M.B. v. Quarantillo

• Decision Date: 22 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 02-2328.,02-2328.
• Parties: M.B., Appellant, v. Andrea QUARANTILLO, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 109

301 F.3d 109

M.B., Appellant, v. Andrea QUARANTILLO, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Appellees.

No. 02-2328.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Audio Teleconference June 14, 2002.

Filed: August 22, 2002.

Blair G. Connelly (argued), Scott Louis Weber, John Ducoff, Latham & Watkins, Newark, New Jersey, for appellant, M.B.

Peter G. O'Malley (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Christopher J. Christie, United States Attorney, Newark, New Jersey, for appellees, Andrea Quarantillo and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and WEIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WEIS, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal we conclude that the Attorney General did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying an alien's request to have his dependency status determined by a state juvenile court. We also conclude that the federal courts have jurisdiction to review the ruling under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's order denying relief to the plaintiff alien.

Plaintiff is a young man, allegedly a national of Algeria¹ who arrived in Newark, New Jersey as a stowaway on a ship that had departed from La Spezia, Italy. The INS apprehended him on arrival, and he has been detained at the Elizabeth Detention Center in Elizabeth, New Jersey ever since. Plaintiff applied for asylum, but his request was denied by an immigration judge and that decision was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Plaintiff asserts that he lived with his parents in Algeria until they were both killed by a bomb when he was about ten years of age. He then lived with an aunt in Algeria until he was twelve years old, at which time she forced him to leave. He went to other countries, and then lived in Italy for three years where he worked as a farm laborer.

At the time of his initial detention, plaintiff carried documents from a proceeding before the Italian Labor & Immigration Department in which he gave his date of birth as June 25, 1982. However, he told the INS on his initial interview that he was born on July 25, 1984. Noting the conflict over the birth date, the INS had a dentist x-ray the plaintiff's teeth and wrist. Based on his reading of the x-rays, the dentist opined that plaintiff was more than 18 years of age.

After his unsuccessful attempt at asylum, plaintiff sought special immigration juvenile status under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). This provision applies to immigrants who have been declared dependent by a juvenile court that has deemed them eligible for long-term foster care because of abuse, neglect or abandonment.

Because plaintiff was in the custody of the INS, the Attorney General's consent was required before a juvenile court could obtain jurisdiction of the dependency claim. The district director of the INS, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, denied the consent request. In a letter dated July 31, 2001, the director pointed out that under New Jersey law for purposes of juvenile court jurisdiction, "child" meant a person under 18 years of age. Based on plaintiff's statement to Italian authorities that he was born in 1982, he would have been 19 years old at the time of his request. Moreover, the director noted, the INS had not been provided evidence that the plaintiffs' parents had been killed or that his aunt had abused him.

The director's letter concluded:

"Given the circumstances, it does not appear that you have provided the proper documentation needed for a favorable consideration to have [plaintiff's] jurisdiction transferred to a New Jersey juvenile court. Therefore, your request is denied.... [Y]our request was refused in accordance with regulations issued under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, as amended (INA), existing INS policy, and New Jersey State Law."

In response to a request for reconsideration, the district director wrote another letter dated October 5, 2001, repeating that as a stowaway the plaintiff was inadmissible for entry into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(D). The letter elaborated on Italian documents charging plaintiff with violating the immigration law of that country. In addition, the director cited 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(d), which requires documentary evidence confirming an applicant's age, and further noted that New Jersey law limited the juvenile court's authority to persons under the age of 18. Concluding that plaintiff had failed to submit any new evidence, the director again denied the request to grant juvenile court jurisdiction.

Plaintiff then filed this suit in the District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.² After extended oral argument, the District Court determined that the INS order was reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court further decided that the INS action was neither arbitrary nor capricious in view of plaintiff's failure to supply documentary evidence in support of his application. The Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the INS has no authority to determine whether an individual meets the jurisdictional age of juvenile court, but is limited by its regulations to determine only whether the person is under the age of twenty-one. In addition, he argues that the requirement of documentary evidence of age is contrary to the congressional intent underlying the special immigration provisions for juveniles. The INS contends that its decision is not subject to judicial review.³ We will discuss the jurisdictional issue first.

I.

Initially, we recognize that the Immigration and Naturalization Act restricts judicial review in certain circumstances, and we must determine whether those limitations apply here.

In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999), the Supreme Court reviewed 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), which denies judicial review of certain immigration matters. Section 1252(g) provides that no court shall have jurisdiction over cases "arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders...." Carefully parsing the text, the Court concluded that that provision applied only to three specific decisions or actions by the Attorney General: those "commencing proceedings," "adjudicating cases" or "executing removal orders." American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 936.

The Court also noted that the statute's other subsections insulate from review the Attorney General's exercise of discretion in a number of contexts. Id. at 486-87, 119 S.Ct. 936. This Court, for example, has held that we lack jurisdiction to review a deportation order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101a(a)(10), now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 310-11 (3d Cir.1996).

Having thoroughly reviewed the statute, we are not persuaded that it precludes jurisdiction in the case before us. Significantly, the INS does not invoke any specific provision of the INA as bearing on this Court's authority to review the Attorney General's actions here. That, however, does not end the jurisdictional inquiry. We must now examine the Administrative Procedure Act, which the plaintiff contends permits us to review the Attorney General's refusal of consent to juvenile court jurisdiction.

The Act provides in broad terms that a "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action ... is entitled to judicial review...." 5 U.S.C. § 702. That expansive language, however, is blunted by section 701(a)(2), which limits this review "to the extent that ... (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."

The Supreme Court has read the Administrative Procedure Act as embodying a basic presumption of judicial review. In Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 778, 105 S.Ct. 1620, 84 L.Ed.2d 674 (1985), the Court said, "[w]e have often noted that `only upon a showing of "clear and convincing evidence" of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.'" (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967)).

On the other hand, the Court significantly weakened the force of that pronouncement when it referred to its previous statement as "`just' a presumption." Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190, 113 S.Ct. 2024, 124 L.Ed.2d 101 (1993). The Court explained that review is not available "in those rare circumstances where the relevant statute" is so drafted "`that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.'" Id. at 191, 113 S.Ct. 2024 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)). In such a situation, the statute can be read "to have committed the decisionmaking to the agency's judgment absolutely." Id. (internal quotations omitted). That approach is rooted in the language of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), which explained that when there is "no law to apply," there can be no judicial review.⁴

There are circumstances, however infrequent, in which review is not available. See, e.g., Lincoln, 508 U.S. 182, 113 S.Ct. 2024, 124 L.Ed.2d 101 (review precluded where agency's discretion is involved in allocating appropriated funds); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) (CIA director's decision to terminate employee on national security grounds not reviewable); ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 107 S.Ct. 2360, 96 L.Ed.2d 222 (1987) (ICC's refusal to grant reconsideration of a prior ICC order not reviewable); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (FDA decision refusing to take various enforcement actions not subject to...