MacFarlane's Case

• Decision Date: 03 December 1953
• Citation: 115 N.E.2d 925,330 Mass. 573
• Parties: MacFARLANE'S CASE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 925

115 N.E.2d 925

330 Mass. 573

MacFARLANE'S CASE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Nov. 3, 1953.

Decided Dec. 3, 1953.

Walter G. Powers, Taunton, for claimant.

James C. Gahan, Jr., Boston, for insurer.

Before QUA, C. J., and WILKINS, SPALDING, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

Glenwood Range Company, a self insurer, appeals from a decree awarding dependency compensation and other sums to Alice MacFarlane, the widow of the deceased employee, Oscar W. MacFarlane, ¹ who contracted a case of silicosis arising out of and in the course of his employment and, in consequence thereof, died on January 11, 1951. The self insurer contends that the claimant's right is barred because during the life of her husband she participated with him in signing a lump sum agreement.

The reviewing board adopted the decision of the single member, which so far as material is: 'The employee under date of October 15, 1950, resolved his rights to incapacity compensation by an agreement to redeem liability by the payment of a lump sum of $6,584.62, making [with] weekly payments theretofore received by him a total of $8,391.77. It is the contention of the self insurer that any claim of the widow for dependency compensation was concluded by the agreement of the deceased when he settled his rights to incapacity compensation. This attitude of the self insurer may be because the now widow signed with the employee in connection with said settlement, and, as administratrix of his estate, cashed the settlement check. I rule that the self insurer's position is not well taken, that the widow had no rights which she could sign away in connection with her husband's settlement of his rights, and that his settlement of his claim could not defeat any rights of the claimant widow. (Cripps' Case, 216 Mass. 586 ; Burns' Case, 218 Mass. 8 ; and Cherbury's Case, 251 Mass. 397 .)'

The self insurer does not take the position that the employee's settlement of his claim is a bar to the widow, but argues that what she did herself with respect to that settlement does constitute a bar. See Wallace v. Lux Clock Co., 120 Conn. 280, 180 A. 466.

The reviewing board did not undertake to find all the facts upon which the self insurer's defence is based. At the hearing before the single member the agreement, dated October 15, 1950, for redeeming liability by payment of a lump sum approved by the board on November 20, 1950, was made part of the record by agreement. This was signed by the employee and by the claimant upon a form apparently provided by the department of industrial accidents. It reads. 'Received of Glenwood Range Co. the lump sum of 6584 dollars and 62 cents ($6584.62), making, with weekly payments already received by me, the total sum of $8391 dollars and 77 cents ($8391.77). Said payments are received in redemption of the liability for all weekly payments now or in the future due me under the Workmen's Compensation Act, for all injuries received by me on or about the 15th day of December 1948, or any other date, while in the employ of the above named employer, subject to the approval of the Department of Industrial Accidents. This includes all medical and legal expenses. [Signed] Oscar W. MacFarlane Employee or Dependent [Signed] Alice MacFarlane wife 29 N. Precinct Street Street and number East Taunton City or Town [Signed] Glenwood Range Company Insurer By James C. Gahan, Jr.' The agreement was witnessed.

Also in the record is a check on a Boston bank dated January 2, 1951, for $5,609.62 payable to Oscar W. MacFarlane, signed 'Brown, Field & McCarthy Settlement Account for Glenwood-Lloyd Claims by James C. Gahan, Jr.' The indorsement is 'Alice MacFarlane administratrix of the estate of Oscar W. MacFarlane deceased.'

The three cases cited by the reviewing board do not sustain its ruling that the widow had no rights she could sign away. The only case of the three to which we need refer is Cripps' Case, 216 Mass. 586, 104 N.E. 565, which held that a release solely by the employee did not bar the widow's claim arising after his death. At page 589 of 216 Mass., at page 566 of 104 N.E., it was said, 'The right of recovery expressly given to his widow cannot accrue until his death. Having been created for her benefit, it is independent of his control, and under section 22 ² can be discharged only by herself where she is the sole dependent, or by those authorized to act in her behalf.' Compare King v. Viscoloid Co., 219 Mass. 420, 422-423, 106 N.E. 988. In Brophy's Case, 327 Mass. 557, 561, 99 N.E.2d 922, 924, there appears the following pertinent language: ...