Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 22 January 1930
• Docket Number: (No. 1180-5172.)
• Citation: 23 S.W.2d 333
• Parties: MADDOX MOTOR CO. v. FORD MOTOR CO.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

23 S.W.2d 333

MADDOX MOTOR CO. v. FORD MOTOR CO.

(No. 1180-5172.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.

January 22, 1930.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Sixth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by F. W. Maddox and another, doing business under the firm name of the Maddox Motor Company, against the Ford Motor Company. A judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals, which remanded the cause for a new trial , and the plaintiffs bring error. Affirmed.

Everett Bryson, of Texarkana, S. P. Jones and Franklin Jones, both of Marshall, and Raymond H. Buck, of Fort Worth, for plaintiffs in error.

Allen & Allen and Leon C. Huvelle, all of Dallas, for defendant in error.

CRITZ, J.

This suit was filed in the district court of Camp county by F. W. Maddox and J. H. Mitchell, who did business under the firm name of Maddox Motor Company, against the Ford Motor Company, a corporation, to recover damages for the breach of an alleged oral automobile sales contract. Trial in the district court resulted in a judgment for Maddox Motor Company for $23,500 damages. The Ford Motor Company appealed from this judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals at Texarkana, which court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for a new trial. 3 S. W.(2d) 911. The case is now before this court on writ of error granted on application of Maddox Motor Company. For the sake of brevity, we refer to the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals for such statement of the case as we do not include herein.

The trial court submitted the case to the jury on special issues, and, among others, submitted the following as special issue No. 6: "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that K. W. Brown, in making said verbal agreement, if any, had authority to make said verbal contract, if any, for Ford Motor Company, or in making same, if any, was he acting within the apparent scope of his authority?" The jury answered this question "Yes."

We will say at this point that we are unable to say from the question as asked and answered whether the jury found Brown had actual authority or merely apparent authority, or both. The issues are submitted in the disjunctive.

The Court of Civil Appeals holds in effect that there is no evidence in the record to sustain a finding of either actual or apparent authority on the part of Brown. We are of the opinion that the evidence set out in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals does constitute some evidence on the issue of apparent authority; that is, we are of the opinion that the facts on this issue are not so definitely in favor of either party as would authorize the trial court to instruct a verdict, or an appellate court to render a judgment.

Notwithstanding our disagreement with the conclusion of the Court of Civil Appeals in the above matter, it is plain that, even if this were the only question involved in this appeal, we would have no authority to render judgment here for plaintiff in error, or to affirm the judgment of the district court. This is on account of the right or jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals to determine the facts of a case, and its power to set aside the findings of a jury in the trial court and remand the case for another trial. Tweed v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 107 Tex. 247, 166 S. W. 696. See opinion on rehearing, page 253, of 107 Tex., 177 S. W. 957, 958. "This proceeds from the jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals to determine the facts of a case, and its undoubted power to set aside the findings of the jury in the trial court, and remand the case for another trial." Tweed v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra. The Court of Civil Appeals has jurisdiction to determine the facts, and, where they hold there is no sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, the Supreme Court will presume that they would have held that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Pollock v. H. & T. C. R. R. Co., 103 Tex. 69, 123 S. W. 408. This holding is also expressly approved in the Tweed Case, supra.

We quote the following from the opinion of Judge Phillips in the Tweed Case, supra: "An extended printed argument has been filed in this case by counsel for the plaintiff in error, urging that we ought to render judgment in his favor because of our not having sustained the conclusion of the Court of Civil Appeals that Tweed was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, the jury having resolved that issue in favor of the plaintiffs; but, in view of these plain adjudications as well as the explicit opinion of Judge Gaines in Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co., 91 Tex. 406, 44 S. W. 69, we find some difficulty in understanding how any misapprehension could have arisen upon this question. With the Court of Civil Appeals invested with the full power of determining the facts of the cause, and setting aside the verdict of a jury on the facts, it must be assumed, as is said in the opinions quoted, that in reaching a conclusion that the evidence showed as a matter of law that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and for that reason ordering that the cause be remanded, in the same case it would have held that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. With a case thus remanded under the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, it would amount to a denial of its authority to determine the facts and set aside a verdict on the evidence for this court to assume the power of rendering the judgment because it differed with the conclusion reached by that court upon the effect of the evidence."

In the case at bar, we are of the opinion that there is evidence in the record, and quoted by the Court of Civil Appeals to support the contention of Maddox Motor Company, that K. W. Brown was clothed with apparent authority to make the contract for Ford Motor Company; but, the Court of Civil Appeals having found there is none, and that court being invested with power to determine the facts of the case and set aside the verdict on the facts and remand for a new trial, it must be assumed that, in reaching the conclusion that there are no facts to establish apparent authority on the part of Brown, and for that reason ordering a remand of the case, said court would have held the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Choate v. S. A. & A. P. Ry. Co., 91 Tex. 406, 44 S. W. 69. The Choate Case is also cited with approval by Judge Phillips in the Tweed Case, supra.

Since this case must stand reversed and remanded, there is another question which we deem it proper to discuss.

As shown by the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, Maddox and Mitchell, the plaintiffs in error, filed an application with the Ford Motor Company's branch office at Dallas for a similar contract as one theretofore held by one Nichols for the sale of Ford products at Pittsburg, Tex. For the purpose of pressing their application, both Maddox and Mitchell went to Dallas and there had a personal interview with one K. W. Brown, an agent and chief roadman of the Ford Motor Company in Texas. What was said between Brown and plaintiffs is relied on by plaintiffs as constituting the first contract.

This conversation, as set out in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, is as follows: "The conversation, as well as I remember, started, the first thing—when K. W. Brown walked up there and shook hands with us, and he said, `Now, gentlemen, if you have come over to intercede for the old dealer, Mr. Nichols, I am a busy man, and I haven't got time to talk to you.' I said, `Mr. Brown, I have come over here to make application for the Ford agency myself for Pittsburg.' When I told him that I was over there to negotiate for the agency or contract at Pittsburg. Brown said, `Mr. Maddox, you understand I have got seven applications on my desk now for the agency at Pittsburg, and some of them are old experienced dealers; but,' he said, `Listen, if you will do what I want you to, I will give you the contract.' And I said, `Mr. Brown, what do you want me to do?' and he said, `Go back home and secure a well located lot and build a house, a building that we will accept and approve, not only for the present time, but for the future home of the Ford.' I says, `Mr. Brown, how long will you give me a contract if I will go home and secure a location that you will approve and build a building that you will accept on it?' He said, `You understand, Maddox, the written contract that we put out is only for twelve months'; and I said, `Mr. Brown, I couldn't build a building—buy a lot and build a building like you would want for any Ford contract for a period of twelve months'; and he said, `Listen, Maddox, you ignore the written contract that will be sent you later; I will give you a contract for a period of six years, if you will do what we want you to do, buy a lot and build a building that we will accept and approve, at Pittsburg.' I said, `I will do that.' He then turned around to Dr. Mitchell and said, `Dr. Mitchell, will Maddox build a building like we want in Pittsburg? Will you guarantee it, Doctor, that he will build a building like we want?' and Dr. Mitchell said, `I will guarantee that he will build it as you require'; and he said, `Then that is enough. I am a busy man. You go back home, and I will ship you some cars,' which he did."

As shown by the findings of the Court of Civil Appeals, within a few days after their return to Pittsburg, Tex., the plaintiffs received from the Ford Motor Company a very lengthy written contract, which contained many provisions and stipulations not necessary to mention here, but which, among the many others, contained the following provisions:

"(17) This agreement shall continue in force and govern all transactions between the parties hereto until cancelled or...