M. A. R. T. A. v. McCain, 50372

Decision Date08 July 1975
Docket NumberNo. 50372,No. 1,50372,1
Citation135 Ga.App. 460,218 S.E.2d 122
PartiesM.A.R.T.A. v. S. S. McCAIN
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Kennedy, Bussey, Sampson & Spaulding, Thomas G. Sampson, Ben W. Spaulding, W. Stell Huie, Terrence Lee Croft, Atlanta, for appellant.

Dunaway, Haas & Broome, Henry R. Stringfellow, Norris C. Broome, Atlanta, for appellee.

MARSHALL, Judge.

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) appeals, under a certificate of review, from a denial of its motion to dismiss plaintiff-appellee's complaint for property damages filed in the Civil Court of Fulton County. The motion to dismiss was based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue. Held:

Ga.L.1965, pp. 2243, 2265 (the MARTA Act of 1965) provides in Section 10(t), as follows: '(t) Any action to protect or enforce any rights under the provisions of this Act or any suit or action against such Authority, except as provided in Section 9(c), shall be brought in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, and any action pertaining to validation of any bonds issued under the provisions of this Act shall likewise be brought in said court, which shall have exclusive, original jurisdiction of such actions.' MARTA contends that because plaintiff's suit for property damages, ex delicto, was brought in the Civil Court of Fulton County, instead of the Superior Court, that the former was without jurisdiction under this provision of the MARTA Act of 1965.

We have read the MARTA Act of 1965 and conclude that Section 10(t) thereof restricts the jurisdiction and venue of 'any' suits brought against MARTA, in all types of actions, to the Superior Court of Fulton County. The confusion arises because Section 10 of the Act is entitled 'Revenue Bonds,' and all of the other 21 subsections thereunder deal with various aspects of revenue bonds-except subsection (t).

It seems that the General Assembly has made a habit of obscuring broad venue and jurisdiction provisions under the narrow topic of 'Revenue Bonds.' See e.g. Code Ann. § 98-218 (1968) (State Ports Authority); Code Ann. § 95A-1231 (Supp.1974) (Georgia Highway and Tollway Authority); Code Ann. § 95-2429 (1972) (State Toll Bridge Authority); Code Ann. § 95A-1266 (Supp.1974) (State Tollway Authority); Code Ann. § 32-122a (1969) (Georgia Education Authority University); Code Ann. § 32-1422a (1969) (Georgia Education Authority Schools); Code Ann. § 43-620a (1974) (Jekyll Island State Park Authority); Code Ann. § 91-522a (1971) (Georgia Building Authority); Code Ann. § 65-332 (1966) (Farmers Market Authority). We have found no cases or other annotations to these code sections wherein the venue and jurisdiction provisions, though placed under revenue bond headings as in the MARTA Act, have been held to apply strictly to suits arising out of revenue bonds.

There is no question that the language used in this subsection clearly applies to 'any' suit or action against the...

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6 cases
  • Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Authority
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • September 9, 1983
    ...refers to the entire "Jekyll Island-State Park Authority Act." Second, a similar venue provision was examined in M.A.R.T.A. v. McCain, 135 Ga.App. 460, 218 S.E.2d 122 (1975), and the court observed "that the General Assembly has made a habit of obscuring broad venue and jurisdiction provisi......
  • LaPier v. Holliman, Civ. No. C80-55G.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • December 22, 1980
    ...Lines, Inc., 200 Ga. 216, 223, 39 S.E.2d 225 (1946); Foster v. Brown, 199 Ga. 444, 450, 34 S.E.2d 530 (1945); MARTA v. McCain, 135 Ga.App. 460, 461-62, 218 S.E.2d 122 (1975). Given the absence in the code section of any definition of the term "school year," the preamble may be used to clari......
  • Legacy Acad., Inc. v. JLK, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 20, 2014
    ...discount rate; thus, the statute does not foreclose proof of another applicable discount rate. See OCGA § 1–1–7 ; MARTA v. McCain, 135 Ga.App. 460, 461, 218 S.E.2d 122 (1975) (statute's title or heading neither determines meaning of language nor controls legislature's intent as expressed in......
  • Glover v. Donaldson
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • April 6, 1979
    ...original jurisdiction of such actions." This provision is not limited to suits arising out of revenue bonds (MARTA v. McCain, 135 Ga.App. 460, 218 S.E.2d 122 (1975)) although the provision as to "exclusive, original jurisdiction" relates to actions pertaining to bond The plaintiffs contend ......
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