M.M. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.
Decision Date | 03 November 2015 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 14–6061 |
Citation | 142 F.Supp.3d 396 |
Parties | M.M. and E.M., individually and on behalf of S.M. v. The School District of Philadelphia |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
David J. Berney, Law Offices of David J. Berney, Philadelphia, PA, for M.M. and E.M., individually and on behalf of S.M.
Miles H. Shore, School District of Phila, Philadelphia, PA, for The School District of Philadelphia.
Presently before the court are: (1) plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record on Counts I and II of Plaintiffs' Complaint ( , defendant's response thereto (Doc. No. 18) and plaintiffs' reply (Doc. No. 22); (2) Cross-Motion of Defendant The School District of Philadelphia for Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Cross-Motion," Doc. No. 20) and plaintiffs' response thereto (Doc. No. 21); and (3) plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs ("Mot. for Fees," Doc. No. 17), defendant's response thereto (Doc. No. 19) and plaintiff's reply (Doc. No. 23). A telephone conference was held before the undersigned on June 24, 2015 on the aforementioned motions.
This action arises out of plaintiffs' contention that defendant, The School District of Philadelphia, failed to provide a free and appropriate public education ("FAPE") to plaintiff S.M., a student who formally attended school in the school district. On December 11, 2013, plaintiffs filed an administrative due process complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. , Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. , and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. In a written decision dated July 22, 2014 (the "Admin. Decision"), Hearing Officer Jake McElligott, Esquire (the "Hearing Officer"), determined that defendant denied plaintiff S.M. a FAPE under the IDEA. In his decision, the Hearing Officer stated that "[a]ny claim not specifically addressed in this decision and order is denied." (Admin. Decision at 18.) Plaintiffs admit that the Hearing Officer ruled against plaintiffs on their Section 504 and ADA claims. (Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. at 2.)
On October 20, 2014, plaintiffs filed the instant litigation asserting claims under the ADA (Count I), Section 504 (Count II), and the IDEA (Count III). See Complaint (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiffs do not seek compensatory damages in this litigation. Rather, plaintiffs state that they "filed their complaint under the ADA, Section 504, and the IDEA to receive their attorney's fees and costs as prevailing parties in the underlying administrative action." (Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. at 3 n.1.) As a prevailing party under the IDEA, plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees and costs under that statute. Plaintiffs further explain that they filed under these three statutes because, while a party is not entitled to expert costs under the IDEA, courts have held that a prevailing party may recover expert costs under the ADA and Section 504. Id.
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs seek entry of judgment in their favor on Counts I and II of the Complaint based upon the administrative record so that they can recover expert costs under Section 504 and/or the ADA. Defendant contends that judgment on the administrative record is not warranted because, in order to prevail on their claim for compensatory damages under the ADA and Section 504, plaintiffs must prove intentional discrimination, and there is no proof of such intentional discrimination. (Def.'s Resp. at 3-12.) In their response to defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs state that they "do not seek compensatory damages." During the telephone conference on June 24, 2015, plaintiffs' counsel confirmed that plaintiffs do not seek compensatory damages. Hence, no proof of intentional discrimination is required in order for plaintiffs to prevail on Counts I and II of their complaint. Defendant asserts no other grounds in opposition to plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and did not seek leave to supplement its opposition to plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment after learning that plaintiffs were not seeking compensatory damages. Accordingly, plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is unopposed and will be granted as such.
Alternatively, plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment also is granted on the merits. Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Furthermore, an issue is "genuine" if a reasonable jury possibly could hold in the nonmovant's favor on that issue. Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pennsylvania , 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir.1998). To demonstrate that no material facts are in dispute, the moving party must show that the non-moving party has failed to establish one or more essential elements of his or her case. Hugh v. Butler County. Family YMCA , 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). In analyzing the evidence, the court will view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc. , 579 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir.2009). Once the moving party has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party may present evidence in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "While the evidence that the non-moving party presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla." Hugh , 418 F.3d at 267 (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).
A plaintiff claiming deprivation of a FAPE frequently seeks relief under the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that there are few differences between the substantive requirements of Section 504's negative prohibition and the IDEA's affirmative duty. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v N.E. ex rel . M.E. , 172 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir.1999). In Centennial Sch. Dist. v. Phil L. and Lori L. , 799 F.Supp.2d 473, 481 (E.D.Pa.2011) (Robreno, J.), the court explained the similarities between the two statutes as follows:
Id. at 481 n. 4. However, the failure to provide a FAPE under the IDEA is not a per se violation of Section 504. Id. at 480–81 () (quoting Ridgewood , 172 F.3d at 253 and citing Andrew M. v. Del. County Office of Mental Health & Mental Retardation , 490 F.3d 337, 350 (3d Cir.2007) ). See also A.W. v. Middletown Area Sch. Dist. , 2015 WL 390864, at *15 (M.D.Pa. Jan. 28, 2015) . And see CG v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ. , 734 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir.2013) () (footnotes omitted); Andrew M. v. Del. County Office of Mental Health & Mental Retardation , 490 F.3d 337, 350 (3d Cir.2007) (same); N.P. v. East Orange Bd. of Educ. , 2011 WL 463037, at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2011) (...
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