Maddox v. Morris

• Decision Date: 31 January 1900
• Parties: MADDOX et al. v. MORRIS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

35 S.E. 170

110 Ga. 309

MADDOX et al. v. MORRIS.

Supreme Court of Georgia

January 31, 1900

Syllabus by the Court.

1. This court cannot undertake to say that a trial judge did not correctly state to the jury the contentions of the parties to a case on trial, when he certifies that he did state the contentions as made. Certainly the losing party has in this respect no cause of complaint, when, irrespectively of his contentions, the precise law of the case was, as in the present instance, clearly stated to the jury.

2. When counsel, while arguing a case to a jury, requested the court to instruct them that "where a charge of fraud, or the like, was made, and the party so charged failed to rebut it or produce evidence to disprove it, the jury might presume its truth," and, after remarking that he had no doubt the court would comply with his request, proceeded to make several charges of fraud against the adverse party frequently using the expression, "I charge," etc and in so doing going outside of the evidence, the court did not err in instructing the jury that "oral charges or insinuations in argument, and not under oath," did not cast upon the party at whom they were directed the burden of disproving the same; the jury being also instructed to try the case according to the evidence, and all the inferences to be legitimately drawn therefrom.

3. Although the pleadings may not embrace any charge of fraud against either party, yet, if the issue involved is one of fraud, the mere inaccuracy on the part of the judge of alluding to the pleadings while calling the attention of the jury to the charges of fraud made against a party is not cause for a new trial.

4. Where, in answer to a question from the jury as to "whether they could take into consideration all the circumstances, or just go directly by the evidence," the court replied that "the jury would look at all the evidence in the case, and are authorized to draw such legitimate conclusions as properly flow from what is proved," and in the same connection instructed them that "evidence may be either direct to a fact or by circumstances which point out or indicate that fact," and, further, that "in so far as the evidence produced either directly proves a fact, or as it may fairly be inferred or concluded from the evidence produced, it is within the province of the jury to consider all the light they can gain from the evidence," held, that the juror's...