M.D. v. State

• Decision Date: 28 February 1997
• Docket Number: CR-95-0947
• Citation: 701 So.2d 58
• Parties: M.D. v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 58

701 So.2d 58

M.D. v. STATE.

CR-95-0947.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Feb. 28, 1997.

Rehearing Denied May 2, 1997.

Certiorari Denied Aug. 15, 1997

Alabama Supreme Court 1961356.

R. Wendell Sheffield, Birmingham; and Bryan A. Stevenson, Montgomery, for appellant.

Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Cecil Brendle, Jr., asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

COBB, Judge.

M.D. appeals from an order of the Jefferson County Juvenile Court directing that he be transferred to the circuit court for prosecution as an adult on charges of capital murder and robbery. He raises five issues on appeal.

I

M.D.'s first argument is that the juvenile court failed to follow the mandates of Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-34(c), which require the court to determine whether he should be committed involuntarily to the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation ("the Department") due to his mental retardation. The State argues that the juvenile court followed the procedures set out in the statute.

The transfer of a juvenile to circuit court for prosecution on a criminal charge is governed by Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-34. Subsection (c) of that statute provides "When there are grounds to believe that the child is committable to an institution or agency for the mentally retarded or mentally ill, the court shall proceed as provided in Section 12-15-70."

Section 12-15-70 provides, in relevant part, that a juvenile court may order a child to be examined by a mental health professional, who will then report the child's condition to the court. That section further provides that if the report leads the court "to believe that a minor or child is mentally ill or mentally retarded, as defined in this chapter, the court shall proceed in the manner set out in Section 12-15-90." (Emphasis added.)

Section 12-15-90 authorizes the involuntary commitment of minors and provides a procedure for that commitment. Section 12-15-90(j) provides that a court may order the commitment of a minor to the Department due to his mental retardation if there is substantial evidence 1.) that the child is mentally retarded; 2.) that the child is not of borderline intelligence or mildly retarded; and 3.) that, if the child is allowed to remain in the community, he is likely to cause serious injury to himself or to others or that adequate care, rehabilitation, and training opportunities are available only at one of the Department's facilities. While certain of the procedures are mandatory, the commitment decision remains in the court's discretion.

M.D. contends that the juvenile court failed to follow the procedures mandated by the statute and, instead, "conducted a competency determination as a new method by which to determine the propriety of juvenile transfer to criminal court for someone with significant mental retardation." He alleges, further, that "after the court found that he was competent to stand trial, it without further analysis authorized transfer to criminal court." (Appellant's brief at page 16; emphasis added.) M.D.'s arguments, however, are not supported by the record. The record reflects that the juvenile judge took great care to follow the mandates of the law, to protect M.D.'s rights, and to act in accordance with M.D.'s best interests. Details regarding the procedural history of the case, the evidence elicited at the hearings, and the juvenile court's statements and orders are necessary to the resolution of this issue.

Fifteen-year old M.D. was charged with capital murder and first degree robbery for his participation in the April 9, 1995, robbery of Courtney and Betty Long, and the murder of Betty Long while both were inside Tenth Avenue Cleaners, a business Betty and her husband owned. On April 12, 1995, the State filed a motion to transfer, pursuant to § 12-15-34, Ala.Code 1975. On April 19, 1995, M.D.'s attorney filed a motion for a mental health evaluation; he requested that the court determine whether M.D. was insane at the time of the crime and whether he was competent to stand trial. The trial court granted the motion.

Dr. Wendy Rebert, a licensed clinical psychologist and certified forensic examiner, examined M.D. on June 21, 1995, to determine his competence to stand trial, his mental state at the time of the alleged offense, and the propriety of the transfer to circuit court. In her report, Dr. Rebert stated that she had assessed M.D.'s competency to stand trial by reviewing certain records, by conducting an interview, and by administering the Competency to Stand Trial Assessment Instrument, ¹ and she found that M.D. "was fully capable of assuming the role of defendant at the present time." (C. 133.) ² Dr. Rebert also found that M.D. was competent at the time of the alleged offense. Finally, Dr. Rebert stated that she believed that transfer to circuit court was in the best interests of M.D. and of the community, in part because there were no other available options. She acknowledged that M.D.'s IQ score was in the moderate range of retardation, but said that he was capable of behaving in a socially appropriate manner when it was to his best advantage to do so.

On September 20, 1995, the trial court held a hearing. The court clearly explained the purposes of the hearing and the order in which it would address those purposes. The court stated that it would first hear defense counsel's competency motion; that if M.D. was found to be competent to stand trial, the court would next hear the State's evidence to determine whether probable cause existed; and that if probable cause was found, the third part of the hearing would be devoted to determining whether M.D. should be transferred to stand trial in circuit court. (R.I, 8-12.) As the details below will demonstrate, the court followed the procedure outlined above; thus, M.D.'s claims that the juvenile court ordered his transfer on the basis of a competency determination alone, and without further analysis of the propriety of a transfer, is simply false.

First, Dr. Rebert testified extensively about her forensic evaluation of M.D. She testified in detail about her assessment of M.D.'s competency to stand trial and her determination that he was competent. Dr. Rebert also stated that M.D. achieved a full scale IQ score of 48 on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, that the results were consistent with an earlier administration of the IQ test, and that this score was in the moderate range of mental retardation. She also testified that M.D.'s IQ score did not reflect his true potential. Dr. Rebert stated that an IQ score of 48 was not, by itself, sufficient evidence to find M.D. incompetent to stand trial; she explained that individuals with little formal education typically achieve IQ scores that underestimate their true abilities. She stated that she believed that M.D.'s actual intelligence level and true potential were higher than reflected by his IQ score. She also testified that a person with a true functioning level of 48 would not have a clear, articulable understanding of the court system, and M.D. exhibited a high level of understanding of the system.

Dr. Rebert testified that she could not make a clinical diagnosis of mental retardation without assessing M.D.'s adaptive functioning, which she described as a measure of his ability to perform the activities of daily living; however, Dr. Rebert testified that she never performs that assessment when conducting forensic evaluations because adaptive functioning is not relevant to a determination of competency. (R. II, 64-68, 73-75.)

The judge stated that an IQ of 48 was so low that she would typically find the person incompetent; however, when presented with expert testimony that M.D. was competent, the judge was willing to consider that testimony and the expert's basis for that conclusion. Dr. Rebert then explained again, in detail, that from her interview and assessment, she determined that M.D. understood and could articulate his understanding, for example, of the charges against him, the possible punishment, and the trial procedure, and that he could aid his attorney in his defense.

M.D.'s stepfather testified that he had concerns about M.D.'s mental health. He said that M.D. had urinated in his bedroom and had hidden food in dresser drawers. He also testified that when he was younger, M.D. cut his siblings with a knife.

After considering the foregoing testimony, and the testimony of M.D.'s stepfather regarding M.D.'s bizarre behavior, the court found that M.D. was competent to stand trial.

The court proceeded to the second stage of the hearing--a determination of whether there was probable cause to believe that M.D. had committed the offense. The court found probable cause as to both charges, and ordered the parties to reconvene the next day for a hearing on the motion to transfer.

When the parties returned on September 21, 1995, for the transfer hearing, the judge informed the parties that, upon further reflection and due to M.D.'s low IQ score, she would be more comfortable in making a competency determination after M.D.'s adaptive functioning level was tested. On its own motion, the court then set aside its previous ruling and reserved ruling on competency, and ordered Dr. Rebert to conduct adaptive skills testing. Dr. Rebert then completed the Vineland Social Maturity Scale to determine M.D.'s level of adaptive functioning. In her report of these results, Dr. Rebert stated that M.D. "achieved a social age of 12 years." She explained that a diagnosis of mental retardation required a significantly subaverage IQ score and deficits in social/adaptive functioning. M.D.'s IQ score was significantly subaverage, but Dr. Rebert reported that she could not state that his Vineland score was subaverage, even though it was below his chronological age. (C. 89.) Thus, Dr. Rebert's testing of M.D.'s adaptive skills confirmed her earlier determination that M.D. was functioning at a level higher than that reflected by...