M.M. v. State
Decision Date | 29 February 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 4D11–532.,4D11–532. |
Citation | 80 So.3d 1125 |
Parties | M.M., a child, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Travis Dunnington, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Fisher, Assistant Attorney
General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
The issue presented is whether law enforcement officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk appellant after the report of an armed robbery. We find, based on the specific facts of this case, that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk appellant. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress.
Sergeant Anton of the Davie Police Department was dispatched to an area in reference to an armed robbery. The sergeant later described this area as a “high crime area” known for “robberies, burglaries and narcotics.” The only information he had was transmitted by a BOLO stating that “two white males had just robbed the victim at gunpoint and fled the area on foot.” The sergeant never spoke with the alleged robbery victim, nor was he ever apprised of any information from the alleged victim. At about 12:30 a.m., the sergeant encountered appellant and another individual about three blocks from the area of the alleged robbery. Appellant and the other individual were walking away from the area of the alleged robbery at that time. Less than three minutes elapsed from the time of the dispatch regarding the alleged robbery to the time the sergeant contacted appellant and the other individual.
The sergeant detained the two individuals, “not knowing if they were involved in a crime.” The sergeant told appellant and the other individual to put their hands on the hood of his car. At the later suppression hearing, the sergeant testified that he “had no clue in knowing if these were the guys that were involved in this or if we still had people out on the loose.” The sergeant did not observe any bulges in appellant's clothing, and on cross-examination, he acknowledged there were other people outside on the street when he stopped appellant and the other person. Another officer who came to the scene patted down appellant. The officer felt a bulge in appellant's right pocket. The officer could not say whether the bulge was a weapon. The officer asked appellant if he could take out the bulge from appellant's pocket, to which appellant responded, “Yes.” The officer then discovered a bag of marijuana.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress that was denied by the trial court. Appellant and the state agreed that the motion to suppress was dispositive, and appellant entered a plea of no contest, while reserving his right to appeal. This appeal ensues.
In evaluating a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this court's “review of the trial court's application of the law to the historical facts is de novo.” Rigterink v. State, 66 So.3d 866, 884 (Fla.2011). This court should “interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to” sustaining the ruling of the trial court. Fuentes v. State, 24 So.3d 1231, 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citation omitted).
The state claims that the officers had sufficient evidence demonstrating reasonable suspicion and permitting the officers to detain appellant. At the level of “police-citizen encounters involv[ing] an investigatory stop ... a police officer may reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993). Id.
In this case, the stop of appellant rested entirely on the description from the BOLO. As this court has explained:
In determining the legality of a stop as a consequence of a BOLO, this court has looked to factors such as the length of time and distance from the offense, specificity of the description of the alleged perpetrator(s), the source of the BOLO information, the time of day, absence of other persons in the vicinity of the sighting, suspicious conduct, and any other activity consistent with guilt.
Jean v. State, 987 So.2d 196, 198 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
In the present case, we find that the BOLO lacked sufficient specificity to provide the sergeant with reasonable suspicion justifying the stop of appellant. “[A] vague description simply would not justify a law enforcement officer in stopping every individual who ... might possibly meet that...
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...arise from a vague BOLO with minimal connections to the person stopped and no other overtly suspicious conduct.For example, the BOLO in M.M. v. State described “two white males [who] had just robbed the victim at gunpoint and fled the area on foot.” 80 So.3d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). ......
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