Mad River Orchard, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 44870
| Decision Date | 19 January 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 44870,44870 |
| Citation | 573 P.2d 796,89 Wn.2d 535 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | MAD RIVER ORCHARD, INC., et al., Appellants, v. KRACK CORPORATION, an Illinois Corporation, and Puget Sound Engineering, Inc., a Washington Corporation, Respondents, v. FOOD INDUSTRIES RESEARCH & ENGINEERING, INC., et al., Defendants. |
Rutherford, Kargianis & Austin, Samuel Rutherford, Seattle, for appellants.
Gavin, Robinson, Kendrick, Redman & Mays, William Mays, Yakima, Pinckney Rohrback, Seattle, James Arneil, Wenatchee, for respondents.
Plaintiff Mad River Orchard Company leased apple storage rooms from Wenatchee Wenoka Growers' Association. The leased storage was controlled atmosphere rooms where, during storage, the air content is controlled to retard or slow maturation of the apples. The equipment which provided refrigeration to the leased rooms was manufactured by the defendant Krack Corporation and installed by defendant Puget Sound Engineering, Inc.
Plaintiff Mad River Orchard is a packer-shipper; it was handling apples for growers and had stored in the controlled atmosphere facilities bins containing approximately 60,000 boxes of apples.
On two occasions the Krack-manufactured refrigerant equipment developed ammonia leaks. Put simply, ammonia and apples do not mix. Faced with ammonia saturated apples, Mad River Orchard tried to salvage and pack the damaged apples. The apples, for the most part, were not salvageable. Wenatchee Wenoka settled the growers' claims for the loss of the apples, less some salvage.
Plaintiff Mad River Orchard sued in its own right, claiming damages, according to its allegations, for "lost customer relationships, its reputation, interference with contractual and business relationships, salvage efforts, storage costs and loss of fixed expenses and profits."
Plaintiff offered an exhibit summarizing its claimed loss of "fixed expenses." Defendants' objection was sustained. No error is assigned to that ruling. The court and all counsel then entered into an extensive dialogue, 38 pages in the record of proceedings, about plaintiff's theories of recovery, one of which was under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965). On two occasions the court asked plaintiff's counsel if he were going to present additional proof of damages. At one point plaintiff's attorney advised the court that "we have presented all the evidence on that point we are going to present." Shortly thereafter, the court told plaintiff's counsel that "if you haven't offered the evidence in the case, you had better offer it."
In apparent anticipation of the court's ruling rejecting plaintiff's theory of damages, all counsel agreed that a motion to dismiss would be made and the jury dismissed. After the jury was dismissed, plaintiff's counsel made an offer of proof. The court dismissed plaintiff's claims. We affirm.
We do not reach the merit of plaintiff's theory of damages because plaintiff's offers of proof were too late and lack sufficient specificity in fact and theory for the trial court to rule thereon.
An offer of proof, properly presented, serves three purposes. First, it should inform the court of the legal theory under which the offered evidence is admissible. Second, it should inform the trial judge of the specific nature of the offered evidence so the court can judge its admissibility. Third, it thereby creates a record adequate for appellate review. It is the desirable practice to have the offered evidence in the form of questions and answers from the witness rather than conclusionary statements by counsel.
We have long held that an offer of proof must be specific and the theory of admissibility disclosed.
The principle upon which we decide this case is that it is the duty of a party to make clear to the trial court what it is that he offers in proof, and the reason why he deems the offer admissible over the objections of...
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State v. Tillman
...adequate for appellate review.' " State v. Conrod, 198 Conn. 592, 597, 504 A.2d 494 (1986), quoting Mad River Orchard, Inc. v. Krack Corporation, 89 Wash.2d 535, 537, 573 P.2d 796 (1978). Although counsel for the defendant did not articulate that he was presenting an "offer of proof," it is......
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State v. Ray
...evidence so that the court can assess its admissibility; and it creates a record adequate for review. Mad River Orchard Co. v. Krack Corp., 89 Wash.2d 535, 537, 573 P.2d 796 (1978); State v. Negrin, 37 Wash.App. 516, 525, 681 P.2d 1287, review denied, 102 Wash.2d 1002 (1984). See also State......
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State v. Leandry
...thereby creates a record adequate for appellate review." [Internal quotation marks omitted.] ), quoting Mad River Orchard Co. v. Krack Corp., 89 Wash.2d 535, 537, 573 P.2d 796 (1978).Moreover, the record is devoid of any concrete evidence that would have allowed the court to conclude that t......
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State v. Thornton, No. 36379-8-II (Wash. App. 4/21/2009)
...could properly assess its admissibility. State v. Ray, 116 Wn.2d 531, 538, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991) (citing Mad River Orchard Co. v. Krack Corp., 89 Wn.2d 535, 537, 573 P.2d 796 (1978)). Without an adequate offer of proof, the record is insufficient to establish an adequate foundation to admit ......