Mace v. Hollenbeck

• Decision Date: 01 April 1915
• Docket Number: No. 16514.,16514.
• Citation: 175 S.W. 876
• Parties: MACE v. HOLLENBECK et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

175 S.W. 876

MACE v. HOLLENBECK et al.

No. 16514.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

April 1, 1915.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Texas County; L. B. Woodside, Judge.

Action by Mattie M. Mace against Sanford

M. Hollenbeck and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Dooley & Hiett, W. E. Barton, and C. E. Covert, all of Houston, for appellant. Lamar, Lamar & Lamar and George H. Scott, all of Houston, for respondents.

BLAIR, J.

This is a suit to quiet title. The question in the case is the proper construction of the will of Arthur Hollenbeck, which will, omitting formal parts, is as follows:

"I, Arthur S. Hollenbeck, of the city of Mountain Grove, county of Wright and state of Missouri, being of sound and disposing mind, hereby declare this instrument to be my last will and testament and hereby revoke all former testamentary dispositions of my estate heretofore made by me.

"First. I hereby give and bequeath to my beloved wife, Martha M. Hollenbeck, if she survives me, my entire estate, real, personal and mixed wheresoever situated after my debts and funeral expenses are paid, to be used for her benefit and assistance in whatever manner she chooses during her natural life and after her death her debts and funeral expenses paid, the remainder to be divided, giving one half to her legal heirs and one half to my legal heirs according to their lawful order.

"Second. I hereby appoint my said wife, Martha M. Hollenbeck, if she survives me, my executrix and direct that she shall not be required to give bond as executrix.

"Third. In the event of my wife dying before me I hereby give and bequeath my entire estate, real, personal and mixed wheresoever situated after my debts and funeral expenses are paid, one half to the legal heirs of my wife, Martha M. Hollenbeck, according to their lawful classification and one half to my lawful heirs according to their legal classification.

"Fourth. In event of my wife dying before me hereby appoint * * * my executor and hereby direct that he shall not be required to give bond as such executor."

It was admitted that, plaintiff was 53 years old in 1909 and was formerly the wife of the testator, having been married to him in 1872 and having lived with him as his wife until 1904, when he died without descendants. Since his death she married Mace. Defendants are the heirs at law of testator and plaintiff, who is still childless. It is further admitted that said Arthur S. Hollenbeck and wife, at the date of said marriage, had very little property, and that the property owned by the said Arthur S. Hollenbeck, at the date of his death, was the result of the joint labors, economy, and accumulation of himself and his said wife. It is further admitted that, in addition to the property devised by the will read in evidence, there was another piece of property on which was located a flouring mill, valued at $3,000, which was held by Arthur S. Hollenbeck and Mattie M. Hollenbeck, plaintiff, as tenants by the entireties. Upon the death of said Arthur S. Hollenbeck, the title to this vested in said Mattie M. Hollenbeck in fee simple. It is further admitted that the said Mattie M. Hollenbeck paid on the purchase price of said mill property, out of the money derived out of her father's estate, the sum of $838.78. It is further admitted, in open court, that Arthur S. Hollenbeck's personal property, at the time of his death, was of the value of $3,262.84, and that the value of his real estate was $3,500. There was evidence that the rental value of the farm in 1909 was $300 to $350. The trial court held that plaintiff took only a life estate in the lands described in the petition, without power of disposition or sale, and that in the remainder in said lands the heirs of the testator were seised of a one half interest and the heirs of plaintiff would take the other half upon plaintiff's death. Plaintiff appealed and contends the will gives her the fee in the lands or, at least, a life estate with power of disposal.

By reason of the "infinite variety" of expression employéd in wills, precedents are of less value in their construction than in many other fields of inquiry. Even identical words justly receive different interpretations when set in variant contexts and used under different circumstances. By the statute (section 583, R. S. 1909) we are admonished, in construing wills, to "have due regard to the directions" therein and to "the true intent and meaning of the testator," and such intent must be enforced unless it conflicts with public policy, or positive law. The true intent is to be determined from" the language of the entire instrument, the circumstances surrounding the testator to be availed of in construing language equivocal or of doubtful meaning. In construing a will. the ordinary, primary meaning is to be given its language unless other terms used disclose that such meaning is repugnant to the testator's intent as it appears from the whole.

The first section of the will is the basis of this controversy. By that section the testator gave to plaintiff, in case she survived him, his entire estate, subject to the payment of his debts and funeral expenses, "to be used for her benefit and...