M. T. Reed Const. Co. v. Jackson Plating Co.

• Decision Date: 21 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 45331,45331
• Citation: 222 So.2d 838
• Parties: M. T. REED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and John S. Winbigler v. JACKSON PLATING COMPANY.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 838

222 So.2d 838

M. T. REED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and John S. Winbigler v. JACKSON PLATING COMPANY.

No. 45331.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

April 21, 1969.

Rehearing Denied June 9, 1969.

Cox, Dunn & Clark, Jackson, for appellants.

Watkins & Eager, Elizabeth Hulen, Jackson, for appellee.

BRADY, Justice.

Appellee instituted suit in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County against appellants, M. T. Reed Construction Company and its employee, John S. Winbigler, for the recovery of damages sought on the ground of negligence on the part of appellants in the selection and in the installation of a material known as Tectum in the roof deck of appellee's building. From a verdict in the sum of $8,452 in favor of the appellee, the appellants prosecute this appeal.

The cardinal facts upon which this cause of action is predicated, stated as tersely as possible, are as follows. On September 15, 1960, a standard form of agreement between contractor and owner was entered into between appellants and appellee for the construction of the building for the plating operations of appellee. The building was completed and accepted in April 1961 by the appellee. There is an acrid dispute as to whether or not a substance known as Tectum used in the construction of the roof deck was selected because the appellee chose said Tectum after counseling and advising with the appellants and other persons who had utilized this material in the buildings which they had constructed or whether or not the selection and utilization of Tectum in the roof deck was made because of the recommendations of the architect, John S. Winbigler, co-appellant. The specifications prepared by Mr. Winbigler clearly indicate the use of Tectum as an integral part of the roof deck. The proof is conclusive that in the late summer of 1966, because of the high humidity, acid fumes and other work conditions incident and necessary in the operations of appellee's business, the Tectum disintegrated and the interior portion of the roof began to sag and fall apart so that depressions in the roof occurred where water collected or pooled and leaked into the interior of the building.

The record is clear that for a period of almost six years, in spite of the humid conditions within the building and in spite of the elements, the roof as constructed rendered satisfactory service for which it was constructed and that the appellee had no reasonable grounds upon which to suspect or believe that the roof was defective until water began to leak into the interior of the building and the roof began to sag and disintegrate. It became apparent in the summer of 1966 that it was necessary for the appellee to install a new roof on his building, and by April 1967 said material had failed in certain areas, and when the declaration was filed on December 29, 1967, the roof decking had deteriorated to the point where the roofing needed replacement. The declaration filed on December 29, 1967, was filed well within six years subsequent to the time that the appellee discovered that the roof decking had failed. The declaration sounds in tort, predicated upon the negligence of appellant Winbigler in the performance of his contract with the appellee and in violation of his common law duty to perform the contract with care, skill, reasonable expediency and faithfulness.

A judgment based on the jury verdict of $8,452 in favor of the appellee was entered. From that judgment this appeal is taken.

The only assignment of error which we reach on this appeal is appellants' assertion that the action was barred by the running of the statute of limitation. Section 722 of the Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated (1956) provides: 'All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.' All litigants agree that this section applies to the case at bar; but they disagree over the interpretation to be placed on the word 'accrued.' The appellants contend that the cause of action accrued and the statute of limitation began to run no later than the date of the completion and delivery of the building in April of 1961. It is pointed out by the appellants in their brief that the roof began to fail and sag as early as the late summer of 1966 which was well within the six year period beginning in April 1961. In contravention thereof the appellee argues that the cause of action did not accrue and the statute did not begin to run until the appellee had been injured and suffered damage as a result of appellants' negligence. Since no allegation of fraud was made in the present case, we agree that Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 742 (1956), which provides that in cases of fraudulent concealment the cause of action does not accrue until 'such fraud shall be, or with reasonable diligence might have been, first known or discovered,' has no application in the case at bar.

In support of the position that the cause of action did not accrue until actual injury with resultant damage occurred, the appellee's attorney in her excellent brief refers to certain cases from other jurisdictions which apply the 'discovery' or the 'know or ought to know' rule and also to particular Mississippi negligence cases which hold that only injury to person and property, and not merely negligence in...