M.D. v. Perry
Decision Date | 01 July 2011 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. C–11–84. |
Citation | 799 F.Supp.2d 712 |
Parties | M.D.; BNF Stukenberg, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rick PERRY, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Amelia Jean Cardenas, Barry F. McNeil, Richard Thaddeus Behrens, Haynes Boone LLP, Dallas, TX, April L. Farris, Yetter Coleman LLP, Austin, TX, Christopher D. Porter, Paul R. Yetter, Yetter Warden and Coleman LLP, Dori Kornfeld Goldman, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, Hector Antonio Canales, Patricia Canales Bell, Canales Simonson PC, Tony J.A. Canales, Corpus Christi, TX, Jessica Polansky, Marcia Robinson Lowry, Olivia Sohmer, Patrick Almonrode, Stephen Dixon, Children's Rights, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.
James B. Eccles, James C. Todd, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendants.
On this day came on to be considered Defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss. (D.E. 43.) For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. (D.E. 43.)
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), as Plaintiffs bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.E. 1 at 9.)
Plaintiffs filed this civil rights action in this Court on March 29, 2011, naming as defendants Rick Perry (Governor of Texas), Thomas Suehs (Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission), and Anne Heiligenstein (Commissioner of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services). (D.E. 1.) The Court subsequent certified this lawsuit as a class action, consisting of “[a]ll children who are now and all those who will be in the Permanent Managing Conservatorship [ (‘PMC’) ] of the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services [ (‘DFPS') ].” (D.E. 49 at 34.) Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief to remedy what they claim is Defendants' operation of the Texas foster care system in violation of certain federal constitutional mandates.1 As explained in the Court's Order on class certification, Plaintiffs complain that children within PMC custody are subjected to a variety of harms (such as repeated placements, over-medication, abuse, neglect, and deprivation of familial relationships with siblings) due to deficiencies in the Texas foster care system. (D.E. 49 at 1–2.) Plaintiffs claim that they are “brought into state custody because they were abused and neglected at home, but then are left to languish for years, too many of them suffering further abuse and neglect while the state does little to seek and secure permanent homes for them.” (D.E. 15 at 7.) Plaintiffs bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claim violations of substantive and procedural due process, along with certain rights of familial association, derived from the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (D.E. 1 at 83–85.)
On May 24, 2011, Defendants filed their Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss, contending that this lawsuit “would effectively require the Court to takeover and administer Texas' foster care system despite the fact that regular and competent oversight of Texas' foster children has already been entrusted to the Texas district courts by the Texas Legislature.” As such, they request that this Court abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Younger and Burford doctrines,2 so that “each of the named Plaintiffs [can] seek the individualized relief he or she desires in the Texas courts.” (D.E. 43 at 10.) Plaintiffs responded on June 14, 2011. (D.E. 55.)
III. DiscussionA. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs challenges to a court's subject matter jurisdiction.3 Where a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is filed, “[a] trial court may find that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking based on (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir.2011).4 B. Younger Abstention
Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise jurisdiction granted to them. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976)). Certain doctrines, however, require abstention in “extraordinary circumstances.” Deakins, 484 U.S. at 203, 108 S.Ct. 523. One such abstention doctrine originates from the Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris. In Younger, the Supreme Court reversed a district court decision enjoining a state district attorney (Younger) from prosecuting Harris under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act (which Harris claimed ran afoul of certain constitutional rights) because that injunction violated a “national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 39–41, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). As the Supreme Court has subsequently explained, Younger abstention Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45, 91 S.Ct. 746).
The Fifth Circuit has noted that, “[a]lthough Younger abstention originally applied only to criminal prosecutions, it also applies when certain civil proceedings are pending, if the State's interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and the National Government.” Health Net, Inc. v. Wooley, 534 F.3d 487, 494 (5th Cir.2008) (citations omitted). Abstention under Younger v. Harris “is generally deemed appropriate [when] assumption of jurisdiction by a federal court would interfere with pending state proceedings, whether of a criminal, civil, or even administrative character.” Louisiana Debating and Literary Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1490 (5th Cir.1995). In determining whether Younger abstention is warranted, courts apply a three factor test derived from Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). The Middlesex factors are: “(1) the dispute must involve an ‘ongoing state judicial proceeding,’ (2) an important state interest in the subject matter of the proceeding must be implicated, and (3) the state proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges.” Texas Ass'n of Business v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir.2004) (citing Wightman v. Tex. Supreme Ct., 84 F.3d 188, 189 (5th Cir.1996)); see Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515. “When these requirements are met, the federal district court has no choice but to dismiss the federal action; it may not abstain, nor may it stay the federal action pending resolution of the state proceedings.” Nall v. Stringer, 4 F.3d 989, 1993 WL 360771, at *3 (5th Cir.1993). “[A] district court's decision to abstain [is reviewed] for abuse of discretion, provided that the elements for Younger abstention are present.” Earle, 388 F.3d at 518.
Defendants contend that Younger abstention is appropriate here. In essence, they argue that Texas district courts exercise continuing jurisdiction over each child in foster care, and this federal class action would interfere with that jurisdiction. Defendants also cite relevant precedents to have applied Younger in similar contexts, and contend that the Middlesex factors are satisfied. (D.E. 43.) In response, Plaintiffs point out that Texas receives federal funding and submits to federal oversight; as such, this case does not offend principles of comity and federalism. They also contend that none of the Middlesex factors are satisfied, and that numerous precedents around the nation support rejection of Younger abstention in the context of cases challenging state foster care systems. (D.E. 55.)
The Court begins with a review of the Middlesex factors, then turns to relevant precedent and other arguments the parties raise.
The parties dispute whether the Middlesex factors are satisfied, thus warranting Younger abstention. Defendants contend that all three factors are satisfied; Plaintiffs contend that none are. The Court addresses each in turn.
The first consideration under Middlesex is whether the dispute involves an “ongoing state judicial proceeding.” Earle, 388 F.3d at 519. “State judicial proceedings” generally include criminal, civil, and “administrative proceedings that are ‘judicial’ in nature.” Id. at 520.
In support of their position on this point, Defendants describe in detail the legal procedures governing foster care in Texas, which themselves are not in dispute. In essence, the Texas district court to which a child's suit affecting the parent child relationship (“SAPCR”) is assigned has a “continuing statutory duty to oversee” the child's case. (D.E. 43 at 10 (...
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