MacDonald v. Sheriff
Decision Date | 26 January 1953 |
Citation | 94 A.2d 555 |
Parties | MacDONALD v. SHERIFF et al. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Morris G. Pilot, Michael Pilot and Gerald P. Collins, Bangor, for plaintiff.
Henry Heselton Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.
Before MURCHIE, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, MERRILL, NULTY and WILLIAMSON, JJ.
This case comes before us on appeal by the defendants from a final decree of the sitting justice granting a permanent injunction against the defendants as they constitute and are the State Liquor Commission in a bill in equity filed in Penobscot County Supreme Judicial Court.
From the bill in equity, the answer, the findings of facts by the sitting justice and the agreed stipulation, the following facts seem clear:
The complainant, on January 1, 1952, was duly issued by the State Liquor Commission a spirituous and a vinous liquor license and also a malt liquor license for the year 1952, which licenses, by their terms, permitted said complainant to legally carry on the sale of liquor in premises located in the town of Herman in the County of Penobscot commonly known as Hotel 'Turn-Inn'. It also appears that the complainant asserted, and it is not seriously denied, that he lawfully conducted his business during the year 1952 in accordance with what is now known as Sec. 22-C, Chap. 57, R.S.1944, said Sec. 22-C having been enacted by the Legislature by Sec. 102, Chap. 349, P.L.1949, and former Secs. 36 and 53 of said Chap. 57, Chap. 97, §§ 1, 2, P.L.1947, were repealed by Secs. 103 and 105 of said Chap. 349, P.L.1949, and as amended by Chap. 252, P.L.1951, and in accordance with United States Eastern Standard Time. It is also stipulated and agreed that for the year 1952 the town of Herman did not by vote adopt daylight saving time, so-called.
Chap. 1, Sec. 4, R.S.1944, defines standard time as follows:
'Sec. 4. Standard time defined. R.S. c. 1, § 8, 1931, c. 273, § 1. Within this state the standard time shall be that which is known and designated by the federal statute as 'United States Eastern Standard Time."
The United States Eastern Standard Time referred to above was established and enacted by an act of Congress which is known as the Act of March 19, 1918, Chap. 24, Secs. 1, 2 and 4, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 261, 262, 263, and said Act provided in substance that for the purpose of establishing standard time of the United States the continental United States was divided into five zones. It was provided that the standard time of the first zone shall be based upon the mean astronomical time of the seventy-fifth degree of longitude west from Greenwich; the bases of the other zones are similarly set forth and it was provided that the limitations of each zone were to be defined by an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission having regard for the convenience of commerce and for the junction and division points of Interstate Commerce. Sec. 263 provided that the standard time of the first zone, which included the State of Maine, would be known and designated as United States Eastern Standard Time.
So far as our research shows, United States Eastern Standard Time has been the legal time in use in the State of Maine, at least, since 1931, except that during the emergency created by what we call the second world war, that is, the war between the United States and Germany, Italy, Japan and other foreign countries, by Chap. 330, P.L.1941, Sp.Sess.1942, standard time in our State was advanced one hour. Under the provisions of the act, when the emergency ceased the act was terminated by proclamation of the Governor effective as of September 30, 1945. The only other reference to daylight saving time or to a different time than United States Eastern Standard Time in our statutes which has been called to our attention appears in R.S.1944, Chap. 57, now known as Sec. 22-C to which we will hereafter refer.
We, therefore, declare that except when changed or modified by the Legislature, United States Eastern Standard Time is the legal time for all legal business of the State of Maine and, whenever in our statutes time is referred to, unless it is otherwise specified, it means United States Eastern Standard Time as defined by R.S.1944, Chap. 1, Sec. 4, above quoted. In short, the liquor licenses issued to and held by the complainant permit the operation of the business of selling liquor during the hours prescribed therein and those hours refer to United States Eastern Standard Time unless that time is changed or modified by the Legislature as above stated.
Sec. 22-C, Chap. 57, R.S.1944, as amended, reads as follows:
(Emphasis ours.)
Sec. 6, Subsec. VIII of Chap. 57, R.S.1944, with respect to the power of the State Liquor Commission to establish rules and regulations reads as follows:
We might add for purposes of clarification that the emphasized portion of said Sec. 22-C hereinbefore quoted was enacted by said Chap. 97, P.L.1947, and at that time affected Secs. 36 and 53 of Chap. 57. When Chap. 349, Sec. 102, P.L.1949 was enacted as Sec. 22-C, Secs. 36 and 53 of said Chap. 57 were repealed. The State Liquor Commission, acting in pursuance of Chap. 57, Sec. 6, Subsec. VIII, and after the adoption of the amendment enacted by said Chap. 97, P.L.1947, which was the daylight saving proviso now contained in Chap. 57, Sec. 22-C, promulgated what is known as Rule 15 which reads as follows:
(Emphasis ours.)
The State Liquor Commission, through its inspection agencies, notified the complainant that he was carrying on his liquor business contrary to the Statutes and the Rules prescribed thereunder by the State Liquor Commission because the State Liquor Commission had determined that a majority of such business establishments in the town of Herman were being conducted on daylight saving time and that unless complainant changed his hours to accord with what the State Liquor Commission had determined was the time generally used in the town of Herman, which was claimed to be daylight saving time under Rule 15, it would be necessary to call the complainant before the Commission to consider the suspension or revocation of the licenses held by co...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Somerset Cnty. v. Dep't of Corr.
...("[I]t is axiomatic that State agencies may exercise only that power which is conferred upon them by law."); MacDonald v. Sheriff, 148 Me. 365, 372, 94 A.2d 555 (1953) ("The Commission being purely a creature of statute is subject to the rule universally applicable to all bodies that owe th......