Maciejczak v. Bartell

• Decision Date: 08 August 1936
• Docket Number: 25925.
• Citation: 60 P.2d 31,187 Wash. 113
• Parties: MACIEJCZAK v. BARTELL, Sheriff, et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

60 P.2d 31

187 Wash. 113

MACIEJCZAK v. BARTELL, Sheriff, et al.

No. 25925.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

August 8, 1936

Appeal from Superior Court, Grays Harbor County; J. M. Phillips Judge.

Action by Nellie Maciejczak, as administratrix of the estate of Thomas Maciejczak, against Jeff Bartell, Sheriff of Grays Harbor County, C. M. Stearns, A. E. Anderson, the American Surety Company of New York, J. A. Nienau, and William Maynard. At the close of plaintiff's case, the action was dismissed as to J. A. Nienau and William Maynard. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants Jeff Bartell, C. M Stearns, and A. E. Anderson appeal.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

W. H Abel and Geo. D. Abel, both of Montesano, for appellants.

F. L. Morgan and Beth E. Morgan, both of Hoquiam, and A. P. Wilson, of Montesano, for respondent.

BEALS Justice.

This action was instituted by Nellie Maciejczak for the purpose of recovering damages for the alleged wrongful death of her husband, Thomas Maciejczak. Plaintiff sued, as administratrix of the estate of her late husband, upon two causes of action, first, to recover damages for pain and suffering endured by him, and, second, for the benefit of herself as his widow and sole dependent. The defendants named in plaintiff's third amended complaint, upon which the action was tried, were Jeff Bartell, sheriff of Grays Harbor county, American Surety Company of New York, a corporation, surety on the sheriff's bond, and A. E. Anderson, C. M. Stearns, W. L. Maynard, and J. A. Nienau, deputy sheriffs. As to Maynard and Nienau, the action was dismissed at the close of plaintiff's case.

It appears that the deceased, Thomas Maciejczak, with his wife, the plaintiff in this action, owned and operated a farm in Grays Harbor county. July 20, 1934, Mr. Maciejczak was arrested, having been charged with the offense of malicious destruction of property. He was given a preliminary hearing Before a justice of the peace, was bound over for trial, and committed to the county jail. In the complaint upon which the action was tried, plaintiff alleged the arrest of her husband by the defendant sheriff, acting through his deputies, and that at about 9 o'clock on the evening of July 25th the sheriff and his deputies assaulted Mr. Maciejczak, severely beating him, and thereafter binding him to the bars of the jail corridors, leaving him in the position during the entire night, without care or medical attention; that the defendants (other than the surety company) threatened Maciejczak with severe punishment and with deportation to Poland, his native land; that, as a result of the treatment of Mr. Maciejczak, he was reduced to a state of frenzy, and, without medical attention, was charged with insanity, and by the superior court was ordered taken to the state hospital for the insane at Steilacoom, where he died July 28, 1934, as the result of the treatment which he had received at the hands of the defendants.

By their answer the defendants denied any wrongful acts on their part, and, after pleading the arrest of Thomas Maciejczak under a lawful warrant and his commitment to the county jail, alleged that he became violently insane; that he attempted to kill other prisoners confined in the jail, and attempted to kill himself by striking his head against the walls and floor, thereby inflicting upon himself injuries, from the result of which he died. Defendants alleged that in the exercise of their duty they restrained Mr. Maciejczak and overpowered him, using no unnecessary violence. They further alleged that they called a physician to attend Mr. Maciejczak, who examined and treated him. The material affirmative allegations of the answer were denied by plaintiff in her reply.

Upon trial of the action Before the court sitting with a jury, a verdict was rendered awarding plaintiff, upon her first cause of action, the sum of $5,000, and upon the second cause of action the sum of $11,500. The verdict also included an award against the surety company in the sum of $5,000, that being the amount of its bond. Defendants' motion for a new trial, or in the alternative for judgment in their favor notwithstanding the verdict, having been denied, judgment was rendered on the verdict in plaintiff's favor, from which judgment defendants Jeff Bartell, C. M. Stearns, and A. E. Anderson have appealed.

Error is assigned upon the admission of evidence over appellants' objection; upon the exclusion of evidence upon respondent's objection; upon the giving of certain instructions and the refusal of other instructions requested by appellants; upon alleged misconduct of counsel; and upon actions on the part of the court, which appellants alleged were erroneous and prejudicial. Error is also assigned upon the form of the judgment, the same not providing that the judgment against the surety company be considered as a portion of the judgment against the sheriff; upon the denial by the trial court of appellants' motion for a directed verdict; upon the denial of their motion for judgment in their favor notwithstanding the verdict; and upon denial of their motion for a new trial.

Appellants argue that the utmost which it can be contended respondent's case shows is that the decedent was hit over the head with blackjacks or saps by appellants Stearns and Anderson. It clearly appears that while decedent was confined in the county jail he became at least to some extent irrational, and that the sheriff and his deputies forcibly subdued him and placed him under such physical restraint that he could not injure himself or any one else. Appellants argue that, even if a question for the jury was presented as to whether or not excessive force was used, there is nothing from which it can fairly be inferred that excessive force was the proximate cause of the injuries to, and the death of, decedent, and that the jury could only speculate concerning the amount of force which Maciejczak had used upon himself and the resulting extent of his self-inflicted injuries. Appellants invoke the well-recognized rule stated in 17 C.J. § 166, title 'Death': Where death may have resulted from either of two causes, for one of which defendant would be liable, and for the other not liable, plaintiff must show with a reasonable certainty that the cause for which defendant is liable produced the result.'

Appellants cite many other authorities to the same effect.

The evidence introduced by respondent tended to prove that Thomas Maciejczak was a quiet, inoffensive, rather ignorant farmer, who, by unceasing industry and painful economy, had succeeded in turning his acres of rough land into a valuable and thriving farm; that years of controversy with a railroad company which had built a branch line through his land, and loss suffered by him through alleged wrongful acts of the railroad company, had brought Mr. Maciejczak to a state of mind in which he felt justified in taking the law into his own hands, as the result of which he evolved and put into operation a plan to force the railroad to cease using the track across his property. This resulted in the arrest of Mr. Maciejczak, with the result that he was confined in jail. This worried him greatly, and caused him to fear that he would be killed, or at least deported. He became extremely nervous and doubtless manifested irrational symptoms. It was appellants' theory that it was necessary to physically subdue Mr. Maciejczak and place him under restraint; that this was done without the exertion of unnecessary force; and that any injuries which Mr. Maciejczak received were selfinflicted. Respondent's evidence tends to prove that Mr. Maciejczak was brutally beaten over the head, and that his death a few days later was the direct result of the injuries inflicted upon him by appellants. On the other hand, appellants contend that Mr. Maciejczak's death was due to acute mania, and that the injuries which he inflicted upon himself constituted a contributing cause.

Careful examination of the record convinces us that the rule relied upon by appellants is not applicable to the situation here presented. The evidence presents a question upon which the jury should pass. The trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for judgment in their favor as matter of law.

Many questions are presented on this appeal. On respondent's objection, the trial court refused to allow appellants to testify as to what they did and as to what the deceased did at the time of the alleged assault upon the latter; the court being of the opinion that such testimony came within the bar of Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1211, which reads as follows: 'No person offered as a witness shall be excluded from giving evidence by reason of his interest in the event of the action, as a party thereto or otherwise, but such interest may be shown to affect his credibility: Provided, however, that in an action or proceeding where the adverse party sues or defends as executor, administrator or legal representative of any deceased person, or as deriving right or title by, through or from any deceased person, or as the guardian or conservator of the estate of any insane person, or of any minor under the age of fourteen (14) years, then a party in interest or to the record, shall not be admitted to testify in his own behalf as to any transaction had by him with, or any statement made to him, or in his presence, by any such deceased or insane person, or by any such minor under the age of fourteen (14) years: Provided further, that this exclusion shall not apply to parties of record who sue or defend in a representative or fiduciary capacity, and have no other or further interest in the action.'

Respondent's second cause of action was brought pursuant to Rem.Rev.Stat. §§...