Macmaster v. Advance Thresher Co.

• Decision Date: 19 November 1894
• Citation: 10 Wash. 147,38 P. 760
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: MACMASTER v. ADVANCE THRESHER CO.

38 P. 760

10 Wash. 147

MACMASTER v. ADVANCE THRESHER CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 19, 1894

Appeal from superior court, Garfield county, R. F. Sturdevant Judge.

Action by J. R. Macmaster against the Advance Thresher Company, in which there was a judgment for plaintiff. From a judgment denying its petition to vacate and modify such judgment defendant appeals. Reversed.

S. G. Cosgrove and Chadwick, Fullerton & Wyman for appellant.

M. F Gose, for respondent.

DUNBAR C.J.

This is a petition of appellant for the vacation and modification of a judgment which shows upon its face that the appellant was duly served with a copy of the complaint and summons in Clarke county, in the state of Washington, on the 2d day of November, 1893, by service upon its statutory agent, duly empowered to accept service. The case was tried in Garfield county. The judgment in this case was taken on the 8th day of December, 1893, 36 days after service upon appellant. The act of 1893 prescribes what the summons shall contain, and, among other things, requires the summons to direct a defendant to appear within 20 days after service of summons, and defend the action. The appellant stoutly contends that the provision of the prior law in relation to summons, viz. that the defendant when served outside of the district in which the action is brought shall be entitled to 40 days to answer, has not been affected or repealed by the act of 1893, and many authorities are cited and large space is given, both in the brief and in the oral argument, to this contention. Without following the argument seriatim, or discussing the many cases cited, we are of the opinion that the act of March 15, 1893, is a complete act within itself, so far as prescribing the manner of commencing civil actions and bringing the same to trial is concerned; that it undertakes to, and does, change the time of answer in response to the summons; and that it was the duty of the defendant in this case, had the action been brought in the proper court, to have answered the complaint within the time prescribed by the law of 1893.

Neither do we think there is anything in appellant's contention that said act is unconstitutional, or that its provisions are obnoxious to section 19 of article 2 of the constitution of the state, which provides that "no bill shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title." The title in question is "An act to provide for the manner of commencing civil actions in the superior courts and bringing the same to trial." The object of commencing an action is to bring it to trial, and, while there may be more words used in the title of the act than are absolutely necessary, we think there is but one subject expressed therein. We are compelled, however to decide, under the statute, that this action was brought in the wrong county. Section 160, Code Proc., provides that "an action against a corporation may be brought in any county where the corporation has an office for the transaction of business, or any person resides upon whom process may be served against such corporation, unless otherwise provided in this Code." Section 161 provides that "in all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the defendants, or some of them, reside at the time of the commencement of the action, or may be served with process, subject, however, to the power of the court...