Macauley v. Collier Cnty. Sheriff Office
| Decision Date | 25 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:21-cv-300-JLB-NPM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | ROGER MACAULEY, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Paul Kusma, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. COLLIER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE and KEVIN RAMBOSK, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Collier County, Florida, Defendants. |
ROGER MACAULEY, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Paul Kusma, Deceased, Plaintiff,
v.
COLLIER COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE and KEVIN RAMBOSK, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Collier County, Florida, Defendants.
No. 2:21-cv-300-JLB-NPM
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division
October 25, 2021
ORDER
JOHN L. BADALAMENTI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Timothy Paul Kusma tragically passed away while detained in the Naples Jail Center, a facility where medical services were provided by Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc. (“Armor”), a private contractor. Plaintiff Roger Macauley, as personal representative of Mr. Kusma's estate (“the Estate”), now sues Defendants Collier County Sherriff's Office (“CCSO”) and Sheriff Kevin Rambosk, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Collier County, Florida.
The Estate brings two claims against each defendant arising from Mr. Kusma's death: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to Mr. Kusma's medical needs, and (2) negligence under Florida law. Each claim relies on the same basic premise: Defendants failed to properly screen, supervise, or train Armor. The Estate alleges that, as a result, Armor did not provide Mr. Kusma- who was diabetic-with the correct insulin medication and did not timely provide
him with emergency services as his condition worsened. Defendants move to dismiss all four counts for various reasons, including lack of capacity to sue CCSO, failure to state a claim, state-law sovereign immunity, and failure to comply with the presuit screening requirements in Chapter 766, Florida Statutes. (Doc. 13.)
The parties agree that Counts I and III of the complaint should be dismissed because CCSO does not have capacity to be sued under Florida law. Accordingly, those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. After carefully reviewing the parties' remaining arguments, the Court holds that Count II must be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, but the Estate will be granted leave to amend. Count IV will be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and without leave to amend on the basis of sovereign immunity and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to comply with Chapter 766, Florida Statutes.
Background[1]
In 2015, Armor and Sheriff Rambosk executed a contract under which Armor agreed to provide medical services to inmates at the Naples Jail Center in exchange for a baseline compensation of $4, 883, 121.00. (Doc. 1-2 ¶ 36.) The contract included an annual cap of $750, 000 for “off-site medical services, ” which the Estate
describes as a disincentive for Armor to seek off-site treatment for inmates. (Id.; Doc. 1, ¶ 26.) Armor was also obligated to create a quality assurance program “of regularly scheduled audits of health care services, ” which was required to be supervised by a third-party consultant retained at Armor's expense. (Doc. 1, ¶ 27; Doc. 1-2, ¶ 24.) According to the Estate, Sheriff Rambosk agreed to this contract without properly screening Armor's alleged track record of medical negligence in various jails outside of Florida. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 28-46, 111-16.)
On March 28, 2019, Mr. Kusma-a Type 1 diabetic since childhood-was arrested by CCSO for driving with a suspended license. (Id., ¶¶ 47, 49.) He was booked into the Naples Jail Center and denied bond because of a prior probation violation. (Id., ¶ 48.) At the time of his booking, Mr. Kusma's blood glucose level was normal for someone with his condition. (Id., ¶ 51.) However, Armor's medical staff allegedly failed to provide Mr. Kusma with his “normal long acting insulin.” (Id., ¶ 55.) As a result, Mr. Kusma's blood glucose level “began to skyrocket.” (Id.)
Over the next several days, Mr. Kusma “repeatedly informed” Armor's staff that his blood sugar level was too high, and the insulin being provided to him was not helping. (Id., ¶¶ 56-57.) But Mr. Kusma's appeals were apparently ignored, even as he became visibly ill. Over the next two weeks, Mr. Kusma experienced multiple symptoms associated with a high blood-sugar level, including loss of consciousness, vomiting, coughing up blood, chest pain, and diarrhea. (Id., ¶¶ 58- 65.) Despite these conspicuous symptoms-and despite being placed in the medical
observation unit at least once-Mr. Kusma was not provided with different insulin medication or transported to an emergency room. (Id.)
On April 11, 2019, after returning from a court hearing, Mr. Kusma became so ill that he defecated on himself. (Id., ¶ 66.) Rather than being given medical attention, Mr. Kusma was “placed in a shower, ” where he collapsed. (Id., ¶ 66.) When chest compressions and epinephrine proved ineffective, Mr. Kusma was transported to North Collier Hospital in an unresponsive state. (Id., ¶ 68.) “Laboratory studies” of his blood at the hospital showed that he was “in a state of severe diabetic ketoacidosis.” (Id.) Shortly after arriving at the hospital, Mr. Kusma was pronounced dead. (Id., ¶ 70.)
Discussion
I.The parties agree that Counts I and III against the CCSO must be dismissed due to lack of capacity.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3), “[t]he law of the state in which the district court is located generally determines a party's capacity to sue or be sued.” Williams v. Monroe Cnty. Dist. Att'y, 702 Fed.Appx. 812, 813 (11th Cir. 2017). In Florida, “there are constitutionally created political subdivisions called counties and separately created constitutional officers, including a sheriff.” Spry v. Turner, No. 8:11-cv-531-T-33TGW, 2011 WL 940343, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2011) (citing Fla. Const. art. VIII, §§ 1(a), (d)). But “no provision is made constitutionally or statutorily for a ‘Sheriff's Department' as a separate legal entity, as an agency of the county, or as a corporate entity, nor is a Sheriff's Department given authority to be sued in such a name.” Id. (collecting cases). Thus, Florida “has not established
Sheriff's offices as separate legal entities with the capacity to be sued.” Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 523 Fed.Appx. 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013).
The parties agree that Counts I and III, which are against CCSO, must be dismissed for lack of capacity. (Doc. 13 at 4-5; Doc. 20 at 5-6.) Based on the law above, the Court agrees and will dismiss those counts without prejudice.[2]
II. The Estate fails to state a Monell claim against Sheriff Rambosk in his official capacity.
Sheriff Rambosk moves to dismiss Count II because the Estate has not identified any policy that would create liability under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (Doc. 13. at 5-12.) The Estate identifies two policy decisions that, in its view, expose Sheriff Rambosk to Monell liability: (1) hiring Armor to provide medical services in the Naples Jail Center despite its allegedly poor track record, and (2) inadequately supervising, training, or retaining Armor once it was hired. (Doc. 20 at 6-13.) The Court will begin with the basic principles of local government liability under Monell, followed by the essential elements of a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court will then discuss the Estate's two theories of liability and explain why the complaint, in its current form, does not state a claim under either theory.
A. Monell liability.
Count II seeks to hold Sheriff Rambosk liable for improperly hiring, training, and supervising Armor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any “person” who deprives someone of their federally protected rights under color of state law. The Supreme Court has held that local government entities are “persons” under section 1983 but “cannot be held liable . . . on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Instead, local governments can only be held liable under section 1983 when they execute a “policy or custom” that “inflicts the injury.” Id. at 694. Local government liability under Monell may be based on “(1) an express policy; (2) a widespread practice so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom; or (3) an act or decision of an officer with final policy-making authority.” Boudreaux v. McArtor, 681 Fed.Appx. 800, 804 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Cuesta v. Sch. Bd., 285 F.3d 962, 966-68 (11th Cir. 2002)).
B. Deliberate indifference.
Pretrial detainees have a right to adequate medical care under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985). The minimum standard of medical care required by the Due Process Clause is identical to the standard for convicted persons under the Eighth Amendment. Id. Accordingly, to prevail on a section 1983 claim for inadequate medical care, a pretrial detainee must demonstrate that jail officials acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs. Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). When bringing a claim under Monell, the detainee must demonstrate
not only that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, but also that the local government entity “had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference, ” and that this “policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
“A deliberate-indifference claim has two components: an objectively serious medical need, and subjective deliberate indifference to that need.” Hannah v. Armor Corr. Health Servs. Inc., 792 Fed.Appx. 742, 744 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004)). “An objectively serious medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity...
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