M. O'Dowd's Sons & Co. v. City of Council of Augusta
| Decision Date | 19 May 1914 |
| Docket Number | 363. |
| Citation | 82 S.E. 148,141 Ga. 748 |
| Parties | M. O'DOWD'S SONS & CO. v. CITY COUNCIL OF AUGUSTA ET AL. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
There being a general law in this state providing a uniform method of exercising the right of condemning or taking private property for public purposes, and defining the quantum of interest acquired under proceedings for this purpose, which is less than a fee-simple title, an act passed subsequently to the adoption of this general law, conferring upon a municipality the authority to acquire by condemnation a fee-simple title to real property, is a special law enacted in a case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, and is repugnant to paragraph 1 of section 4 of article 1 of the Constitution of the state, which inhibits such legislation.
If the special law referred to above could be construed so as to include two distinct powers for the purposes of condemnation--one the power to acquire by condemnation the feesimple title to real property, and the other the power to condemn for the purposes stated and acquire the interest authorized to be acquired under the general law covering the subject of condemnation--then the plaintiffs met this possibility by setting up in their petition that under such a construction the act would contain matter not covered or expressed by the title, and thus would be invalid because repugnant to another provision (article 3, § 7, par. 8) of the Constitution (Civil Code 1910, § 6437).
Error from Superior Court, Richmond County; H. C. Hammond, Judge.
Condemnation proceedings by the City Council of Augusta and others against O'Dowd's Sons & Co. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
Hamilton Phinizy, of Augusta, for plaintiff in error.
C Henry Cohen and W. K. Miller, both of Augusta, for defendants in error.
BECK J. (after stating the facts as above).
The third section of the act under consideration is not material to a consideration of the questions involved in this case. The act is attacked on the ground that it violates paragraph 1 of section 4 of article 1 of the Constitution of the state (Civil Code 1910, § 6391), which provides that:
"Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law."
The general law which, according to the contentions of the petitioner, makes provision for condemnation of real property and the title or interest to be acquired therein, is to be found in an act providing a uniform method of exercising the right of condemning private property, approved December 18 1894 (Acts 1894, p. 95), which act is now embraced in the Code of 1910, §§ 5206-5246. This act of December 18, 1894, is a general law (Alexander v. Augusta, 134 Ga. 849 68 S.E. 704), and covers the case of "all corporations" authorized to take private property for public purposes, where such corporations are seeking to acquire property by condemnation. The expression, "all corporations authorized to take private property for public purposes," includes, of course, municipal corporations. Not only does the act of 1894 provide the method of condemnation, but it also declares the quantum of interest with which the corporation condemning the property shall become vested. It was insisted in argument by counsel for defendant in error that the act of 1894 was intended to be, as is shown by the title, an act to provide a uniform method of exercising the right of condemnation; that it was merely remedial in its scope; and that so much of the act embraced in section 27 thereof as defines the quantum of interest to be taken by the condemnor was beyond the scope of the act as indicated by the title, and contains matter different from what is expressed in the title. However sound this last stated contention of defendant might be if the validity of the provision last referred to depended solely upon the legislative declaration as contained in the original act, it is deprived of all force and effect by the fact that this provision in the act of 1894, questioned on the ground that it contains matter different from what is expressed in the title, was embodied in the Code of 1895 in connection with the other provisions of the act of 1894, just as they are written in the original act. Emory v. Grand United Order of Odd Fellows, 140 Ga. 423, 78 S.E. 922. The Legislature having already provided by a general law for the title or quantum of interest which should be taken by a corporation in private property condemned for public purposes, it was not competent for that body, in view of the constitutional inhibition against the passage of special laws in cases for which provision has been made by an existing general law, to confer upon one particular corporation the power to acquire, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, a greater interest in property than that which is given to corporations generally under the general law last referred to. And the Act of July 27, 1909, which by its terms confers upon the city council of Augusta the right to acquire a fee-simple title to real property taken by the city under condemnation proceedings, is in direct contravention of the constitutional provision inhibiting the enactment of special laws in cases for which provision is made by an existing general law.
The general law provides as follows, in regard to the quantum of interest which can be condemned:
"Upon the payment, by the corporation or person seeking to condemn, of the amount of the award, and final judgment on appeal, such corporation or person shall become vested with such interest in the property taken as may be necessary to enable the corporation or person taking to exercise their franchise or conduct their business; and whenever the corporation or person shall cease using the property taken for the purpose of conducting their business, said property shall revert to the person from whom taken, his heirs or assigns."
If this act of July 27, 1909, had conferred upon the city council of Augusta authority to condemn any real estate "for enlarging, extending, or improving the water system of said city, or for the protection of said city or county from damage by floods and freshets, and for other purposes," a lawful condemnation of property would, under the general law above quoted, have vested...
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