Maas v. Superior Court of San Diego Cnty.

Decision Date07 November 2016
Docket NumberS225109
Citation1 Cal.5th 962,383 P.3d 637,209 Cal.Rptr.3d 571
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties Michael Eugene MAAS, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.

Russell S. Babcock, San Diego, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Edward C. DuMont, State Solicitor General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven T. Oetting, Deputy State Solicitor General, Lise S. Jacobson, Peter Quon, Jr., and Susan E. Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Cantil–Sakauye, C.J.Code of Civil Procedure section 170.61 affords litigants the right to peremptorily challenge a superior court judge based on a good faith belief that the judge is prejudiced. When a motion under section 170.6 is in proper form and timely filed, the judge is not permitted to try the assigned civil or criminal action or special proceeding, or to hear “any matter therein that involves a contested issue of law or fact.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(1).) We granted review to decide whether the statute contemplates that a party may challenge the judge assigned to assess and rule on a petition for writ of habeas corpus, at the initial stage of the habeas corpus process, before an order to show cause with respect to the petition's claims has been issued.

We conclude that, like a superior court judge's resolution of a petitioner's claims after issuance of an order to show cause, the initial assessment of a petition for writ of habeas corpus to determine whether the petitioner has stated a prima facie case for relief requires the judge to hear “a contested issue of law or fact” in a special proceeding, within the meaning of section 170.6. Accordingly, we hold that a petitioner who requests the name of the judge assigned to examine his or her habeas corpus petition is entitled to notice of that assignment, and also is entitled to peremptorily challenge the assigned judge, so long as all of the procedural requirements of section 170.6 have been satisfied, including the requirement that the assigned judge not have participated in the petitioner's underlying criminal action.

The Court of Appeal in this case reached the same conclusion and issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to reassign the assessment of Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus to a judge other than the judge who originally reviewed, and then summarily denied, his petition. The Court of Appeal's judgment is affirmed.

I. FACTS

In April 1998, a jury convicted petitioner Michael Maas of grand theft of an automobile (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1) ), and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) ). In a bifurcated proceeding, Superior Court Judge Allan J. Preckel found true the allegation that Maas had suffered two prior “strikes” (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)(i), 1170.12 ), and sentenced him to 25 years to life.

Four months later, in August 1998, a different jury found Maas guilty of burglary and forgery of a fictitious check in a trial presided over by Superior Court Judge Larrie R. Brainard. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 470.) After finding true the allegations that Maas had suffered two prior strikes, Judge Brainard sentenced him to 25 years to life and set that term to run consecutively to Maas's other sentence. Both judgments were upheld by the Court of Appeal.

Nearly 15 years later, on July 13, 2013, Maas filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in the August 1998 proceedings because his trial attorneys failed to properly challenge the prior felony convictions that led to imposition of two consecutive sentences under the “Three Strikes law.” On July 19, about one week after filing his petition, Maas wrote to the court clerk, asking for the case number, the date of filing, and the name of the judge assigned to his petition. Ten days later, on July 29, Maas received a photocopy of the petition's cover page, which had been file stamped with the date July 17, 2013. About one week after that, in a letter dated August 4, Maas again wrote to the court clerk, repeating his request for the name of the assigned judge. Three days later, Superior Court Judge John M. Thompson summarily denied Maas's habeas corpus petition; that is, he denied it without having issued a writ of habeas corpus or an order to show cause. Judge Thompson explained in his four-page denial order that Maas's claims were procedurally barred because he had failed to justify his substantial delay in raising the challenge to his Three Strikes sentences, and he had not established good cause for revisiting arguments that previously had been raised and rejected on appeal.

Maas then filed a new petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal, again alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and challenging his sentence. In addition, Maas complained about the court clerk's failure to timely notify him of Judge Thompson's assignment. In connection with this assertion, Maas attached to his habeas corpus petition a declaration in which he averred under penalty of perjury that had he been informed that Judge Thompson was assigned to review his petition for writ of habeas corpus, he would have followed the advice of his brother and moved to disqualify Judge Thompson for bias pursuant to section 170.6.

The Court of Appeal requested and received from the Attorney General an informal response to Maas's complaint that he was denied his statutory right under section 170.6 to peremptorily challenge Judge Thompson. Thereafter, the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause on that claim for relief and appointed counsel for Maas.

The Court of Appeal construed Maas's claim regarding section 170.6 as one seeking a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate the summary denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus and to reassign the petition to a judge other than Judge Thompson (see § 170.3, subd. (d)), and ordered that a writ of mandate issue. The Court of Appeal held that when a petitioner collaterally attacks his criminal convictions and sentences by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, and the petition is assigned to a judge other than the original trial judge, the petitioner may assert a section 170.6 peremptory challenge to the judge assigned to rule on the habeas corpus petition.

We granted review on our own motion, directing the parties to address whether section 170.6 permits a peremptory challenge to be asserted in a habeas corpus proceeding before an order to show cause has been issued, against a judge who has been assigned to assess a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Maas was designated the petitioning party.

II. DISCUSSION

The question presented in the case involves an interplay between a litigant's right to disqualify a superior court judge for prejudice under section 170.6, and the procedures governing a petitioner's challenge to his or her criminal conviction or sentence by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We begin with a brief overview of the relevant features of the two schemes, and then proceed to decide the proper application of section 170.6 under the circumstances presented by this case.

A. Disqualification of a superior court judge under section 170.6

Section 170.6 provides that “a judge, court commissioner, or referee of a superior court of the State of California shall not try a civil or criminal action or special proceeding of any kind or character nor hear any matter therein that involves a contested issue of law or fact when it is established as provided in this section that the judge or court commissioner is prejudiced against a party or attorney or the interest of a party or attorney appearing in the action or proceeding.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(1).) Prejudice is established, for purposes of section 170.6, by a motion supported by an “affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury, or an oral statement under oath” that the assigned judge “is prejudiced against a party or attorney ... so that the party or attorney cannot, or believes that he or she cannot, have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before the judge....” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2).) So long as the “motion is duly presented, and the affidavit or declaration under penalty of perjury is duly filed or an oral statement under oath is duly made, thereupon and without any further act or proof,” a different judge must be assigned to try the cause or hear the matter. (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(4).)

When a litigant has met the requirements of section 170.6, disqualification of the judge is mandatory, without any requirement of proof of facts showing that the judge is actually prejudiced. (McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 531, 116 Cal.Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268 ; Loftin v. Superior Court (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 577, 579, 97 Cal.Rptr. 215 [the statute's provisions “give a litigant one chance to get rid of an unwanted judge, whom he cannot successfully challenge [for cause] under [former] section 170].) This court has characterized the Legislature's enactment of section 170.6 as having bestowed upon litigants “an extraordinary right” to peremptorily challenge a judge. (McCartney, at p. 531, 116 Cal.Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268.) “The right is ‘automatic’ in the sense that a good faith belief in prejudice is alone sufficient” for disqualification. (Ibid . ; see Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 193, 137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148.) Permitting a party's belief that the judge is prejudiced to justify disqualification was intended to “preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the courts.” (Solberg, at p. 193, 137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148 ; International Union of Operating Engineers v. Superior Court (1989) 207...

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1 cases
  • Scott v. Superior Court, G057606
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 16 Mayo 2019
    ...the commencement of the hearing, or before the court considers and evaluates the petition before granting relief. (Maas v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 962, 977.) In this case, at the time Scott filed his peremptory challenge on April 2, 2019, the challenge was timely and should have bee......

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