Mack v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 08 March 2019
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 8:15-cv-676-T-23JSS
• Parties: OTIS MACK, III, Applicant, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

OTIS MACK, III, Applicant, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

CASE NO. 8:15-cv-676-T-23JSS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

March 8, 2019

ORDER

Otis Mack, III, applies for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and challenges the validity of his state convictions for first-degree murder and burglary of an occupied dwelling, for which convictions Mack is imprisoned for life. Numerous exhibits ("Respondent's Exhibit ___") support the response. (Doc. 12) The respondent admits the application's timeliness. (Doc. 12, p. 5)

FACTS¹

Mack and his co-defendant entered the seventy-four-year-old victim's home where they used duct tape to bind both her ankles and hands and to cover her mouth. Mack and his co-defendant took from the victim's home a computer; the victim's purse and jewelry; and some of the victim's personal papers. Mack and theco-defendant left the scene in the victim's car. The victim died as a result of the attack. The medical examiner testified that the victim suffered from emphysema. During the attack the victim sustained blunt force injuries and a broken rib. The medical examiner opined that (1) lung disease, (2) a gag, and (3) a broken rib collectively and fatally inhibited the victim's breathing.

Mack's fingerprints were on both a roll of duct tape found in the victim's home and on a piece of duct tape from the victim's mouth. Mack's DNA was found (1) on the victim's bed sheet, (2) on a bruise on the victim's arm, and (3) on fingernail clippings from the victim. Mack and his co-defendant were arrested and charged with first-degree murder and burglary of an occupied dwelling. After waiving his Miranda rights, Mack confessed. A jury convicted Mack of both charges, and he serves life imprisonment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:

In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking injustification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011). See White v. Woodall, 572 U. S. 415, 427 (2014) ("The critical point is that relief is available under § 2254(d)(1)'s unreasonable-application clause if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there could be no 'fairminded disagreement' on the question . . . .") (citing Richter); Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) ("And an 'unreasonable application of' those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.") (citing Woodall, 134 S. Ct. at 1702). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) ("It is the objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of the state court decision that we are to decide."). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412.

The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the state case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. at 694. A federal court must afford due deference to a state court's decision. "AEDPA prevents defendants — and federal courts — from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett,559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, 181 (2011) ("This is a 'difficult to meet,' . . . and 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt' . . . .") (citations omitted).

When the last state court to decide a federal claim explains its decision in a reasoned opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific reasons as stated in the opinion and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) ("[A] federal habeas court simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable."). When the relevant state-court decision is not accompanied with reasons for the decision, the federal court "should 'look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning." Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192. "The State may contest "the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision . . . . Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192.

In a per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate court on direct appeal affirmed Mack's convictions and sentences. (Respondent's Exhibit 7) Similarly, in another per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate court affirmed the denial of Mack's subsequent Rule 3.850 motion to vacate. (Respondent's Exhibit 12) The state appellate court's per curiam affirmanceswarrant deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 ("When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary."), and Bishop v. Warden, 726 F. 3d 1243, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2013) (describing the difference between an "opinion" or "analysis" and a "decision" or "ruling" and explaining that deference is accorded the state court's "decision" or "ruling" even absent an "opinion" or "analysis").

As Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181-82, explains, review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court:

We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that "resulted in" a decision that was contrary to, or "involved" an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward-looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court.

Mack bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court's fact determination. "[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden ofrebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to a finding of fact but not to a mixed determination of law and fact. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046 (2001). The...