Maddaloni v. Maddaloni
Decision Date | 24 August 2016 |
Citation | 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05851,142 A.D.3d 646,36 N.Y.S.3d 695 |
Parties | Laura MADDALONI, respondent, v. Luigi MADDALONI, appellant. (Appeal Nos. 1–4). Laura Maddaloni, respondent-appellant, v. Luigi Maddaloni, appellant-respondent. (Appeal No. 5). |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Kenneth S. Sternberg, New York, N.Y., for appellant and appellant-respondent.
Castrovinci & Mady, Smithtown, N.Y. (Philip J. Castrovinci, Katharine E. O'Dette, and Matthew Mady of counsel), for respondent and respondent-appellant.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., MARK C. DILLON, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, and JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.
Appeals by the defendant from four orders of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Carol MacKenzie, J.), dated October 1, 2013 (two orders), December 3, 2013, and May 20, 2014, and appeal by the defendant and cross appeal by the plaintiff from stated portions of a judgment of divorce of that court entered May 19, 2014. The first order dated October 1, 2013, granted the plaintiff's motion for an award of temporary maintenance. The second order dated October 1, 2013, granted the plaintiff's motion for an award of counsel fees. The order dated December 3, 2013, granted the plaintiff's motion for an award of additional counsel fees. The order dated May 20, 2014, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to hold the defendant in civil contempt and to award the plaintiff $2,500 in counsel fees pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237(c). The judgment of divorce, upon a decision of that court dated February 6, 2014, made after a nonjury trial, inter alia, awarded the plaintiff the sum of $500,000, representing 25% of the appreciation of the defendant's business known as Maddaloni Jewelers, and monthly maintenance for a period of 10 years, and distributed the parties' assets.
ORDERED that the judgment of divorce is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The appeals from the two orders dated October 1, 2013, and the order dated December 3, 2013, must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the judgment of divorce (see Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 383 N.Y.S.2d 285, 347 N.E.2d 647 ; Anderson v. Anderson, 50 A.D.3d 610, 610, 855 N.Y.S.2d 194 ). These three orders, which awarded pendente lite maintenance and counsel fees to the plaintiff, are not reviewable on the appeal from the judgment of divorce under CPLR 5501 because, if reversed or modified, they would not necessarily affect the judgment (see Anderson v. Anderson, 50 A.D.3d at 610, 855 N.Y.S.2d 194 ; Mellen v. Mellen, 260 A.D.2d 609, 611, 688 N.Y.S.2d 674 ; Samuelsen v. Samuelsen, 124 A.D.2d 650, 651, 508 N.Y.S.2d 36 ; cf. Oakes v. Patel, 20 N.Y.3d 633, 643–645, 965 N.Y.S.2d 752, 988 N.E.2d 488 ). In any event, the financial circumstances of the parties were fully explored at trial, which is the appropriate remedy for any perceived inequity in a pendente lite award of maintenance (see Anderson v. Anderson, 50 A.D.3d at 610, 855 N.Y.S.2d 194 ; Samuelsen v. Samuelsen, 124 A.D.2d at 652, 508 N.Y.S.2d 36 ; Zoda v. Zoda, 121 A.D.2d 380, 503 N.Y.S.2d 90 ).
The parties in this action for a divorce and ancillary relief were married in January 1988. At the time of the marriage, the defendant owned several cars, a house, and a jewelry business, and he was in contract to buy a shopping center. On August 22, 1988, less than eight months after the parties were married, they experienced marital difficulties and entered into a postnuptial agreement. Among other things, this agreement provided that, in the event that the parties divorced after the first five years of marriage, the plaintiff agreed to accept the sum of $50,000, payable in five equal annual installments of $10,000, “in full satisfaction of any and all claims of whatsoever kind and nature she may have at that time for past or future support or for distribution of assets.”
Thereafter, the parties reconciled and remained married for more than 25 years. They had two children, who were emancipated by the time of the trial.
The plaintiff commenced this divorce action on March 16, 2011. A hearing with regard to the validity of the 1988 postnuptial agreement commenced on August 9, 2011, but the parties agreed to adjourn the matter so that they could pursue reconciliation. Shortly thereafter, on September 28, 2011, the parties executed an amendment to the 1988 postnuptial agreement. On December 5, 2012, well over a year later, the hearing with regard to the validity of the 1988 postnuptial agreement resumed. The validity of the 2011 amendment to the postnuptial agreement was not addressed at the hearing; that issue was later referred to trial. After the hearing, the Supreme Court upheld the separate property provisions of the 1988 postnuptial agreement. However, the court determined that the $50,000 maintenance provision in that agreement, which purported to be in full satisfaction of all claims, was unenforceable on the ground that it was unconscionable.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court conducted a nonjury trial, which commenced on September 11, 2013, and concluded on October 25, 2013. Following the trial, the court issued a 31–page decision dated February 6, 2014, which was denominated an “order.” The court determined that the 2011 amendment to the postnuptial agreement was invalid and of no force and effect because, among other reasons, the amendment lacked consideration and the defendant and his counsel engaged in unethical overreaching when the defendant delivered the 2011 amendment directly to the plaintiff rather than her counsel. The court further found, among other things, that the plaintiff's testimony was credible, but the defendant's testimony and documentary evidence lacked credibility. Significantly, the court concluded that the defendant's real income was greater than what was claimed on his tax returns, and imputed income to the defendant of “at least $600,000 per year.” With regard to the appreciation of Maddaloni Jewelers, one of the defendant's businesses, the court found that the 1988 postnuptial agreement was silent as to equitable distribution of the appreciation of the business, and that the plaintiff established that she made significant direct and indirect contributions to the value of Maddaloni Jewelers during the marriage.
After the Supreme Court issued its decision after trial, which was denominated an “order,” the plaintiff moved, inter alia, to hold the husband in contempt for his failure to comply with certain provisions of the decision. The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the paper dated February 6, 2014, was a decision, not an order, and thus the plaintiff's contempt motion was premature.
Based on its findings in the decision dated February 6, 2014, the Supreme Court entered a judgment of divorce that, among other things, awarded the plaintiff the sum of $500,000, representing 25% of the appreciation of Maddaloni Jewelers, and monthly maintenance for a period of 10 years.
One day after the judgment of divorce was entered, in an order dated May 20, 2014, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion to hold the defendant in contempt, finding that the paper dated February 6, 2014, was indeed an order, and that the defendant failed to comply with its specific directives.
The defendant appeals, and the plaintiff cross-appeals, from stated portions of the judgment of divorce. The defendant also appeals from so much of the order dated May 20, 2014, as granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to hold him in civil contempt and to award the plaintiff $2,500 in counsel fees. We affirm the judgment of divorce insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, and reverse the order dated May 20, 2014, insofar as appealed from.
Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(3) provides that “[a]n agreement by the parties, made before or during the marriage, shall be valid and enforceable in a matrimonial action if such agreement is in writing, subscribed by the parties, and acknowledged or proven in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded.” Such an agreement may include, inter alia, a “provision for the amount and duration of maintenance or other terms and conditions of the marriage relationship ... provided that such terms were fair and reasonable at the time of the making of the agreement and are not unconscionable at the time of entry of final judgment” (Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][3] ). “An unconscionable bargain is one which no person in his or her senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and no honest and fair person would accept on the other, the inequality being so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of any person of common sense” (Morad v. Morad, 27 A.D.3d 626, 627, 812 N.Y.S.2d 126 ; see Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 71, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 365 N.E.2d 849 ; Label v. Label, 70 A.D.3d 898, 899, 895 N.Y.S.2d 192 ).
Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the maintenance provision of the 1988 postnuptial agreement, which provided the plaintiff with only $50,000 in full satisfaction of all claims, would be unconscionable by the time a final judgment would be entered in this action. At the time that the parties executed the 1988 postnuptial agreement, the defendant owned, among other things, a jewelry...
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