M.D. v. Abbott
| Decision Date | 14 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11-CV-00084 |
| Parties | M.D.; bnf STUKENBERG, et al, Plaintiffs, v. GREG ABBOTT, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' first application for attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs for the time period through October 11, 2019. (D.E. 682; D.E. 683; D.E. 764; D.E. 765).
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The procedural history of this 9-year litigation is adequately described in this Court's December 17, 2015 Memorandum Opinion and Verdict, January 2018 Order, and November 2018 Order. (D.E. 368; D.E. 559; D.E. 606). Subsequent to the November 2018 Order, Defendants appealed to the Fifth Circuit. (D.E. 607). On July 8, 2019, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for implementation of the order. M.D. v. Abbott, No. 18-40057 (5th Cir. 2019). On October 11, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting an award for attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs. (D.E. 681-688). On October 31, 2019, Defendants filed a motion objecting to Plaintiffs' Bill of Costs, and on November 1, 2019 Defendants filed their response to Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. (D.E. 706; D.E. 709). On December 9, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their reply in support of their application for attorneys' fees and their response to Defendants' objections to the Bill of Costs. (D.E. 764; D.E. 769). On January 13, 2020, Defendants filed their sur-reply to Plaintiffs' responses. (D.E. 784; D.E. 785).
42 U.S.C. § 1988 governs fee awards for prevailing civil-rights plaintiffs in lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. McNamara v. Moody, 606 F.2d 621, 626 (5th Cir. 1979); 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The statute provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section [1983], . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. §1988(b); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 172 (5th Cir. 1978). The Fifth Circuit applies a two-step method in calculating the fee award for the prevailing party. Combs v. City of Huntington, Texas, 829 F.3d 388, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2016); Jackson v. Host Intern., Inc., 426 F. App'x 215, 225-26 (5th Cir. 2011). The court must first calculate a lodestar amount "equal to the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work." Rutherford v. Harris Cty., 197 F.3d 173, 192 (5th Cir. 1999); See, e.g., Neles-Jamesbury, Inc. v. Bill's Valves 974 F. Supp 979, 985-86 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Jimenez v. Wood Cty., 621 F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2010). The burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the number of hours expended and the hourly rates charged falls on the fee applicant. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). There is a "strong presumption" that the lodestar is the reasonable fee. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010). This however "may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee." Id.
After calculating the lodestar amount, a district court's next step is to consider whether to enhance or decrease the lodestar based on twelve Johnson factors. Combs, 829 F.3d 388 at 392. These factors are: (1) time and labor required; (2) novelty and complication of the issues; (3) skill required; (4) whether the attorney had to refuse other work to litigate the case; (5) attorney's customary fee; (6) whether fee is fixed or contingent;1 (7) whether the client or case circumstances imposed any time constraints; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained2; (9) attorney's experience, reputation, and ability; (10) whether the case was "undesirable;" (11) the nature and length of relationship with the clients; and (12) awards in similar cases. Rutherford, 829 F.3d at n.23; Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The burden of proving that an enhancement is necessary is placed upon the fee applicant. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992). The district court "must provide a reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination" and that the record indicates that the court utilized the Johnson framework for its analysis. Moench v. Marquette Transportation Company Gulf-Inland, L.L.C., 838 F.3d 586, 596 (2016); Union Asset Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 642 (5th Cir. 2012). However, "[m]any of these [Johnson] factors usually are subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate...and should not be double-counted." Jason D.W. by Douglas W. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1998). Enhancing the lodestar is a "rare" circumstance since there is a strong presumption that the lodestar amount is already the reasonable fee. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 at 548, 554.
As stated above, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 enables prevailing civil-rights plaintiffs to request fee awards. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. One is a prevailing party "for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Hensley, 461 U.S. 424 at 433. A plaintiff prevails "when actual relief on the merits of [plaintiff's] claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Lefemine v. Wideman, 568 U.S. 1, 4 (2012).
Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party since they secured the core relief sought in the case which includes a finding that the State of Texas violated the U.S. Constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs and an order requiring the State to remedy the violations. See (D.E. 606). The Fifth Circuit subsequently affirmed large and significant parts of the order and remanded for this Court to implement it. See M.D. v. Abbott, No. 18-40067, D.E. 00515024789, (5th Cir. July 8, 2019). Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to an award for reasonable fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Defendants, however, dispute the degree by which Plaintiffs prevailed in this case, arguing that Johnson Factor #8 ("The Amount Involved and the Results Obtained") requires an across-the-board 75% reduction to any attorneys' fee award given to Plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court has ruled that if a litigant brings multiple claims against the same defendant in a lawsuit and prevails only on some of the claims, work on the unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been expended in pursuit of the ultimate result. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. However, when claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories, much of the attorneys' time will be devoted to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours spent on a claim-by-claim basis. Id. There is no duty to segregatethe proposed fees when the original claims "are too intertwined to differentiate effectively." Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Flores, 2011 WL 2160928, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 27, 2011); See Snook v. Popiel (In re Snook), 168 F. App'x 577, 580 (5th Cir. 2006).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are indeed the prevailing party and have received the main and core remedy sought, which is in essence the systemic and ongoing reform of the Permanent Managing Conservatorship class foster care system, in such a timely, complex class-action civil-rights case such that Plaintiffs' claims are too intertwined to differentiate for attorneys' fees award consideration. As the Court stated in a telephone conference in August 2019, 3 (D.E. 640, p.4). Indeed, because this lawsuit, and all the numerous individual remedies that Plaintiffs sought, had an overarching goal of giving relief to the state's Permanent Managing Conservatorship class foster children, the Court concludes that this case involved a common core of facts and are based on related constitutional legal theories, making it difficult to divide the hours spent on a claim-by-claim basis. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Given this, no separation of fees per claim is necessary.
After determining the prevailing party, the Court must utilize the following two-step process in determining the fee award to be granted to the prevailing Plaintiffs: (1) it must first calculate the lodestar amount, and then (2) it must consider whether to enhance or decrease this amount considering the Johnson factors. Combs, 829 F.3d 388 at 391-392. In this analysis, theCourt need not be "meticulously detailed," and "[i]f the district court has articulated and clearly applied the [Johnson factors] ..., [the Fifth Circuit] will not require the trial court's findings to be so excruciatingly explicit in this area of minutiae that decisions of fee award consume more paper than did the cases from which they arose." Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 98 F.3d 817, 823 (5th Cir. 1996). As noted earlier, to calculate the lodestar amount, the Court must analyze whether the hours Plaintiffs' counsel expended and the rates they request are reasonable. See Hensley, 461 U.S. 424 at 433; Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, fn.8 ().
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