M.C.J. v. State

• Decision Date: 10 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. AP-2,AP-2
• Citation: 444 So.2d 1001
• Parties: M.C.J., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1001

444 So.2d 1001

M.C.J., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. AP-2.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Jan. 10, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1984.

Glenna Joyce Reeves, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Barbara Ann Butler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jacksonville, for appellee.

ERVIN, Chief Judge.

M.C.J., a child, appeals an adjudication of delinquency for vehicular homicide, ¹ and although we affirm as to all four points raised, we find that two of the issues merit discussion.

On the afternoon of March 20, 1982, M.C.J. was driving a 1973 Plymouth automobile westbound on Beaver Street in Jacksonville when a Fiat attempted to make a left turn from Devoe Street onto Beaver ahead of her and in the process pulled in front of her oncoming vehicle. To avoid hitting the Fiat, M.C.J. swerved to the left and collided head-on with a jeep convertible in the eastbound lane of Beaver Street, causing the deaths of its driver and his infant son. The Fiat was not involved in the collision.

Three witnesses testified at the delinquency hearing that just before the accident, they observed the moving Plymouth and opined that M.C.J. was exceeding Beaver Street's 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. At the scene, Officer Wright, a homicide investigator with the highway patrol, observed that the Plymouth left 32-foot scrub marks, not skid marks, which indicated to him that the vehicle's tires had slid, because they were turned to the left. In his opinion, the marks would indicate some braking action, but not enough to cause the wheels to lock. Moreover, the marks might be the result of a defective braking condition, such as worn pads. That M.C.J. was aware her automobile's brakes were defective was evinced by her telephone conversation with her husband, just following the accident, in the nearby home of witness Barbara Herrington, who testified that M.C.J. had asked her husband, accusingly, why he had not yet repaired the brakes. Indeed, M.C.J. herself confirmed her realization of the brakes' condition through her inculpatory statement to Officer Wright, several days following the accident.

A visual inspection of the interior of the vehicle by Officer Wright at the scene also revealed several cans of beer on the right front floorboard, some unopened and still cool, and others empty. Three hours following the accident, Officer Wright, while talking to M.C.J. at the hospital, smelled alcohol on her breath, although he said she did not then appear to be intoxicated. Further evidence relevant to the issue of M.C.J.'s reckless behavior disclosed that M.C.J. did not at any time, including that of the accident, possess a Florida driver's license.

The Plymouth sustained heavy damage to the left front and bumper, and, pursuant to routine procedure, Officer Wright had the car towed and locked up for a mechanical inspection and inventory, which occurred approximately five hours after the accident. The front wheels were removed at that time and the brakeliners and shoes obtained for inspection, although the rear brakeliners and shoes were not removed until two days later. A physical damage appraiser and mechanic testified that the front shoes were completely worn through, leaving metal on metal, and the rear shoes were extremely thin. The defense unsuccessfully moved to suppress the brakeliners and any results from tests performed on them on the grounds that such evidence was obtained without a warrant and was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion, finding that at the time the car was impounded, Officer Wright had probable cause to believe M.C.J. had committed vehicular homicide pursuant to section 782.071, Florida Statutes, and that the search and seizure without a warrant were reasonable. We agree.

M.C.J. first contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence relating to the brakeliners in that the state failed to establish that the warrantless search and seizure of the brakeliners were justified under any of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement. It is not disputed that the car was legally impounded. ² The validity of warrantless inventory searches of impounded motor vehicles has been upheld. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). The determinative issue concerns the scope of the search and seizure, and whether the warrantless search could reasonably extend to the brakeliners. ³ We find that the liberal approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in two recent cases, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) and Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 102 S.Ct. 3079, 73 L.Ed.2d 750 (1982), dealing with warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles, supports our decision to affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. These cases reaffirm the principle, first recognized in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), that a warrantless search of a vehicle, stopped on probable cause to believe it contained incriminating evidence, does not offend the unreasonable search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment. Officer Wright clearly had probable cause to believe M.C.J.'s automobile contained incriminating evidence. His belief was based not only upon his observations of both the scrub marks and the vehicle at the scene but also the statements of M.C.J. and the witnesses to the accident. The fact that the searching officer conducted a search of the impounded vehicle without a warrant is without consequence, as long as the evidence supports the determination that the officer was armed with probable cause. The exception to the warrant requirement is no broader or narrower than the scope of a search which a magistrate can direct by warrant issued upon probable cause. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 823-24, 102 S.Ct. 2171-2172, 72 L.Ed.2d 592-93. As a result, if probable cause exists to search a stopped vehicle, the warrantless search may be extended to every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the objects of the search. Id. 456 U.S. at 820-21, 102 S.Ct. at 2170-2171, 72 L.Ed.2d at 591. Moreover, it is now well recognized that the absence of exigent circumstances does...