Harrison v. State
Decision Date | 28 January 2005 |
Citation | 905 So.2d 858 |
Parties | Clifton Lee HARRISON v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Jeffrey Todd Stearns, Brewton, for appellant.
Troy King, atty. gen., and Yvonne A.H. Saxon, asst. atty. gen., for appellee. SHAW, Judge.
Clifton Lee Harrison appeals the trial court's revocation of his probation. He raises one issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred in denying his request for a psychiatric evaluation. He argues that he was entitled to a psychiatric evaluation to determine his competency to have his probation revoked because, he says, he presented evidence at the probation-revocation hearing that raised a bona fide doubt as to his competency.1
Before addressing Harrison's specific claim, we must first address a threshold issue: whether revocation of probation of an incompetent probationer violates due process.
It is axiomatic that the conviction of an accused while incompetent violates due process. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S.Ct. 440, 100 L.Ed. 835 (1956); and Ex parte LaFlore, 445 So.2d 932 (Ala. 1983). Probation-revocation proceedings are not criminal trials, see Bullock v. State, 392 So.2d 848, 851 (Ala.Crim.App. 1980) (); however, a person facing revocation of probation is entitled to certain minimum due-process protections. A probationer is entitled to written notice of the claimed violations, to disclosure of the evidence against him or her, to an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to a written statement by the judge as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), and Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 102-03, 312 So.2d 620, 622-23 (1975). These rights, however, would be meaningless to an incompetent probationer. As explained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
State ex rel. Vanderbeke v. Endicott, 210 Wis.2d 502, 515-16, 563 N.W.2d 883, 887-88 (1997). "It would be fundamentally unfair to require a revocation hearing and then not ensure the safeguard that defendant understands the nature and object of the proceedings against him and that he is able to assist in his defense in a rational way." People v. Martin, 61 Mich.App. 102, 107-08, 232 N.W.2d 191, 194 (1975). Other jurisdictions have similarly recognized the right of a probationer to be competent before his or her probation is revoked. See People v. Stevens, 309 A.D.2d 1192, 765 N.Y.S.2d 121 (2003); State ex rel. Juergens v. Cundiff, 939 S.W.2d 381 (Mo.1997); State v. Singleton, 322 S.C. 480, 472 S.E.2d 640 (1996); State v. Lockwood, 160 Vt. 547, 632 A.2d 655 (1993); State v. Qualls, 50 Ohio App.3d 56, 552 N.E.2d 957 (1988); Thompson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 26 (Tex.App.1983); Commonwealth v. Megella, 268 Pa.Super. 316, 408 A.2d 483 (1979); and Hayes v. State, 343 So.2d 672 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977). Therefore, we hold that revocation of probation while a probationer is incompetent violates due process.
We now turn to whether there was bona fide doubt as to Harrison's competency that would require the trial court to order a psychiatric evaluation.
Ingram v. State, 779 So.2d 1225, 1270-71 (Ala.Crim.App.1999), aff'd, 779 So.2d 1283 (Ala.2000). Rule 11.1, Ala.R.Crim.P., provides that "[a] defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial or to be sentenced for an offense if that defendant lacks sufficient present ability to assist in his or her defense by consulting with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding of the facts and the legal proceedings against the defendant."
At the probation-revocation hearing, Harrison's mother testified that before his incarceration Harrison had received Social Security disability benefits because of his mental condition; that, with her help, he had reapplied for those benefits after his release; that Harrison suffered from a severe learning disability and that he "couldn't learn, couldn't comprehend what was going on" (R. 23); that Harrison was unable to work because of his mental disability; that Harrison cannot read or write; that Harrison is a "follower" and is easily led by others (R. 24); and that Harrison needs help understanding business and legal matters. In addition, Harrison's counsel asserted that at the preliminary hearing, a transcript of which is not included in the record on appeal, Harrison had told the court that "he didn't have an understanding about what was happening." (R. 4.)
Although the testimony of Harrison's mother established that Harrison had...
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