Maddox v. State
Decision Date | 10 February 1915 |
Docket Number | (No. 3387.) |
Citation | 173 S.W. 1026 |
Parties | MADDOX v. STATE. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dallas County; R. B. Seay, Judge.
F. M. Maddox was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Affirmed.
A. S. Baskett, of Dallas, for appellant. C. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was indicted, charged with murder, and when tried was convicted of manslaughter, and his punishment assessed at four years' confinement in the state penitentiary.
The facts show that appellant cut and killed Charles Colson on the night of the 6th of July of last year. The evidence would further show, without conflict, that appellant came from his home that night to a moving picture show, and after visiting the show was on his way home when he met Colson. They engaged in a conversation, and while walking along Colson asked appellant if he would take a drink with him, and, upon appellant stating he would, Colson pulled a bottle of whisky out of his pocket, and appellant took a drink out of the bottle. The evidence would further justify a finding that, in a few minutes after taking the drink of whisky, appellant's throat and tongue began to have a numb or dead feeling, when he asked Colson what was the matter with the whisky, and Colson replied it had morphine or coke in it. Appellant says he asked him, "Do you mean cocaine?" and Colson replied, "Yes;" and, when asked what he meant by giving one whisky with cocaine in it, Colson replied, "I thought you were a cocaine fiend, too." Appellant says he told Colson he was mistaken, and Colson replied, "It won't hurt you," and shortly thereafter asked if he would have another drink; appellant declining. To this much of the testimony there is but little, if any, conflict, but from this point there is quite a variance.
The state's witness W. L. Moulder testifies he is a driver for the Dallas Transfer Company, and he saw a part of the difficulty near the transfer barns. He states he saw the parties standing near one of the barns, and appellant said something about there being morphine in the whisky, and Colson replied it did not make any difference; that appellant then struck deceased, and deceased began backing, threw up his hands, and told appellant to let him alone; that appellant kept backing Colson until Colson backed into barn No. 2; that he saw Colson turn as if to run, and appellant struck him in the back; that he saw appellant strike deceased several blows; that Colson never struck appellant at all, but held up his hands and told him to let him alone. Witness says he went in the barn and saw Colson; that he was not then dead, but died in about two or three minutes; that he saw no knife in deceased's possession nor none laying around there.
Frank McDonald says he was sitting on the curb near transfer barn No. 2 when he first saw the two men; that they were then about 150 feet from him, and were talking and quarreling, but he could not understand what they said; that deceased started toward witness, and, to use his own language, witness testified:
Thus it is seen that the state's case is that appellant, becoming angry at deceased giving him whisky with cocaine in it, while deceased was trying to get away from him, pursued him, cutting him until deceased fell; that deceased at no time struck or attempted to strike appellant.
Appellant's testimony presents two lines of defense: Temporary insanity, produced by drinking the whisky with cocaine in it, and self-defense. He testified:
That as he was on his way home from the moving picture show he met deceased, who said,
He further testified he did not remember anything after that until the next morning, when he awoke in jail; that his head was then swimming, he had an awful headache, and his tongue and mouth did not feel right; that his mouth and throat felt dry, and his throat was burning.
Appellant's father testified: That he got word that night his son was in jail, and went to see, and the first thing appellant said was: "Pa, have you come after me?" That he spoke to appellant, and said: "Frank, do you know you have killed a man?" And appellant replied: That he was in the jail talking to appellant about five or ten minutes. That appellant's face was red, and his eyes looked glassy, and, from the way appellant talked and acted, in his opinion he was of unsound mind.
Joe Austin, the city detective who arrested appellant, says he was greatly excited when arrested, and talked freely and loquaciously, and his talk was disconnected; that the knife he took off of him had blood on it. The knife was identified and introduced in evidence.
Dr. C. M. Rosser testified and qualified as an expert on insanity. He explained the effect of cocaine on the human system. From the hypothetical question propounded by appellant, based on the evidence offered in his behalf, he testified that in his opinion appellant would be temporarily insane. From the hypothetical question propounded by the state, based on its evidence and theory of the case, the doctor testified that the appellant would not be insane, but his conduct and acts would look like resentment.
So the jury would be left to find whether the hypothetical question propounded by the defendant or the state was founded upon the true state of facts as made by the testimony. Deceased was cut a number of times, both in the back and in the chest, one cut penetrating the heart.
In his brief and argument before this court the appellant seemed to place more stress on bill of exceptions No. 2 than he...
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