Mackin v. Taylor County Court
| Decision Date | 25 November 1893 |
| Citation | 18 S.E. 632,38 W.Va. 338 |
| Parties | MACKIN v. TAYLOR COUNTY COURT. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted June 16, 1893.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A county court is not a party to an appeal taken under section 7, c. 36, Acts 1891, for reassessment of lands by a landowner, from the decision of a county court refusing to reduce the valuation of his land made by a commissioner under said act, and cannot maintain a writ of error from this court to the decision of a circuit court upon such appeal.
2. Power of taxation. Its character discussed.
3. Assessment of taxes and valuation. The character of the act discussed.
4. Is the jurisdiction conferred upon circuit courts by section 7 c. 36, Acts 1891, to entertain an appeal from a decision of a county court touching valuation of land by a commissioner to reassess lands, valid, under the constitution? Is the action of the circuit court on such appeal judicial in nature?
5. Can the supreme court of appeals entertain a writ of error to the decision of a circuit court on such appeal?
Error to circuit court, Taylor county; Joseph T. Hoke, Judge.
Proceedings by Emily Mackin against the county court of Taylor for the correction of an assessment for taxation. From the judgment rendered, the county court brings error. Dismissed.
T. S. Riley, Atty. Gen., and L. M. La Follette, for plaintiff in error.
W. R D. Dent, for defendant in error.
Emily Mackin, feeling herself aggrieved by the valuation of a tract of land for taxation by a commissioner to reassess lands applied to the county court of Taylor county for correction and, that court having refused her relief, she appealed to the circuit court; and, that court having lessened the valuation of the land, the county court of Taylor county obtained this writ of error. Our jurisdiction in the case is challenged, and therefore we must at once pass upon that question, since we can render no judgment on the merits if we have no jurisdiction.
The complaint of Mrs. Mackin is not that her land is not subject to taxation, but that an excessive valuation, arrived at by improper process, was placed upon the land. Fixing the value of property for purposes of taxation is an essential and indispensable part of the assessment of taxes, where the taxation is based on its value. How, without it, can the individual's tax be known or collected? It is a since qua non to the collection of revenue. Thus, it is plain that this court is asked to exercise jurisdiction in a matter which is purely one of valuation for assessment of taxes upon a taxpayer's property. That important function of government, the assessment of taxes, in our free republic of America, national and state, unlike the case in imperial or autocratic governments, belongs exclusively to the legislature. It is a legislative power, and in no sense judicial. This doctrine results from the very nature of our government, and is universally recognized.
Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472; Cooley, Tax'n 32; Heine v. Commissioners, 19 Wall. 655; Van de Griff v. Haynie, 28 Ark. 271; Desty, Tax'n, 81; Opinion of Lee, J., in Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat. 426, and opinion in Com. v. Moore, 25 Grat. 954; Cooley, Const. Lim. 479. By our constitution, §§ 2, 5, art. 10, the power of taxation is expressly vested in the legislature. It would be its prerogative without that grant. The duty of ascertaining taxable values, and of imposing and assessing taxes, rests in the wisdom and discretion of the legislature. It possesses unquestionable power to assess taxes itself, so far as the rightful power is concerned; but the inconvenience of so doing renders this impracticable, and therefore the legislature may perform this duty through such officers, agents, or tribunals as it may choose. State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill, 487; Vande Griff v. Haynie, 28 Ark. 271; Hardenbergh v. Kidd, 10 Cal. 402; 1 Desty, Tax'n, § 97. The power to impose taxes and assess property value for taxation being thus purely legislative, the judiciary cannot exercise it, cannot do any act, without authority of the legislature, which is an act of assessment of value for taxation or imposition of a tax, because the constitution, by article 5, divides the state government into three distinct departments,--legislative, executive, and judicial,--and prohibits either from exercising the powers of the other. In this great constitutional provision, common to all American states, lies the very soul of free government, distinguishing it from tyrannical government, and is the best guaranty of order, harmony, safety, and liberty. The simple fact that one of these departments is invested with a certain function or power negatives the idea that another department may exercise it, because it would defeat the principle and letter of article 5, separating them and their functions. If, then, the act which this court is, in this case, asked to exercise, be one in its nature essentially an act of taxation,--one relating to or forming part of the procedure in taxation,--we cannot exercise the jurisdiction. It is such an act. We are called upon to act in the matter of appraisal of land for tax purposes. The commissioner appraised it. Then the county court appraised it, by approving the commissioner's action. Then the circuit court lowered the valuation. And this court is either to fix another valuation, or adopt that of the county or circuit court. In other words, this court is asked to do an act that is simply one of valuation,--an indispensable act in the process of taxing this land. It is a legislative function, and we cannot perform it, unless there be a lawful delegation of authority to perform it. If we entertain this writ of error, we perform that function. Whence does this court get authority to entertain this writ of error? If even any statute could give it, where is the one that does give it? I hardly know under which of two acts the application for reduction of value was made. The petition for writ of error says it was made under section 94, c. 29, Code, while other parts of the record indicate that the valuation was one made by a commissioner reassessing lands under chapter 36, Acts 1891, and the application for relief under section 7 of that act. I regard the latter as the case. But in this case it is a matter of no import, for similar legal principles apply, and bring us to the same conclusion.
Section 7 of chapter 26, Acts 1891, provides that any one feeling aggrieved by the assessment of his land under that chapter may apply to the county court for relief, and, if refused, may have the evidence certified, and appeal to the circuit court. There it stops, without giving any appeal or writ of error to this court. If it be said that the chapter providing for appeals and writs of error to this court in cases generally comes in, and it was not necessary expressly, here, to grant such appeal or writ of error, then I ask, why expressly grant an appeal to the circuit court, when there stood the writ of certiorari for correction of errors in county courts? The reason why an appeal is given by said statutes from the county court to the circuit Court is that, if not expressly granted, there could be no relief by certiorari, or in any other mode, but the decision of the county court would be final, because it is a rule of law that when once a tax valuation is made, in due course, it is final, unless the legislature has provided for a review; and when the particular mode of review has been resorted to, and fails to afford relief, there is no relief by appeal to the courts. The taxpayer is confined to the redress accorded by the legislature in its grace; and this because it is matter of taxation, confided exclusively to the legislature, which can give just such remedy for correction, or none, as it deems proper, and the matter being legislative, and not judicial, the courts cannot interfere. Cooley, Tax'n, 528, 529; Insurance Co. v. Pollak, 75 Ill. 292; 2 Desty, Tax'n, 623; Wade v. Commissioners, 74 N.C. 81; Stewart v. Maple, 70 Pa. St. 221; International, etc., R. Co. v. Smith Co., 54 Tex. 2; Gilpatrick v. Inhabitants, 57 Me. 277, and cases cited; Osborn v. Inhabitants, 6 Pick. 98. The legislature having accorded to the taxpayer an appeal from the county court to the circuit court, and provided for no appeal to this court, negatives an intent to allow an appeal to this court. It knew that, without an allowance of such appeal, none could be had. There is good reason for the omission to concede such appeal. The act grants an appeal from the commissioner to the county court, and from it to the circuit court. Should it go further, and allow application to this court, and thus enable every one disposed to litigate his assessment so far, and in large measure hamper and embarrass the collection of revenue necessary for the operation of government?
But is this writ of error justified by section 3, art. 8, of the constitution, or section 1, c. 135, of the Code, prescribing generally the appellate jurisdiction of this court? It may be suggested that it falls under that provision giving this court appellate jurisdiction in cases concerning the right of a corporation, county, or district to levy tolls or taxes. This does not apply, as the right to levy taxes on this land is not in dispute, but only its valuation, and under this clause the right to levy taxes must be involved. Miller v. Navigation Co., 32 W.Va. 52, 9 S.E. 57. Again, here the state is levying taxes, not merely a county or district. Does it fall under the provision that a party to a controversy in any circuit court may have a writ of error in "civil cases where the matter in controversy, exclusive of costs, is of greater value or amount than one hundred dollars?" It does not...
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