M.M. v. M.F.
| Decision Date | 29 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 108957,108957 |
| Citation | 2020 Ohio 5082 |
| Parties | M.M., ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. M.F., ET AL., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Appearances:
McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman Co., L.P.A., Christian R. Patno, and Colin R. Ray, for appellant M.M.
David L. Lash, for appellant W.A.
Williams, Moliterno & Scully Co., L.P.A., and Christina N. Williams, for appellee M.F.
{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants M.S.M. ("M.M.") and W.A. (collectively, "Appellants") appeal from the trial court's granting of defendant-appellee M.F.'s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Several days prior to June 7, 2017, M.F. loaned her car, a Mazda 626 ("the Mazda"), to her daughter J.R. J.R. and her husband had three teenage children and the family was temporarily in need of an extra vehicle for the children. The Mazda was a sedan equipped with five seatbelts.
{¶ 3} On June 7, 2017, J.R.'s daughter S.R. asked her parents if she could borrow a car to drive to a friend's house. J.R. told S.R. that she could take the Mazda. Later that evening, S.R. was driving with five of her friends when she lost control and crashed into two trees. S.R. and three of her passengers were not seriously injured. 16-year-old passenger S.A., W.A.'s daughter, sustained serious injuries, including facial fractures, as a result of the crash. 16-year-old passenger K.M., M.M.'s daughter, was ejected from the vehicle and killed.
{¶ 4} At the time of the incident, S.R. had had her probationary driver's license for approximately three weeks, and was, therefore, subject to the restrictions enumerated in R.C. 4507.071. S.R. admitted to driving over the speed limit and listening to loud music at the time of the crash.
{¶ 5} On September 19, 2018, M.M., individually and as administrator of the estate of K.M., filed a complaint against M.F. and State Farm Mutual AutomobileInsurance Company ("State Farm"). M.M. brought a negligent entrustment claim against M.F., and a breach of contract claim against State Farm.
{¶ 6} On January 9, 2019, W.A. filed a motion to intervene. The court granted this motion, and on January 17, 2019, W.A. filed an intervening complaint, bringing an identical negligent entrustment claim against M.F.
{¶ 7} On April 2, 2019, State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment. On June 3, 2019, the court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment as to the breach of contract claim.1
{¶ 8} On May 20, 2019, M.F. filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of her motion for summary judgment, M.F. relied primarily on deposition testimony from herself, S.R., and J.R. On July 12, 2019, M.M. filed a brief in opposition. On August 16, 2019, the trial court granted M.F.'s motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 9} M.M. and W.A. both appealed, and this court granted their joint motion to join appeals. Appellants present two assignments of error for our review.
{¶ 10} In their first assignment of error, Appellants argue that the trial court committed reversible error in granting summary judgment to M.F. because genuine issues preclude summary judgment. In their second assignment of error, Appellantsargue that the trial court erred in failing to consider their arguments regarding secondary entrustment and other negligence theories of liability.
{¶ 11} We review summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). We accord no deference to the trial court's decision and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.
{¶ 12} Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and, viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion that is adverse to the nonmoving party, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party carries an initial burden of identifying specific facts in the record that demonstrate their entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996).
{¶ 13} If the moving party fails to meet this burden, summary judgment is not appropriate; if the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party has the reciprocal burden to point to evidence of specific facts in the record demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 293. Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden.
{¶ 14} To prevail on a negligent entrustment claim involving the operation of a motor vehicle, a plaintiff must show (1) that the vehicle was operated withpermission of the owner; (2) that the driver of the vehicle was incompetent to operate it; and (3) that the owner of the vehicle knew — either through actual knowledge or through knowledge implied from known facts at the time of the entrustment — that the driver was unqualified or incompetent to operate the vehicle. Rieger v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 512, 2019-Ohio-3745, 138 N.E.3d 1121, ¶ 17, citing Gulla v. Straus, 154 Ohio St. 193, 194, 93 N.E.2d 662 (1950). The plaintiff must also show that the owner's negligent entrustment caused the plaintiff's injury. Id., citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. White, 122 Ohio St.3d 562, 2009-Ohio-3718, 913 N.E.2d 426, ¶ 36. The failure to prove any of these elements is fatal to a negligent entrustment claim. Id.
{¶ 15} Appellants argue that M.F. negligently entrusted her vehicle to S.R., and that M.F. knew or should have known that S.R. was an incompetent driver. In response, M.F. argues that she entrusted the Mazda to J.R., not S.R., and there is no evidence to support a finding that S.R. was operating the Mazda with M.F.'s permission. Therefore, M.F. submits that based on the holding in Rogers v. Kazee, 10 Ohio App.3d 139, 141, 460 N.E.2d 1149 (10th Dist.1983), the proper inquiry is whether the initial entrustment to J.R. was negligent.
{¶ 16} Further, M.F. argues that there is no evidence that S.R. was incompetent, and similarly that there is no evidence that M.F. knew or should have known of this alleged incompetence. After reviewing the record, we find no basis upon which to conclude that the trial court erred in granting M.F.'s motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 17} As an initial matter, Appellants' negligent entrustment claim is premised on the conclusion that M.F. entrusted the Mazda to S.R. This is unsupported by the record. Appellants assert that when M.F. entrusted the Mazda to her daughter's family, she knew or should have known that S.R. would use the vehicle. Contrary to this assertion, M.F. testified that when she entrusted the Mazda to J.R., she did not expect that S.R. would be driving the vehicle. Further, M.F. was not even aware that S.R. had ever driven the Mazda prior to the night of the accident. S.R. only obtained express permission to drive the vehicle from her parents several days after the Mazda's entrustment.
{¶ 18} Appellants point to facts in the record regarding the purpose of the entrustment and M.F.'s close relationship with her daughter and grandchildren. The record reflects that the reason J.R.'s family needed an additional vehicle at the time of the accident was that her children had different final exam schedules at different locations.
{¶ 19} Appellants are correct that the record reflects that M.F. was aware of these circumstances. The record also directly undermines Appellants' argument, however, because M.F. testified in her deposition that when she loaned the Mazda to J.R., she imagined that S.R.'s brothers would use the vehicle but never contemplated that S.R. would drive the Mazda because she had so recently starteddriving. M.F. specifically stated that she "never even thought of [S.R.] driving" the Mazda because she had so recently gotten her license.
{¶ 20} Likewise, the record reflects that at the time of the entrustment, J.R. also had not contemplated that S.R. would use the Mazda. Instead, J.R. explained that her intention in borrowing the Mazda was for her other children to be able to take the car to their final exams. In light of the foregoing, Appellants have not presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the first element of their negligent entrustment claim.
{¶ 21} Even if the record contained evidence that M.F. had entrusted the Mazda to S.R., or had reason to know that S.R. would use the Mazda, summary judgment in M.F.'s favor was still appropriate. With respect to the second element of their negligent entrustment claim, Appellants have failed to present any evidence indicating that S.R. was an incompetent driver, much less that M.F. had any knowledge of such alleged incompetence at the time of the entrustment.
{¶ 22} In support of their argument that S.R. was an incompetent driver, Appellants point out that she was a new driver and she was driving approximately 50 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. residential zone at the time of the accident. Further, S.R. allowed six occupants in the Mazda, despite the vehicle being equipped with only five seatbelts. Appellants also point to S.R.'s deposition testimony, in which she acknowledged that she did not appreciate the true risks of driving and drove in excess of the speed limit an average amount. Finally, Appellants emphasize that anissue of material fact exists regarding whether S.R.'s youth or "tender age" caused the crash.
{¶ 23} As an initial matter, there is no dispute that S.R.'s driving at the time of the accident in this case was reckless. Based on the elements of negligent entrustment as...
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