Maddux v. Blagojevich

• Decision Date: 18 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 107416.,107416.
• Citation: 911 N.E.2d 979,233 Ill.2d 508
• Parties: Honorable William D. MADDUX et al., Appellants, v. Rod R. BLAGOJEVICH, Governor, State of Illinois, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

911 N.E.2d 979

233 Ill.2d 508

Honorable William D. MADDUX et al., Appellants, v. Rod R. BLAGOJEVICH, Governor, State of Illinois, et al., Appellees.

No. 107416.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 18, 2009.

David A. Novoselsky and Brian A. Schroeder, Chicago, for appellants.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, Paul Berks, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), for appellees Illinois State Board of Elections and Its Members.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Plaintiffs, Cook County Circuit Court Judge William D. Maddux and five Cook County voters eligible to vote in judicial elections, sought a declaration from the circuit court of Cook County that the Compulsory Retirement of Judges Act (Retirement Act or Act) (705 ILCS 55/1 et seq. (West 2006)) is unconstitutional. The circuit court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the appellate court, and then filed a motion to transfer to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(b). See 210 Ill.2d R. 302(b) (requiring, if in the public interest, prompt adjudication by the Illinois Supreme Court). We allowed the motion and ordered that the appeal be taken directly to this court. 210 Ill.2d R. 302(b). For reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs' complaint challenged the constitutionality of the Retirement Act on a number of grounds, including that it impermissibly imposes limitations on the judicial retention process in violation of article VI, section 12(d), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 12(d)). Plaintiffs named as defendants the Governor of Illinois,¹ the members of the Illinois State Board of Elections and the Cook County clerk. The defendant Governor moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2006)), claiming that there was no actual controversy between himself and the plaintiffs. The Board defendants moved to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2006)), on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim that the Act is unconstitutional. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, relying solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and claiming they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Judge Maddux is currently the presiding judge of the law division of the Cook County circuit court. He was first appointed a circuit judge in 1991 and was subsequently elected as a circuit judge in 1992. He was later retained by the voters as a circuit judge in the 1996 and 2002 elections. His current term expires in 2010. Judge Maddux will be 75 years old by the date his term expires and will, at that time, be subject to the Retirement Act's provisions. In an amendment to their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Judge Maddux intends to run for retention should the Act be invalidated, but will not run in a contested election should the Act be upheld.

The circuit court filed a memorandum opinion and order, granting the defendants' motions to dismiss and denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed the case in its entirety with regard to all defendants.² In so doing, the circuit court determined that it was bound to accept the "judicial gloss" placed on the Retirement Act by the First District's decision in Anagnost v. Layhe, 230 Ill.App.3d 540, 172 Ill.Dec. 46, 595 N.E.2d 109 (1992). The circuit court noted that Anagnost had construed the Act as preventing a judge from running in a retention election after the expiration of the term in which the judge attains the age of 75, but allowing a judge to run for judicial office in a contested election, regardless of any age limitation. The circuit court concluded that there was no basis to conclude that the Retirement Act amounted to a constitutionally unauthorized modification of the retention process, as the text and history of the judicial article of the Illinois Constitution support the constitutionality of the Act as interpreted by Anagnost.

ANALYSIS

The dismissal of a complaint is reviewed de novo. People ex rel. Ryan v. World Church of the Creator, 198 Ill.2d 115, 120, 260 Ill.Dec. 180, 760 N.E.2d 953 (2001).

This case turns on the meaning of the Retirement Act and whether its operation is consistent with our state constitution.

The Retirement Act provides:

"A judge is automatically retired at the expiration of the term in which the judge attains the age of 75. Such judge shall conclude all matters pending before him unless the Supreme Court makes other provisions for the disposition of such matters. This Section shall apply to all Supreme Court, appellate, circuit and associate judges." 705 ILCS 55/1 (West 2006).

As in all cases of statutory construction, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly in passing the Act, and the enacted language is generally the best evidence of that. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill.2d 234, 246, 302 Ill.Dec. 735, 850 N.E.2d 172 (2006). We may also consider the purpose behind the Act and the evils sought to be remedied, as well as the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other, a critical consideration for this case. County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill.2d 593, 604, 326 Ill.Dec. 848, 900 N.E.2d 1095 (2008).

The Act states that a judge is "automatically retired" at the expiration of the term in which he attains the age of 75. The word "retired" is modified by the adverb "automatically." Thus, the Act makes clear that, once a judge reaches the age of 75 while still serving a judicial term of office, the termination of work is not left to choice. Giving the language its plain and ordinary meaning, as we must (People v. Roos, 118 Ill.2d 203, 210, 113 Ill.Dec. 81, 514 N.E.2d 993 (1987)), the Act dictates that a judge who turns 75 at any point during his term must cease to be employed as a judge at the conclusion of that term. The verb "retired" in this context means permanent termination of employment as a judge. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1939 (1986) (defining "retire" as to withdraw from "active duty"); Black's Law Dictionary 1317 (7th ed.1999) (defining "retirement" as the termination of one's "employment or career"). We therefore conclude that, under the Act's plain language, mandatory, permanent retirement is required for all judges at the expiration of the term in which they reach age 75.

The circuit court, following the construction of the Act offered in Anagnost v. Layhe, 230 Ill.App.3d 540, 172 Ill.Dec. 46, 595 N.E.2d 109 (1992), interpreted the Act in a manner that departs considerably from its plain language. As we explain, however, that construction does not effectuate the purpose behind it and cannot stand.

In Anagnost, the appellate court construed the Act to bar sitting judges from seeking retention of their seats once they reach the age of 75 within a term, but not from seeking election. The case involved a 75-year-old licensed attorney who sought the nomination for the office of supreme court justice. The defendants challenged his nominating petitions on the basis that he was ineligible for office under the Act because he was too old. The attorney challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that the legislature lacked authority to prohibit persons 75 years old or older from running for judicial office. The appellate court recognized the difficult constitutional question that the case presented. Anagnost, 230 Ill.App.3d at 542-43, 172 Ill.Dec. 46, 595 N.E.2d 109. On the one hand, the court acknowledged the long line of authority which prevents the legislature from adding to the qualifications for judicial office, as specified in section 11 of the judicial article.³ Anagnost, 230 Ill.App.3d at 542, 172 Ill.Dec. 46, 595 N.E.2d 109. On the other hand, the court observed that section 15(a) of that article⁴ expressly authorized the legislature to fix a mandatory retirement age for judges. Anagnost, 230 Ill.App.3d at 542, 172 Ill. Dec. 46, 595 N.E.2d 109.

Ultimately, the appellate court did not reach the constitutional question. Anagnost, 230 Ill.App.3d at 542-43, 172 Ill.Dec. 46, 595 N.E.2d 109. Instead, it resolved the case by construing the Act as not barring a "person over the age of 75[,] and otherwise qualified to serve as a judge from running in a judicial election." Anagnost, 230 Ill.App.3d at 544, 172 Ill.Dec. 46, 595 N.E.2d 109. The court noted that the "language of the Judges Act leaves little room for an interpretation that it is applicable to any one [sic] other than sitting judges." Anagnost, 230 Ill.App.3d at 544, 172 Ill.Dec. 46, 595 N.E.2d 109. It also noted the difference between an adversarial election and the retention process. Anagnost, 230 Ill.App.3d at 543-44, 172 Ill.Dec. 46, 595 N.E.2d 109. Although the court held that a citizen 75 years or older was eligible to run for judicial office, the effect of its holding on sitting judges was that a judge retired under the Act could yet run for election.

Justice Jiganti, in dissent, correctly recognized that the majority's holding was that "a judge may seek election beyond retirement age but not retention." Anagnost, 230 Ill.App.3d at 546, 172 Ill.Dec. 46, 595 N.E.2d 109 (Jiganti, J., dissenting). He noted that while there arguably may be a difference between seeking election and seeking retention, holding that a judge beyond retirement age may seek election but not retention brought about an absurd result. Anagnost, 230 Ill.App.3d at 546, 172 Ill.Dec. 46, 595 N.E.2d 109 (Jiganti, J., dissenting).

In this case, both parties see in Anagnost reason to consider whether legislative acquiescence, a canon of statutory construction, controls the question of the Act's interpretation. They acknowledge that in the time since ...