Lytle v. Halff

• Decision Date: 15 November 1889
• Parties: LYTLE <I>et al.</I> <I>v.</I> HALFF <I>et al.</I>
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

12 S.W. 610

LYTLE et al.

v. HALFF et al.

Supreme Court of Texas.

November 15, 1889.

Appeal from district court, Bexar county; W. W. KING, Judge.

Barnard & Green and Geo. C. Altgelt, for appellants. Simpson & James, J. A. & H. O. Green, and J. H. McLeavy, for appellees.

STAYTON, C. J.

The legislature at its last session passed an act whereby the county of Bexar was divided into two parts, by a line running through the court-house, and that part of the county on the north and west of that line was declared to constitute a new judicial district, to be known as the "Forty-Fifth District," while all that part of the county south and east of that line was declared to constitute the "Thirty-Seventh Judicial District." Bexar county before the act composed the thirty-seventh judicial district, and the judge and district attorney in office in that district were continued in office in the new district bearing the same number, but provision was made for the appointment of a judge for the forty-fifth district, his successor to be elected by the electors resident in that part of the county which was declared to constitute the new district. The act provided that the courts in both districts should have concurrent jurisdiction throughout the limits of Bexar county of all matters, civil and criminal, to the extent this is conferred on district courts by the constitution, and that grand and petit juries should be selected and drawn from the body of the county, providing, however, that no grand jury should be organized in the forty-fifth district. The judge of the thirty-seventh district, however, is required at each term of his court to organize a grand jury, empowered to inquire into all offenses committed within the entire county, whose indictments, together with all appeals in criminal cases from inferior courts in the county, are made returnable to the district court for the thirty-seventh judicial district. Civil actions brought in the county or appealed to the district court from inferior tribunals, in any part of the county, may be filed in either court, at the option of the plaintiff or appellant. The act authorizes the judge of either district, at his discretion, to transfer any cause, civil or criminal, which may be pending in his court, to the other court, and upon the taking effect of the act the clerk of the district court for Bexar county is directed to enter on the docket of the court for the thirty-seventh district all causes then pending in that court, or to be filed therein subsequently, under the provisions of the act, and to place on the docket of the court for the forty-fifth judicial district all causes that may be transferred to that court by the judge for the thirty-seventh district, or filed in that court under the provisions of the act. The act further declared all laws and parts of laws in conflict with it repealed. Gen. Laws 1889, p. 165.

In accordance with the act, a judge was appointed for the forty-fifth judicial district, and, the act having become operative, appellee brought an action in the district court of that district against appellants on a promissory note for more than $500. Citations were duly issued and served on appellants, who failed to answer, and a judgment by default was entered against them. Before the adjournment of the court, appellants filed a motion to set aside the judgment and dismiss the cause, upon the ground that the act creating the district was unconstitutional, but the motion was overruled, and from the judgment this appeal is prosecuted. It is agreed by the parties that there is no question involved other than the validity of the act before referred to, and that if the act be held constitutional the judgment shall be affirmed, but if it be held otherwise the judgment shall be reversed and the cause dismissed.

It is contended on the one side, while there is no provision in the constitution which expressly prohibits the creation of two judicial districts in one county, an implied prohibition arises from the various provisions of that instrument, and that some parts of the act are in violation of article 3, § 56, of the constitution, which forbids the passage of local or special laws therein enumerated. On the other hand, it is claimed that none of the provisions of the act are in conflict with the section of the constitution referred to, or with any other, and that so much of the act as creates two judicial districts in one county is not so repugnant to any express provision of the constitution as to justify a holding that such legislation is impliedly forbidden. There is no pretense that the act in question in any way conflicts with any superior law other than the constitution of this state, and if it be not forbidden by that it must be sustained. It has frequently been said that an act of a state legislature must be held valid unless some superior law, in express terms or by necessary implication, forbade its passage. A prohibition of the exercise of a power cannot be said to be necessarily implied unless, looking to the language and purpose of the constitution, it is evident that without such implication the will of the people, as illustrated by a careful consideration of all its provisions, cannot be given effect. The prohibition which it is claimed ought to be implied in this case is not one affecting any private or personal right, nor is it one that can arise because the power to do the act has been conferred on some department of the government other than the legislature, from which an implied prohibition to the legislature will arise. The implication sought to be raised relates to a mere matter of expediency, which there is a manifest propriety in leaving to the determination of the legislature from time to time, and which it is seldom the purpose of a constitution to determine. It affects neither a public nor a private right. An intention to restrict the power of a state legislature, and especially in reference to such a matter, further than this is done by express limitations, is not to be presumed; and, when it is claimed that this is done by implication, those so claiming ought to be able to point out the provision or provisions of the constitution which require such implication, to give effect to the will of the people evidenced by the entire instrument. That necessary implications exist, under the provisions of the constitution of this state, we do not question; and one of them is found in article 5, which establishes certain courts and fixes their several jurisdictions. In absence of an express prohibition, the legislature would have no power to declare that the several courts thus created should not exercise the powers conferred on them, or to create other courts, and transfer those powers to them, except as the constitution may provide for such change of jurisdiction. Here there is an implied limitation placed on the legislature, resulting from the fact that the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, have declared that certain courts, with defined powers, shall exist, and constitute one of the three departments of the government, which the people never could have intended might be destroyed in whole or in part by another department, or all the other departments. The declaration is that the executive, legislative, and judicial departments shall exist, — this is the fiat of the people, — and neither one nor all of the departments so created can enlarge, restrict, or destroy the powers of any one of these, except as the power to do so may be expressly given by the constitution.

It is contended that article 5, §§ 1, 7-9, of the constitution, impliedly prohibit the creation of two judicial districts in one county. Article 5, § 1, of the constitution, provides: "The judicial power of this state shall be vested in one supreme court, in a court of appeals, in district courts, in county courts, in commissioners' courts, in courts of justices of the peace, and in such other courts as may be established by law." So much of this section has no bearing on the question before us, for it does not attempt to determine what territory may be made a judicial district; but simply, among other things, provides for district courts as a part of the judiciary department, on which, by succeeding sections, a given jurisdiction is conferred. It may be said that all the courts named in this section are created by it. It is true that this section of the constitution expressly recognizes the power of the legislature to establish "criminal district courts," which illustrates the fact that the people desired that such courts should be established as would meet the demand resulting from growth of population and other causes; but it is most likely true that this recognition of power was made in order to prevent any doubt as to the power of the legislature to confer on them, if created, a jurisdiction by the constitution itself conferred on the district and inferior courts; and, further, in connection with the recognition of the power, to declare its limitations. In the one case, it is the establishment, creation, of a court, which, when brought into existence, will exercise a jurisdiction conferred by the constitution on other courts; while in the other, the power exercised is but that of fixing the territory within which an established court shall be held. The express grant or recognition of the one power ought not to be held impliedly to prohibit the exercise of the other, and especially so in view of the provisions of the constitution next to be considered.

Article 5, § 7, provides: "The state shall be divided into twenty-six judicial districts, which may be increased or diminished by the legislature." And section 14 of the same article provides that "the judicial districts in this state, and the time of holding the courts therein, are fixed by ordinance forming part of this...