Macnichol v. Spence

• Decision Date: 30 September 1890
• Citation: 21 A. 748,83 Me. 87
• Parties: MACNICHOL v. SPENCE et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

21 A. 748

83 Me. 87

MACNICHOL

v. SPENCE et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Sept. 30, 1890.

(Official.)

Report from supreme judicial court, Washington county.

This was an action brought by the plaintiff, who is a citizen of this state, upon two joint and several promissory notes, dated December 10, 1874, and given by the defendant Spence, with one McKenzie, for whom he was a surety, at St. Stephen, N. B., and payable one year after date to Douglass Hyslop, or order. These persons were all citizens of the dominion of Canada. The plaintiff purchased the notes February 10, 1885, and began his action April 13, 1885. Interest up to December 10, 1883, had been paid by McKenzie, who moved away in May, 1884, and died in the following fall. Spence testified that he had never been called upon to pay the notes until after McKenzie's removal, that be had not paid anything on them directly or indirectly, and had received no benefit from them.

It was admitted that the notes were not barred by the statutes of New Brunswick as against McKenzie.

The defendant Spence, besides the general issue, filed a brief statement of defense, alleging that the cause of action against him upon the notes was barred by the laws of New Brunswick, while all the parties thereto resided in said province, and before they were negotiated; also that the action was barred by Rev. St. c. 81, § 103, as amended by the act of 1885, e 376. The provisions of the act are quoted in the opinion by the court.

A. MacNichol, for plaintiff.

Harvey & Gardner, for defendants.

WALTON, J. The question is whether the act of 1885, c. 376, which declares that "no action shall be brought by any person whose cause of action has been barred by the laws of any state, territory, or country, while all the parties have resided therein," is applicable to a negotiable promissory note held by a citizen of this state at the time of its passage.

Clearly not. To so construe the act would render it unconstitutional. Statutes of limitation may be made applicable to existing contracts, provided a reasonable time is allowed for the commencement of actions before the right to do so is barred. But it is well settled that the legislature cannot enact a law declaring that all remedies for the breach of existing contracts shall become instantly barred. Such a law, say the court, in Call v. Hugger, 8 Mass. 423, would necessarily impair the obligation of such contracts, and the courts would be bound to consider it a void...