and Airborne Aviation, LLC, and piloted by Defendant-Appellee Christopher Kim (Kim) (collectively, Airborne). That day, just after Kim landed the helicopter in a designated landing zone, a loose tarp, apparently from a trash bundle was sucked into the helicopter's rotor blades, causing one of the blades to sheer off. This caused violent shaking, which allegedly caused Lytle to suffer severe injuries.
Lytle appeals from the March 13, 2019 Final Judgment (Judgment), entered in favor of Airborne and against Lytle by the Circuit Court of the Fifth Circuit (Circuit Court).[1] Lytle also challenges the following orders entered on November 7, 2018 by the Circuit Court: (1) the "Order Striking the Supplemental Affidavit of Scott Cloud Dated September 21, 2018" (Order Striking the Third Cloud Affidavit); and (2) the "Order Granting [Airborne's] Second Motion for Summary Judgment Filed August 30, 2018" (Order Granting Airborne's Second MSJ).[2]
On appeal, Lytle contends that the Circuit Court erred: (1) in striking the supplemental affidavit of her expert Scott Cloud (Cloud), filed on September 24, 2018 (Third Cloud Affidavit); and (2) in granting Airborne's Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Airborne's Second MSJ), filed on August 30, 2018, where "[d]isputed issues of fact exist as to [Lytle's] negligence claims . . . ."
After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve Lytle's contentions as follows and affirm.
(1) Lytle filed the Third Cloud Affidavit as part of her September 24, 2018 opposition to Airborne's Second MSJ. In response, Airborne argued that the Third Cloud Affidavit was new and should be disregarded pursuant to the Circuit Court's February 9, 2018 Amended Order Setting Trial Date (Trial-Setting Order)[3] Specifically, Airborne maintained that Lytle did not produce the Third Cloud Affidavit or a written report including Cloud's new opinions prior to filing her opposition on September 24, 2018, over four months after the deadline imposed in the Trial-Setting Order.
During the October 2, 2018 hearing on Airborne's Second MSJ, the Circuit Court questioned Lytle's counsel regarding Airborne's contention. Counsel responded that Cloud had provided two prior affidavits, as well as his deposition testimony, to Airborne. On November 7, 2018, the Circuit Court entered the Order Striking the Third Cloud Affidavit concurrently with the Order Granting Airborne's Second MSJ.
On appeal, Lytle contends that the Circuit Court erred in striking the Third Cloud Affidavit where: (a) it was timely filed pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c); (b) "the majority of . . . Cloud's opinions" had been timely disclosed to Airborne in two affidavits filed as part of Lytle's October 10, 2017 opposition to Airborne's first motion for summary judgment (Airborne's First MSJ); and (c) Cloud had testified to "the substance of all of his opinions" set forth in the Third Cloud Affidavit at his August 17, 2018 deposition.
We review the Circuit Court's decision to strike the Third Cloud Affidavit for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Nozawa v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3, 142 Hawai'i 331, 342, 418 P.3d 1187, 1198 (2018) (ruling that the circuit court abused its discretion in striking a declaration that allegedly exceeded the scope of, but was deemed on appeal to comply with, a supplemental briefing order). In this regard, we note that "trial courts have broad powers to control the litigation process before them, including the presentation of evidence." Weinberg v. Dickson-Weinberg, 123 Hawai'i 68, 75, 229 P.3d 1133, 1140
(2010) (citing Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.), 76 Hawai'i 494, 507, 880 P.2d 169, 182 (1994), superseded by rule on other grounds, as recognized in DL v. CL, 146 Hawai'i 415, 422, 463 P.3d 1072, 1079 (2020)). "The courts also have inherent power to curb abuses and promote a fair process which extends to the preclusion of evidence . . . ." Id. at 75, 229 P.3d 1133, 1140 (quoting Richardson, 76 Hawai'i at 507, 880 P.2d at 182). For example, it was well within the circuit court's discretion to strike the testimony of a party's witnesses for its failure to comply with the court's deadline for disclosing witnesses. Chen v. Mah, No. CAAP-16-0000712, 2019 WL 1198546, at *3 (Haw. App. Mar. 14, 2019), aff'd, 146 Hawai'i 157, 170, 457 P.3d 796, 809 (2020); see also Glover v. Grace Pac. Corp., 86 Hawai'i 154, 156, 164, 948 P.2d 575, 577, 585 (App. 1997) ().
Here, Lytle does not dispute that she failed to produce a written expert report by Cloud, as required by the Circuit Court's Trial-Setting Order. In addition, Lytle implicitly acknowledges that at least some of the opinions expressed in the Third Cloud Affidavit were not previously set forth in Cloud's prior two affidavits. We further note that the Circuit Court did not strike Cloud's prior two affidavits or his deposition testimony, which remained part of the record. In these circumstances, the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in striking the Third Cloud Affidavit.
(2) Lytle contends that the Circuit Court erred in granting Airborne's Second MSJ, where there were "disputed issues of fact" regarding Lytle's "negligence claims" against Airborne. Lytle argues that the Third Cloud Declaration establishes these "disputed issues of fact" and, even if that declaration is disregarded, "[s]ubstantial evidence of disputed issues of fact" is contained in Cloud's deposition transcript, which was attached in whole to the opposition to Airborne's Second MSJ, and Cloud's two prior affidavits, which were attached to the opposition to Airborne's First MSJ.
We review a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment de novo using the same standard applied by the trial court. Nozawa, 142 Hawai'i at 338, 418 P.3d at 1194 (citing Adams v. CDM Media USA, Inc., 135 Hawai'i 1, 12, 346 P.3d 70, 81 (2015)). "Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 342, 418 P.3d at 1198 (brackets omitted) (quoting Adams, 135 Hawai'i at 12, 346 P.3d at 81). "A fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties." Id. (quoting Adams, 135 Hawai'i at 12, 346 P.3d at 81). The evidence and the inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Yoneda v. Tom, 110 Hawai'i 367, 384, 133 P.3d 796, 813 (2006).
The moving party has the burden to establish that summary judgment is proper. Nozawa, 142 Hawai'i at 342, 418 P.3d at 1198 (citing French v. Haw. Pizza Hut, Inc., 105 Hawai'i 462, 470, 99 P.3d 1046, 1054 (2004)). "Once a summary judgment movant has satisfied its initial burden of producing support for its claim that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment must 'demonstrate specific facts, as opposed to general allegations, that present a genuine issue worthy of trial.'" Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Lales v. Wholesale Motors Co., 133 Hawai'i 332, 359, 328 P.3d 341, 368 (2014)). Thus, "a party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot discharge his or her burden by alleging conclusions, 'nor is he or she entitled to a trial on the basis of a hope that he or she can produce some evidence at that time.'" Adams v. Haw. Med. Serv. Ass'n, 145 Hawai'i 250, 256, 450 P.3d 780, 786 (2019) (brackets omitted) (quoting Henderson v. Prof'l Coatings Corp., 72 Haw. 387, 401, 819 P.2d 84, 92 (1991)).
There are four primary elements to a negligence claim: (1) "A duty or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks" (2) "A failure on the defendant's part to conform to the standard required: a breach of duty"; (3) ...
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