M'Gavock v. Ward

• Decision Date: 01 January 1813
• Citation: 3 Tenn. 403
• Parties: M'GAVOCK v. WARD.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

3 Tenn. 403

M'GAVOCK

v.WARD.

Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee.

1813.

Appeal.

It is the duty of the Court, when requested, to instruct the jury as to the law on all material points, and, if the instruction be not given, the party injured can have the action revised; but, in such case, he must disclose in the bill of exceptions the whole testimony given in the cause, that the revising Court may be enabled to see if correct instructions had been given whether a different verdict would have resulted. [Acc. Nolen v. Wilson, 5 Sn., 340, citing this case.]

The concealment, in the sale of chattels, of a material defect, which could not by common observation be discovered, is such unfair dealing as the law prohibits, and subjects the seller to an action for the deceit. [Acc. McFarlane v. Moore, 1 Tenn., 174.]

This was an action on the case, brought by the appellee against the appellant, in the County Court of Davidson.

The second count in the declaration was for a deceit in the sale of a horse. Upon the trial of the cause in the County Court, as appeared by a bill of exceptions, the appellant moved the Court to instruct the jury that they could not, upon the second count, find in favor of the plaintiff, unless they were satisfied from the evidence that the defendant in that court represented the horse mentioned in such count as different from what he knew him to be, or used some art to disguise his true situation; but the Court refused to give the instructions required.

A verdict was found for the plaintiff in the inferior court, whereupon the defendant prosecuted a writ of error to the Circuit Court, where the opinion of the County Court was affirmed, and an appeal was then taken to this Court.

Trimble and Cooke, for the appellant, argued that unsoundness in the article sold, at the time of the sale, formed no ground of itself for redress on the part of the vendee. In the sale of every description of personal property, in relation to the title, the law implied a warranty; but it was not so in regard to the quality of the thing sold. It would, therefore, follow that where there was no warranty the vendor could not be made liable, unless he represented the article to be sound when he knew it to be otherwise, or used some art to disguise the true situation. 4 Blackstone's Com. 455; 2 East. 314; 1 John. 129, 274; 4 John. 421.

Whiteside and Hayes, for the appellee, were stopped by the Court.

By the Court.

The County Court was requested by the appellant's counsel to charge the jury that they must find for him, unless they believed, from the evidence, that the appellant upon the sale represented the horse...