Piccioli v. Bd. of Trs. of the Teachers' Ret. Sys.

• Decision Date: 04 April 2019
• Docket Number: Docket No. 122905
• Citation: 2019 IL 122905,137 N.E.3d 745,434 Ill.Dec. 673
• Parties: David PICCIOLI, Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2019 IL 122905
137 N.E.3d 745
434 Ill.Dec. 673

David PICCIOLI, Appellant,
v.
The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM et al., Appellees.

Docket No. 122905

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed April 4, 2019

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

434 Ill.Dec. 675

¶ 1 Plaintiff, David Piccioli, appeals directly to this court from an order of the Sangamon County circuit court holding a 2007 amendment to the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (Pub. Act 94-1111 (eff. Feb. 27, 2007) (adding 40 ILCS 5/16-106(10) ) unconstitutional and entering summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Board of Trustees of the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) and its individual trustees.

137 N.E.3d 748

434 Ill.Dec. 676

We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On February 27, 2007, Public Act 94-1111 (eff. Feb. 27, 2007) (2007 Act) was enacted into law. Among other things, the 2007 Act added a new provision to article 16 of the Code, which governs the TRS. Id. (adding 40 ILCS 5/16-106(10) ). This provision allowed an officer or employee of a statewide teachers' union, such as the Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT) or the Illinois Education Association (IEA), who was a certified teacher as of the effective date of the amendment, to establish service credit in the TRS for his or her union work prior to becoming certified as a teacher.¹ Id. To obtain this benefit, an individual had to meet three requirements: (1) be certified as a teacher on or before the effective date of the legislation (i.e. , Feb. 27, 2007), (2) apply in writing to the TRS within six months after the effective date of the legislation, and (3) pay into the system both the employee contribution and employer (State) contribution, plus interest, for his or her prior union service. Id.

¶ 4 According to the legislative debates, the goal of the 2007 amendment was to allow employees of teachers' unions to "pick up their service" in the TRS for the period during which they worked for the union prior to becoming certified as a teacher. 94th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 28, 2006, at 68-69 (statements of Representative Hannig); 94th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, Nov. 30, 2006, at 50 (statements of Senator Martinez).

¶ 5 Plaintiff worked as a lobbyist for the IFT from 1997 until his retirement on December 31, 2012. In December 2006, plaintiff obtained a substitute teaching certificate. On January 22, 2007, he worked for one day as a substitute teacher in the Springfield public schools. By taking these steps, plaintiff met the statutory criteria to qualify as a certified teacher prior to February 27, 2007, the effective date of the 2007 amendment. 105 ILCS 5/21-9 (West 2006) ; 40 ILCS 5/16-106(10) (West 2006). Within six months of that date, plaintiff applied in writing to the TRS. On June 1, 2007, plaintiff officially became a member of the TRS. Plaintiff then contributed $ 192,668 to the system for his union service during the period from 1997 through May 31, 2007.² It is undisputed that plaintiff complied with all of the statutory requirements for obtaining service credit in the TRS for his union service prior to becoming a certified teacher.

¶ 6 In October 2011, the Chicago Tribune published an article and editorial which identified plaintiff by name and criticized the law that allowed him to become a member of the TRS and qualify for a teacher's pension. In response to the negative media coverage, Public Act 97-651 (eff. Jan. 5, 2012) (2012 Act) was enacted into law on January 5, 2012. Among other

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434 Ill.Dec. 677

things, the 2012 Act repealed the 2007 amendment at issue in this case. Id. §§ 5, 97 (amending 40 ILCS 5/16-106(10) ). The 2012 Act stated, in part:

"Retroactive repeal. This amendatory Act * * * hereby repeals and declares void ab initio the last paragraph of Section 16-106 of the Illinois Pension Code as contained in Public Act 94-1111 as that paragraph furnishes no vested rights because it violates multiple provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, including, but not limited to, Article VIII, Section 1 [ ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, § 1 ) (‘Public funds, property or credit shall be used only for public purposes.’) ]." Id. § 97.

¶ 7 The repeal provision also provided for a refund of contributions to employees who had qualified for benefits pursuant to the 2007 amendment. The provision stated:

"Upon receipt of an application within 6 months after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 97th General Assembly, the System shall immediately refund any contributions made by or on behalf of a person to receive service credit pursuant to the text set forth in Public Act 94-1111, as well as any amount determined by the Board to be equal to the investment earned by the System on those contributions since their receipt." Id.

¶ 8 Pursuant to the 2012 Act, the TRS eliminated the service credits plaintiff had received for his union service from 1997 through May 31, 2007, and issued a refund of his contributions. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants in the circuit court. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the retroactive repeal of the 2007 amendment violated several provisions of the state constitution, including the pension protection clause ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5 ). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In their motion, defendants argued for the first time that the 2007 amendment was unconstitutional special legislation ( Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13 ) and, therefore, that the 2012 Act repealing that provision was constitutionally valid.

¶ 9 The trial court agreed with defendants' argument and entered summary judgment for defendants and against plaintiff. The court first rejected plaintiff's claim that defendants lacked standing to attack the constitutionality of the 2007 amendment. The court then held that the effective-date cutoff in the 2007 amendment, which limited benefits to employees who met the eligibility criteria as of the effective date of the legislation, rendered that provision special legislation. Accordingly, the court declared the provision unconstitutional and void ab initio . Plaintiff appealed the trial court's decision directly to this court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 302(a)(1) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011).

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 I. Standing

¶ 12 Plaintiff first contends that defendants lack standing to attack the constitutionality of the 2007 amendment. The doctrine of standing ensures that courts decide actual controversies and not abstract questions. People v. $1,124,905 U.S. Currency & One 1988 Chevrolet Astro Van , 177 Ill. 2d 314, 328, 226 Ill.Dec. 627, 685 N.E.2d 1370 (1997) (citing In re Marriage of Rodriguez , 131 Ill. 2d 273, 279-80, 137 Ill.Dec. 78, 545 N.E.2d 731 (1989) ). Under Illinois law, standing requires "some injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest." Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority , 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492, 120 Ill.Dec. 531, 524 N.E.2d 561 (1988). "To have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, * * * one must have sustained or be in immediate danger of

137 N.E.3d 750

434 Ill.Dec. 678

sustaining a direct injury as a result of enforcement of the challenged statute." Wexler v. Wirtz Corp. , 211 Ill. 2d 18, 23, 284 Ill.Dec. 294, 809 N.E.2d 1240 (2004). "The claimed injury must be (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to defendant's actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief." Chicago Teachers' Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago , 189 Ill. 2d 200, 207, 244 Ill.Dec. 26, 724 N.E.2d 914 (2000) (citing Glisson v. City of Marion , 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221, 242 Ill.Dec. 79, 720 N.E.2d 1034 (1999) ). Questions of standing are reviewed de novo . Wexler , 211 Ill. 2d at 23, 284 Ill.Dec. 294, 809 N.E.2d 1240.

¶ 13 As he did in the circuit court, plaintiff argues that defendants have no personal interest in the controversy because they are in no danger of suffering an injury to their personal rights. Plaintiff maintains that the TRS is merely a fiduciary for the benefit of its members and, thus, has no personal interest in the fund it administers. Accordingly, plaintiff argues, defendants "lack[ ] power to unilaterally attack the 2007 Act's constitutionality." We agree with the circuit court that plaintiff's standing argument is without merit.

¶ 14 Defendants are not seeking judicial redress for any alleged violations of their personal rights. The party seeking judicial review and enforcement in this case is plaintiff, not defendants. In arguing that the 2007 amendment is unconstitutional, defendants are simply defending the constitutionality of the 2012 Act and the actions they took pursuant to that legislation. Defendants complied with the 2007 Act by allowing plaintiff to join the TRS as a member and make contributions for his past union service. Defendants...