Mackendrick v. State

Decision Date09 May 2013
Docket NumberNo. 1D11–5229.,1D11–5229.
Citation112 So.3d 131
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals
PartiesClark MACKENDRICK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; and David P. Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Clark MacKendrick appeals his convictions for capital sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation. MacKendrick contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his incriminating statement and other evidence, disclosed during a custodial interrogation before deputies read his Miranda rights.* Finding this suppression issue dispositive, we reverse and remand for a new trial, thereby mooting a second, separate issue relating to the denial of a motion for mistrial.

I. Facts

The amended information alleged that MacKendrick committed sexual acts against a minor, H.M., on various occasions between July 28, 2003, and July 28, 2005. At the suppression hearing, the State established that on February 21, 2007, MacKendrick was incarcerated at the Okaloosa Correctional Institution for another offense. On that date, two deputies from the Liberty County Sheriff's Office came to the prison to interview MacKendrick regarding the allegations that ultimately led to the charges in this case.

MacKendrick testified regarding his summons to the central office. He was in the dorm area when a prison officer directed him to report to the inspector's office at the center compound. MacKendrick, who is familiar with prison rules and regulations, testified that he heeded the official order because he was told to do so. He explained that his refusal to comply would have constituted disobeying a verbal order, resulting in a disciplinary report. An officer escorted MacKendrick through two secured doors out of the dorm area and frisked him for contraband. When an officer inquired why he was being called to the office, MacKendrick said he did not know the reason. The officer commented that MacKendrick must have done something wrong. In the prison warden's presence, the inspector took MacKendrick to an eight-by-eight room in the “admin” area. MacKendrick testified that after the inspector shut the door behind him, it remained closed during the ensuing interview. MacKendrick denied initiating the interview or voluntarily going to the room. He professed to have no idea why he had been summoned to the office and then to the interview room. MacKendrick encountered Deputies Swier and Bateman, dressed in plain clothes, waiting for him inside the room.

Deputy Swier testified regarding the circumstances that led to the prison interview. Swier became the lead investigator in this case after the mother of eleven-year-old H.M. provided information to authorities concerning sexual abuse by MacKendrick. This led to the victim's taped forensic interview with the Child Protection Team. The allegations in that interview prompted Swier to arrange with prison authorities to interview MacKendrick at the institution. Swier characterized the purpose of his visit as a fact-finding mission to get MacKendrick's version of the story. The deputies brought with them a laptop computer, a blank tape, an audio recorder, and the victim's DVD interview.

The interview room was an administrative office, which had a table, desk, and a few chairs. Swier testified that as MacKendrick was escorted into the room, he appeared shocked to see Swier, whom MacKendrick remembered as the investigator in the prior case that led to his incarceration. MacKendrick asked what Swier and Bateman wanted and why they were there. Swier informed him of H.M.'s allegations. The deputies wanted to hear what MacKendrick had to say. Initially, according to MacKendrick, he doubted whether the victim had really made allegations of sexual abuse. He repeatedly denied the truth of the allegations.

Swier testified that he had no idea whether prison rules and regulations required MacKendrick to appear for questioning. Swier did not discuss with prison officials the terms and conditions of the interview. MacKendrick did not receive Miranda warnings before the interview, which was not recorded. After MacKendrick sat down in the room, the deputies played H.M.'s interview. Swier testified that as MacKendrick listened to the victim's specific allegations of sexual abuse, MacKendrick began shaking and seemed very nervous. Toward the end of the DVD, after H.M. had presented details of the sexual abuse, MacKendrick told the investigators to turn it off, and they complied. MacKendrick testified that he told the deputies to turn off the DVD, not because he was nervous, but because he thought he needed a lawyer.

Swier testified that he then told MacKendrick: “You're saying it didn't happen, she's saying it did. Somebody's not telling the truth.” According to Swier, MacKendrick replied: “If she said it, it must be true.” In Swier's view, this was an incriminating remark that converted what had been a voluntary interview into a custodial interrogation. Swier testified that in a prior, totally separate investigation, MacKendrick had spoken of his past episodes of becoming intoxicated and experiencing alcoholic blackouts. Swier inquired as to whether this could have happened regarding the present allegations.

At that point in the interview, after MacKendrick made the incriminating statement, Swier decided it was time to give Miranda warnings for the first time. Before administering the warnings, Swier told MacKendrick that he wanted to obtain a formal taped statement. MacKendrick testified that he initially agreed to give a statement. Just as he seemed about to waive his rights, however, MacKendrick changed his mind and told the deputies: “I can't do it. You know I'm not waiving my rights.” The interview ended, and the deputies left MacKendrick alone in the room until an officer escorted him back to his cell. About thirty minutes elapsed from the beginning of the interview to the end. At no time during the interview was MacKendrick formally arrested. Subsequently, Swier filed a probable cause affidavit in the court, and an arrest warrant was issued.

In Swier's opinion, the questioning started out as a voluntary interview, and MacKendrick could have left whenever he wanted to do so. MacKendrick was not shackled or handcuffed during the questioning. Swier did not recall whether Bateman had left the room during the interview. The deputy acknowledged that he never informed MacKendrick that he was free not to talk or free to leave the room and return to his cell anytime. Swier testified that he did not give Miranda warnings at the onset of the interview because he was not sure what MacKendrick's version of the facts would be, and whether H.M.'s allegations were true.

MacKendrick provided a somewhat different account of certain details surrounding the interview. After the inspector shut the door and left MacKendrick with the deputies, Swier asked MacKendrick how he was doing. He answered: “I'm doing as best I can, considering my situation.” MacKendrick observed Swier's gold star and knew that Swier was a law enforcement officer. MacKendrick testified that he believed he had to answer the questions. He did not feel that he had the right to leave the interview. The door to the room was locked. When Bateman left and tried to re-enter the room, he had to keep knocking to gain admittance.

MacKendrick testified that Swier never advised MacKendrick about his right to a lawyer before asking for a taped formal statement. After Swier read Miranda rights and asked him to sign a piece of paper, MacKendrick replied: “No. I need an attorney.” According to MacKendrick, he had orally indicated that he needed to talk to an attorney as soon as he viewed H.M.'s interview and asked the investigators to stop the DVD. This was before Swier read his Miranda rights. MacKendrick denied ever saying to Swier that if the victim had said it, then it must be true. MacKendrick told the court that what he really said was: “Everything that these people say about me down there, you think is true.” MacKendrick complained that nothing he told Swier was believable enough for Swier to accept his side of the story. MacKendrick testified that at the conclusion of the interview, the prison inspector escorted MacKendrick out of the room and through a high-security area. MacKendrick reported back to an officer, was frisked again, and was taken back to the dorm.

The motion to suppress asked the trial court to suppress “all statements, gestures or other incriminating evidence obtained at the prison” and to rule it inadmissible at trial. After hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court commented that the mere fact that MacKendrick was incarcerated at the time of the interview, and certainly was not free to leave the institution of his own accord, did not mean he was not free to leave the room. The judge opined that MacKendrick's belief that he was not at liberty to leave did not make it so. Concluding that the interview was not a custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda, the court denied the motion to suppress without additional comment or factual findings.

At the trial (over which a different judge presided), Deputy Swier testified about the background information and H.M.'s interview with the Child Protection Team, which led the deputies to schedule the interview with MacKendrick. The parties agreed that the jury would not be told that the interview with MacKendrick took place while he was incarcerated. Describing the interview, Swier testified that after MacKendrick became quite upset while listening to H.M.'s interview and told them to turn it off, they did so. After that, according to Swier, MacKendrick commented that if the victim said it, then it must be true. H.M. testified at the trial, and the jury viewed the victim's...

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3 cases
  • Bannister v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 8, 2014
    ...a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.’ ” MacKendrick v. State, 112 So.3d 131, 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting Howes v. Fields, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012)) (internal quotations omi......
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    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • October 27, 2014
    ...598, 605–08 (Fla.2001). We have de novo review of the application of a constitutional standard to the facts. Id. ; MacKendrick v. State, 112 So.3d 131, 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). In reviewing the ruling on a motion to suppress, we interpret the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a ligh......
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    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 9, 2013
1 books & journal articles
  • Defendant's statements
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books The Florida Criminal Cases Notebook. Volume 1-2 Volume 2
    • April 30, 2021
    ...there was no corroborating physical evidence; and state relied primarily on victim’s allegations to prove charge. MacKendrick v. State, 112 So. 3d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) When defendant makes an equivocal request to remain silent at the beginning of his statement, the police must clarify hi......

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