MacVeigh v. Division of Unemployment Compensation, 29091.

• Decision Date: 05 November 1943
• Docket Number: 29091.
• Citation: 142 P.2d 900,19 Wn.2d 383
• Parties: MacVEIGH v. DIVISION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

142 P.2d 900

19 Wn.2d 383

MacVEIGH v. DIVISION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION et al.

No. 29091.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 5, 1943

Department 1.

Proceeding by Helen W. MacVeigh to recover unemployment compensation. From a judgment affirming a decision of the Division of Unemployment Compensation and Jack Bates, Commissioner denying the claim, claimant appeals.

Reversed and remanded, with instructions.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Clay Allen, Judge.

Guy E Dunning, of Seattle, for appellant.

Smith Troy, George W. Wilkins, and Frank W. Foley, all of Olympia for respondents.

BEALS Justice.

During the months of April, 1941, Helen MacVeigh filed with the unemployment compensation division her claim for compensation as an unemployed person, pursuant to Laws of 1937, chapter 162, as amended by Laws of 1939, chapter 214 (Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) §§ 9998-103 et seq.). Her claim was denied, and within the time limited by law she attempted to appeal to the superior court from the order of the division denying her claim. The statute prescribing the steps to be taken to perfect such an appeal is found in Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 9998-106(i), and reads as follows: 'Within thirty days after final decision has been communicated to any interested party, such interested party may appeal to the superior court of the county of his residence, and such appeal shall be heard as a case in equity but upon such appeal only such issues of law may be raised as were properly included in his application Before the appeal tribunal. The proceedings of every such appeal shall be informal and summary, but full opportunity to be heard upon the issues of law shall be had Before judgment is pronounced. Such appeal shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court a notice of appeal and by serving a copy thereof by mail or personally on the commissioner, and the filing and service of said notice of appeal within thirty days shall be jurisdictional.'

By Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 9998-106(h), it is provided that the decision of the division shall become final thirty days after 'the date of notification or mailing thereof' to the claimant.

It appears that Miss MacVeigh mailed to the division a copy of her notice of appeal, but a transcript of the page of the appearance docket of the clerk of the superior court for King county (to which court Miss MacVeigh sought to prosecute her appeal), bearing the entries referring to Miss MacVeigh's case, fails to show that her notice of appeal was ever filed with the clerk. A transcript of the record made Before the division was regularly filed in the office of the clerk of the superior court, and the matter proceeded to trial; the court, October 19, 1942, entering an order affirming the decision of the unemployment compensation division denying Miss MacVeigh any benefits under the act. Her motion for a new trial having been denied December 19, 1942, Miss MacVeigh appealed to this court.

It does not appear that the fact that appellant never filed in the office of the clerk of the superior court for King county her notice of appeal from the final ruling of the unemployment compensation division was ever called to the attention of the judge who heard the appeal and entered the order above referred to.

After the matter had been transferred to this court by appellant's appeal, respondent moved to dismiss the appeal upon several grounds, later filing a supplemental motion to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that no notice of appeal from the decision of the division denying appellant's application for an award had ever been filed in the office of the clerk of the superior court, and that for this reason the superior court was without jurisdiction to hear the cause.

Respondent's motions to dismiss appeallant's appeal were brought on for hearing Before this court, the matter having been by the court passed to the merits, to be considered when the appeal should be regularly presented. The matter having later come Before this court upon the appeal, and submitted after argument, is now Before us for determination.

We find no merit in respondent's first motion to dismiss the appeal. Neither is the ground stated in the supplemental motion to dismiss the appeal a proper reason for taking such action. The matter is Before this court upon appeal from a formal order of the superior court. Appellant's appeal from that order has been regularly prosecuted, and respondent's motions to dismiss the appeal are denied.

We are, however, confronted by the fact that from the record Before us it does not appear that appellant ever perfected her appeal from the ruling of the unemployment compensation division to the superior court. The statute governing such appeals is plain, and it appears therefrom that the superior court obtains no jurisdiction to review an order of the division unless the steps prescribed by the statute have been followed.

In the case of Nafus v. Department of Labor and Industries, 142 Wash. 48, 251 P. 877, 878, it was held that the trial court erred in overruling the department's challenge to the jurisdiction of the superior court, because in attempting to appeal to that court from a departmental order, the claimant had not followed the procedure outlined by statute. This court reversed the judgment of the superior court, with directions to dismiss the proceeding. In the course of the opinion, the court said:

'It was incumbent upon the respondent to prove that he had taken an appeal from the department within the time fixed by the statute. In 11 Cyc. 696, it is said:

"A court of special, limited, or inferior jurisdiction must by its record show all essential or vital jurisdictional facts of its authority to act in the particular case, and in what respect it has jurisdiction. This rule also applies to jurisdiction over special statutory proceedings exercised in derogation of, or not according to, the course of the common law. So the necessary jurisdictional facts must affirmatively appear by averment and proof to bring the case within the jurisdiction of such court."

The right to unemployment compensation is founded upon the statute, not upon the common law. In determining questions involving unemployment compensation, the courts exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by the statute, and in accordance with the procedure outlined therein. The situation is analogous to that presented by the industrial insurance laws. In the case of Maddox v. Industrial Ins. Commission, 119 Wash. 21, 204 P. 1057, 1058, this court said: 'This jurisdiction of the superior court over such controversies is appellate only, and not original.' The cases of Tennyson v. Department of Labor and Industries, 189 Wash. 616, 66 P.2d 314, and Ivey v. Department of Labor and Industries, 4 Wash.2d 162, 102 P.2d 683, are to the same effect.

In the case of Puliz v. Department of Labor and Industries, 184 Wash. 585, 52 P.2d 347, 350, we said: 'It has been repeatedly held that the courts have no original jurisdiction in the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Act * * *, and that matters connected with the administration thereof must first be heard and determined by the Department of Labor and Industries.'

The right to proceed under such a statute as that relied upon by appellant is a statutory, and not a common law, right. Mattson v. Department of Labor and Industries, 176 Wash. 345, 29 P.2d 675.

In the case of LeBire v. Department of Labor and Industries, 14 Wash.2d 407, 128 P.2d 308, 311, we again called attention to the fact that in hearing an appeal from that department the court 'acts only in an appellate capacity and does not exercise original jurisdiction in such controversies.'

Concerning the particular problem here presented, the case of Smith v. Department of Labor and Industries, 1 Wash.2d 305, 95 P.2d 1031, 1032, is in point. In that case, it appeared that the appellant, Smith, had presented to the department as claim for compensation, and had received an allowance. From an...