Maddocks v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.

• Decision Date: 07 January 1976
• Citation: 340 N.E.2d 503,369 Mass. 488
• Parties: Marie H. MADDOCKS v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD, State Retirement Board, Intervener.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 503

340 N.E.2d 503

369 Mass. 488

Marie H. MADDOCKS

v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD, State Retirement

Board, Intervener.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Nov. 7, 1975.

Decided Jan. 7, 1976.

Lawrence E. Katz, Cambridge, for Marie H. Maddocks.

Paul A. Good, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Edward Quinlan, Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for the Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.

Bernard S. Kaplan, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State Retirement Bd., intervener.

Before QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, HENNESSEY and KAPLAN, JJ.

QUIRICO, Justice.

This is an action commenced in the Superior Court pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14, for judicial review of a decision of the contributory retirement appeal board (appeal board). ¹ The case is before this court on the plaintiff's appeal pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 15, as appearing in St.1973, c. 1114, § 3, from the judgment entered in the Superior Court affirming the appeal board's decision with respect to the plaintiff's retirement classification and dismissing the action. ² For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the judgment entered in the Superior Court.

We summarize the relevant facts. The plaintiff, a registered nurse, we employed by the Department of Public Health (department) for the Commonwealth for approximately thirty-one years and one month, all but six months of that time being spent at the Westborough State Hospital (hospital). During her employment she held various positions as hospital attendant, head nurse, hydrotherapist, acting supervisor, and supervisor, and on May 2, 1971, she became a chief hospital supervisor, a position which she held until her retirement on July 31, 1972.

On the plaintiff's retirement, a statement describing her title and duties at the hospital was furnished to the State Board of Retirement (retirement board) by the superintendent of the hospital in accordance is reproduced in full in the margin. ³ Based on the description furnished by the superintendent, the retirement board classified the plaintiff in Group 1 under G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g). The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from this classification to the appeal board.

We summarize the evidence presented to the appeal board at its hearing on the plaintiff's appeal. The retirement board introduced copies of letters which it had sent to the plaintiff, one notifying her of her classification in Group 1 and another containing the statement made by the hospital superintendent which described the plaintiff's title and duties while employed at the hospital. The plaintiff testified at length as to the nature of her duties and responsibilities and the length of her service at the hospital. She stated that in the various positions which she held prior to becoming a supervisor in 1958, including that of acting supervisor, her duties required her to spend approximately eighty per cent of her time in direct patient care; that during her service as supervisor, in an average day, above five and one-half out of eight hours were expended in patient care; and that after she became a chief hospital supervisor in May, 1971, the position which she held until her retirement, her average work day 'didn't change very much . . . (and she) spent maybe a half hour or so more on administrative work . . ..'

On cross-examination, she testified that as a supervisor she had jurisdiction over one registered nurse, and approximately ten licensed practical nurses and twenty-four attendants; that she was responsible for approximately 275 patients; that after she became chief hospital supervisor, she was responsible for the direction and coordination of services of five units housing over 700 patients; and that as chief hospital supervisor she supervised five supervisors.

The plaintiff attempted to introduce in evidence two documents in the nature of a salary form, including a description of duties, and a decision of the retirement board, both relating to the retirement classification of the plaintiff's immediate predecessor as chief hospital supervisor. These documents were excluded by the appeal board.

The appeal board thereafter affirmed the decision of the retirement board to classify the plaintiff in Group 1, and it dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. The two page decision of the appeal board contained a brief summary of the evidence presented at the hearing and concluded as follows: 'After due consideration of all the evidence the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board finds that any testimony about (the plaintiff's) work prior to becoming Chief Hospital Supervisor has no bearing on this case. The Board further finds that the (plaintiff) was properly classified in Group 1.'

The plaintiff then commenced the present action in the Superior Court for judicial review of the appeal board's decision and the retirement board filed a notice to intervene as an interested party under G.L. c. 30A, § 14(2). The action was heard by a judge of the Superior Court who then ordered the entry of judgment affirming the appeal board's decision and dismissing the action. The plaintiff's appeal from the judgment is now before us for decision.

1. The plaintiff contends that the appeal board erred in refusing to consider the duties she performed during the thirty years prior to serving as chief hospital supervisor from May, 1971, until her retirement on July 31, 1972. She claims that her duties in those prior years qualify her for classification in retirement Group 2, rather than in Group 1 as determined by the retirement board and the appeal board. It is undisputed that classification in Group 2 would entitle her to substantially greater retirement benefits. Drawn into issue by the plaintiff's contention are the provisions of G.L. c. 32, § 3(2) (g), as appearing in St.1972, c. 284, § 1, the relevant portions of which are reproduced in the margin. ⁴

General Laws c. 32, § 3(2)(g), sets forth the standards for retirement classification of public employees who are members of a contributory retirement system established by the General Laws or by any special law of the Commonwealth. See definition of 'member' in G.L. c. 32, § 1. Section 3(2)(g) contains four groups and all members must be classified in one of those groups. Groups 3 and 4 are clearly inapplicable to the plaintiff and the present inquiry, therefore, centers around Groups 1 and 2. Group 1 is a kind of 'catch-all' category applying to '(o)fficials and general employees including clerical, administrative and technical workers . . . and all others not otherwise classified.' The plaintiff must fall into Group 1 if she does not qualify for a Group 2 classification. She claims entitlement to classification in Group 2, however, on the basis of language which makes that group applicable to 'employees of the commonwealth . . . whose regular and major duties require them to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of . . . persons who are mentally ill or mentally defective . . ..' In support of her claim, the plaintiff argues that the above language must be interpreted so as to require a consideration of an employee's 'regular and major duties' during the entire period of his or her public employment rather than simply at the date of retirement. We disagree.

The plaintiff's argument ignores the plain language of G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g) (Group 2), a reading of which reveals that the present tense is used throughout the statute in describing the duties of employment which entitle persons to classification in Group 2. More specifically, the statute grants a Group 2 classification to employees 'whose regular and major duties require them to have the care, custody, instruction or other supervision of . . . persons who are mentally ill or mentally defective . . ..' (emphasis supplied). G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g). We concur with the conclusion of the judge of the Superior Court that '(t)he term 'require,' used in the present tense, indicates a legislative intent that the classification be based on current job requirements at the time of retirement.' We hold that the plaintiff's classification was properly based on the sole consideration of her duties at the time of retirement.

The plaintiff argues that such an interpretation of G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g), precluding a consideration of her earlier employment duties, is contrary to G.L. c. 32, § 25(5). That statute, however, protects employees from a deprivation of rights or benefits by virtue of statutory alterations or amendments and is on its face inapplicable to the present case.

The plaintiff attempts to elevate her argument under G.L. c. 32, § 25(5), to constitutional proportions by contending that the fact that she was not informed (she does not specify whose duty it was to inform her) that her acceptance of the promotion to chief hospital supervisor would have the effect of reducing her benefits on retirement, constitutes a violation of the impairment-of-contract clause and the due process clause of the United States Constitution. In support of this contention she cites OPINION OF THE JUSTICES, --- MASS. --- , 303 N.E.2D 320 (1973)^A, in which the Justices considered questions arising under G.L. c. 32, § 25(5), and the United States Constitution with respect to proposed legislation which would amend G.L. c. 32, §§ 1--28, the provisions on contributory retirement systems for public employees in the Commonwealth. The issues addressed in that opinion were materially different from those involved herein. We perceive no constitutional rights to be implicated in the present circumstances. The plaintiff accepted of her own free will a promotion in status and a concomitant increase in any without prior inquiry as to the legal consequences of such a promotion. She may not now be heard to complain, on constitutional grounds, of the inevitable consequences of her voluntary act.

2. The plaintiff next claims that the decision of the appeal board to classify her in Group 1, based on an implicit finding that...