M. E., In Interest of
| Decision Date | 26 April 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 54333,54333 |
| Citation | 370 So.2d 795 |
| Parties | In the Interest of M. E., a child, Petitioner. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Allen J. DeWeese, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Robert L. Bogen, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
We have for review by petition for writ of certiorari the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in In the Interest of M. E., a child, 357 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), which conflicts with the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in Stewart v. State, 122 So.2d 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960). The Fourth District, in M. E., held that a manager of a store, even though he does not hold legal title to the premises, has a possessory property interest in the premises superior to that of a burglar and sufficient to support an allegation of ownership in the manager. The Second District in Stewart v. State, under materially similar facts, held that an allegation of ownership in a manager of a business premise is legally insufficient to support a charge of burglary. We resolve the conflict by rejecting the holding in Stewart v. State and approving the Fourth District's conclusion that, for the purposes of charging burglary, ownership may be alleged in the manager of a store even though he does not hold legal title to the premises.
A petition seeking an adjudication of delinquency was filed against M.E., charging him with burglary. The charging document alleged that M.E. unlawfully entered a structure owned by one Wesley Phillips with intent to commit the offense of larceny, in violation of section 810.02(3), Florida Statutes (1975).
At trial, the state presented testimony that the premises entered was a grocery store managed and run by Wesley Phillips. The testimony, however, established that legal title to the store and its contents was held not by Wesley Phillips but by his father. When the state rested its case, M.E. moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of a fatal variance between the allegation of ownership of the store found in the petition and the proof of ownership offered by the state. This motion was denied, and M.E. thereafter was found guilty as charged and adjudicated delinquent.
On appeal, M.E. argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the state failed to prove ownership of the premises as alleged in the petition. He contended that the petition should have charged the burglary of Wesley Phillips' father's store because it was the father who was the owner. The Fourth District rejected his argument and affirmed the adjudication of delinquency. The district court held that it is sufficient to charge and prove a greater possessory right than the accused's; that it is not required that the legal titleholder of the property be pleaded and proved as owner; and that the petition in this case sufficiently identified the property and the proof of ownership was as alleged.
M.E. argues that alleging ownership in one other than the holder of legal title should be done only when the legal titleholder is not in possession and the alleged owner has possession and independent control of the premises and is not a mere servant of the legal titleholder. He contends that in the present case there was a failure to prove ownership in Wesley Phillips because there was no showing that he held legal title nor was there any evidence that he had possession and independent control over his father's business at the time of the burglary so as to vest him with a possessory right sufficient to constitute...
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R. A. v. State, 80-516
... ... We conclude that the testimony that Rainbow Park was part of the school system was sufficient to allow the trier of fact to determine that the School Board's interest in the structure was superior to that of the appellant. See in re M. E., 370 So.2d 795 (Fla.1979); Addison v. State, 95 Fla. 737, 116 So. 629 (1928) ... Appellant's second point, alleging that the state failed to show that the school was the property described in the petition, is ... ...
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Jones v. State, 81-230
... ... The allegations and proof were sufficient to charge ownership for the purpose of proving burglary. Ownership, for this purpose, means any possession which is rightful against the burglar and is satisfied by proof of special or temporary ownership, possession or control. In Interest" of M. E., 370 So.2d 795 (Fla.1979); Patterson v. State, 391 So.2d 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Adirim v. State, 350 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) ... We have considered appellant's final point and find it to be without merit ... The judgment of conviction is ... \xC2" ... ...
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Whetstone v. State
...v. State, 734 So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). One cannot commit the crime of burglary of his own premises. See In the Interest of M.E., 370 So.2d 795, 796-797 (Fla.1979). "Ownership means any possession which is rightful as against the burglary and is satisfied by proof of special or te......
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McDonald v. State, 82-501
...non-consent, see State v. Hicks, 421 So.2d 510 (Fla.1982); (2) the proof with respect to ownership was sufficient, see In the Interest of M.E., 370 So.2d 795 (Fla.1979); Jones v. State, 415 So.2d 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Adirim v. State, 350 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); cert. denied, 365 ......