Macdonald v. Dexter

• Decision Date: 18 June 1908
• Citation: 85 N.E. 209,234 Ill. 517
• Parties: MacDONALD v. DEXTER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

234 Ill. 517

85 N.E. 209

MacDONALD

v.DEXTER.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 18, 1908.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Clair County; R. D. W. Holder, Judge.

Suit for partition by Robert S. MacDonald against Charles Dexter and others. From a decree for partition, defendant Charles Dexter appeals. Affirmed.Wise & McNulty and Brownrigg, O'Brien & Mason, for appellant.

Hickman P. Rodgers and A. H. Baer, for appellee.

Appellee, Robert S. MacDonald, filed a bill in the circuit court of St. Clair county for the partition of certain land, alleging that it was owned by his father at the time of his decease and passed by descent to the said appellee and his brother, Malcolm W. MacDonald, and sister, Helen Hunt MacDonald Jones, as the only heirs at law. The appellant, Dexter, was made a party on the ground that he claimed some interest in the premises which constituted a cloud on the title. Other persons named Quellmalz were also made parties as claiming an interest, but not in any part of the land which is directly involved in this case. The appellant, Dexter, filed his answer, claiming to be the owner of an undivided one-half interest in certain blocks and portions thereof in MacDonald's East Claremont addition to the city of East St. Louis by virtue of the following transactions: He claimed that on March 19, 1890, he entered into a contract in the name of one George Allen, but, in fact, for his own benefit, for the purchase from Eugene Latinette of 40 acres of land, including the parts in question of the East Claremont addition, for a purchase price of $3,000, paying as earnest money $100; that he afterwards made an agreement with Robert S. MacDonald, the father, whereby the latter repaid to said Dexter the $100 and paid to said Latinette the $3,000, taking a warranty deed to the premises from Latinette to said MacDonald, dated April 23, 1890; that MacDonald thereupon delivered to appellant a written memorandum (a copy of which is given in the opinion following); that a portion of the land was afterward sold for $11,150, and MacDonald reserved the $3,000 and divided the remainder between himself and appellant; that later MacDonald conveyed another piece of the 40 acres, and perhaps other pieces as to which appellant was uninformed, but that the said three heirs of Robert S. MacDonald held their respective undivided third interests of the land now in question subject to said Dexter's equitable title and beneficiary ownership of an undivided half of said property. Appellant, Dexter, also filed a cross-bill, setting forth substantially the same facts as in his answer. In the various pleadings filed to the cross-bill and answer said Robert S. MacDonald and his brother and sister set up the claim that the matter of Dexter's rights under the contract had been litigated, on the petition of said Dexter, in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, and that upon being taken to the Supreme Court of Missouri that court reversed the finding of the lower court and found against the claims of Dexter. To an amended bill setting up this matter in reference to the Missouri litigation Dexter answered, claiming that the Supreme Court of Missouri was without jurisdiction to determine his claim in and to real estate located in Illinois; furthermore, that the complainant in the partition proceedings was estopped from setting up that litigation. After the pleadings were settled, the court heard evidence as to heirship and other formal matters, and entered a decree of partition, finding, among other things, that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri was binding upon said Dexter, and that he had no interest in the real estate in question.

CARTER, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The main contention in this case is whether or not the questions involved in the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri (Dexter v. MacDonald, 196 Mo. 373, 95 S. W. 359) are res judicata. The record before us conclusively shows that the parties, subject-matter, and cause of action in the Missouri litigation were identical with those in this proceeding. This being so, under the general rule the judgment of the Missouri court is conclusive on this hearing. Hanna v. Read, 102 Ill. 596, 40 Am. Rep. 608;Ruegger v. Indianapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co., 103 Ill. 449;Chicago Theological Seminary v. People, 189 Ill. 439, 59 N. E. 977. This general rule is admitted by appellant, and he also admits that the judgment or decree of a sister state is entitled to the same credit, validity, and effect in every other court of the United States as it enjoys in the state where pronounced, if the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, and that this is the settled practice under section 1 of article 4 of the federal Constitution. Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158, 39 N. E. 595;Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474,15 Am. Rep. 621; Hanna v. Read, supra. He contends, however, that these general rules do not apply here, as the courts of another state are without jurisdiction to render a decree directly affecting title to land in this state. McCartney v. Osburn, 118 Ill. 403, 9 N. E. 210;Cooley v. Scarlett, 38 Ill. 316, 87 Am. Dec. 298;Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87, 11 Sup. Ct. 960, 35 L. Ed. 640. He maintains that, as the claim here in question affects the title to land in Illinois, the courts of Missouri, while having jurisdiction of the parties, did not have jurisdiction of the subject-matter; that, therefore, the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court is not res judicata. The claim of appellant is based upon the following writing: ‘St. Louis, Mo., April 23, 1892. I hereby agree to allow Charles Dexter one-half of the net profits of the sale of the forty acres of land, (when sold,) being the same land this day bought by me from Eugene Latinette, in St. Clair county, Illinois. R. S. MacDonald.’ The main facts which caused the father of appellee to give this memorandum to appellant are set out in the pleadings, as shown in the statement heretofore given. All of the purchase price for the land in question was paid by the father of appellee, and none by appellant. Manifestly on the record before us he was to be allowed half the net profits of the sale in consideration of his turning over his option for the purchase of the land to MacDonald. Whatever right appellant has must be based upon this written memorandum. If he has the interest he contends for, it must be because an express trust giving that interest is created by this writing. Whatever talk or understanding the parties had previous thereto must be held to be merged in this written memorandum. 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) p. 1078. Hence the trust, if any, must be held to be express, and not an implied or resulting trust, as apparentlycontended by appellant. 15 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 1123.

This court had under consideration a similar written memorandum or agreement in Morrill v. Colehour, 82 Ill. 618. The memorandum there in question showed that the party who did not hold the title to the land, but was to receive a part of the net profits, had advanced a part of the purchase money, and the writing set out its purpose with greater detail than the one now under consideration. In discussing that agreement we said (page 625): ‘The written agreement executed by W. H. Colehour only binds him to pay appellant and the others equal portions of the one-half of the net profits arising from the sale of the lands. It in no event bound him to convey the land, nor can we imagine any state of facts that could arise under the agreement that would require a court of equity to compel him to convey the land to them. Had he failed or refused to proceed to make sale as was contemplated by the parties, he could no doubt, have been compelled to do so, or another would have been appointed for the purpose by a decree of court. By this agreement this was not an interest in or title to the land, but it was an agreement to give appellant, and pay to him, profits that might be realized from the sale of the land. * * * It was not in the contemplation of any of the parties that W. H. Colehour should ever convey a foot of this land to them or either of them. The purchase was made for the purpose of sale and the acquisition of profits. It was not bought to hold as land, but simply as an article of commerce and for speculation, and for that reason equity regards it as personal property among the partners. In such cases the intention of the parties stamps the character of the transaction.’ In the later case of Roby v. Colehour, 135 Ill. 300, 336, 25 N. E. 777, 778, this court again had the same memorandum agreement under consideration, and stated ‘that the beneficiaries under that instrument took no interest in or title to the land itself, but that their interest was only in the profits as to which their relation was that of partners.’ In Boone v. Clark, 129 Ill. 466, 21 N. E. 850,5 L. R. A. 276,Van Housen v. Copeland, 180 Ill. 74, 54 N. E. 169, and Ingraham v. Mariner, 194 Ill. 269, 62 N. E. 609, this court referred with approval to the construction that had been placed upon the writing in question in Morrill v. Colehour, supra. In the Ingraham Case, just cited, this court held that the writing there under consideration gave an interest in the land because it so stated in terms, and reiterated the doctrine that the character of the transaction in such cases is shown by the intention of the parties, and that such intention must be determined by...