Macey v. Com.

• Decision Date: 03 May 1967
• Parties: Peter W. MACEY v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 225

226 N.E.2d 225

352 Mass. 519

Peter W. MACEY v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued April 3, 1967.

Decided May 3, 1967.

Chester C. Paris, Wakefield, for petitioner.

Willie J. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER and REARDON, JJ.

WHITTEMORE, Justice.

This petition for writ of error was reserved and reported by a single justice on the petition, the anser, the return, the findings of the single justice and one assignment of error. The error assigned is that the petitioner was not represented by counsel when he was arraigned in the Superior Court on October 13, 1950, and pleaded not guilty on six indictment, each for breaking and entering in the nighttime and larceny.

Although no appearance was entered, the petitioner was represented by counsel on October 27, 1950, the day set for trial. On that day, after conferring with counsel and as a result of the conference, ¹ the petitioner decided to plead guilty. He did so and sentences were imposed.

The petitioner relies on Hamilton v. State of Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114. Hamilton, sentenced to death on a count for breaking and entering with intent to ravish, alleged error in that he had been without counsel when he pleaded not guilty on his arraignment. The Alabama court refused post-conviction relief because there was no showing that the petitioner 'was disadvantaged in any way.' The Supreme Court reversed the judgment. The court ruled that arraignment under Alabama law was a critical stage for 'then * * * the defense of insanity must be pleaded * * * or the opportunity is lost. * * * Thereafter that plea may not be made except in the discretion of the trial judge, and his refusal to accept it is 'not revisable' on appeal. * * * Pleas in abatement (and motions to quash) must also be made at the time of arraignment. * * * When one pleads to a capital charge without benefit of counsel, we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted. * * * (Cases cited.) In this case, as in those, the degree of prejudice can never be known. Only the presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently.'

In White v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193, the petitioner had entered a plea of guilty at a preliminary hearing when he was not represented by counsel. Later, with counsel, he pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity but at the ensuing trial the prior plea of guilty was introduced in evidence. Plainly the preliminary hearing had become a 'critical' stage in the proceeding and the petitioner was prejudiced.

To show that the arraignment was a critical stage, the petitioner relies on our decisions holding that the pleas were an admission of the validity of the indictments and a waiver of all matters in abatement, and that no pleas to abate or motions to quash might thereafter be filed without leave of court. ² Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 570, 120 N.E. 209, and cases cited. In re Lebowitch, petitioner, 235 Mass. 357, 362--363, 126 N.E. 831, and cases cited. See Commonwealth v. Greenberg, 339 Mass. 557, 564, 160 N.E.2d 181. The exercise of discretion not to allow withdrawal of a plea was not subject to exception, Commonwealth v. Blake, 12 Allen 188, Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 463, 76 N.E. 127, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1056, nor to review on writ of error. In re Lebowitch, petitioner, supra.

Passing the question whether the Hamilton case rule would be applied in all respects in a noncapital case, the issues are whether in the circumstances (1) the arraignment was a critical stage of the proceedings ³ and (2) there was the possibility of prejudice or (3) the absence of prejudice is affirmatively shown.

The controlling circumstance is, we think, the subsequent pleas of guilty after consultation with counsel. Those pleas made irrelevant many constitutional issues. GARVIN V. COMMONWEALTH, MASS., 223 N.E.2D 396,^A and cases cited. In United States ex rel. Maisenhelder v. Rundle, Superintendent, 349 F.2d 592, 595 (3d Cir.), the petitioner without counsel had pleaded guilty at a preliminary hearing and at the later formal arraignment with counsel present he again pleaded guilty. The plea at the preliminary hearing did not affect any rights (see fn. 3), but the court said, 'Additionally, a voluntary and intentional plea of guilty on the advice of counsel constitutes a waiver to any objection of prior proceedings which may also include violation of defendant's rights.' Accord, United States v. French, 274 F.2d 297 (7th Cir.); United States ex rel. Staples v. Pate, Warden, 332 F.2d 531, 533--534 (7th Cir.), and cases cited. We assume that, notwithstanding the waiver involved in the pleas, the petitioner might show that the violation of a constitutional right had affected the decision to plead. The facts do not suggest the relevance of such an exception in this case.

Plainly no attorney having any ground for believing that there was tenable basis to abate or quash the indictments would let the prior pleas of not guilty affect his advice in repect of pleading guilty without first ascertaining whether he might have leave to withdraw those prior pleas. The absence of such a motion is, we think, a reasonable showing that the prior pleas and their possible restriction of defences, did not affect the pleas of guilty. ⁴ The findings show affirmatively or suggest some other considerations that may have underlain the decision so to plead. See fn. 1.

We conclude therefore that the arraignment, as the case turned out, was not a critical stage and that although there was on October 13, 1950, the possibility of prejudice, the absence of prejudice sufficiently appears to make the Hamilton case inoperative. In United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir.), cert. den. sub nom. Cooper v. Reincke, Warden, 379 U.S. 909, 85 S.Ct. 205, 13 L.E.2d 181, the court said, after reviewing the Hamilton and White cases, that 'the 'critical' point is to be determined both from the nature of the proceedings and from that which actually occurs in each case.' In Anderson v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 277, 352 F.2d 945, 946--947 the court, after observing that there is a right to counsel at arraignment, held, 'In this non-capital case, where the record affirmatively shows that no prejudice resulted from...