Madison River RV Ltd. v. Town of Ennis, 99-167.

• Decision Date: 20 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-167.,99-167.
• Citation: 994 P.2d 1098,2000 MT 15,298 Mont. 91
• Parties: MADISON RIVER R.V. LTD., a Montana corporation, Petitioner and Appellant, v. The TOWN OF ENNIS, a Montana corporation, separately, and by and through its Town Council, Respondent and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

994 P.2d 1098

2000 MT 15

298 Mont. 91

MADISON RIVER R.V. LTD., a Montana corporation, Petitioner and Appellant, v. The TOWN OF ENNIS, a Montana corporation, separately, and by and through its Town Council, Respondent and Respondent.

No. 99-167.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs December 22, 1999.

Decided January 20, 2000.

Robert T. Cummins, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana, for Appellant.

J. Robert Planalp, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana, for Respondent.

Chief Justice J.A. TURNAGE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Madison River R.V. Ltd. (R.V.) seeks to build a recreational vehicle park in Ennis, Montana. The Ennis Town Council denied R.V.'s application for preliminary subdivision plat approval, and the Fifth Judicial District Court, Madison County, upheld that decision. R.V. appeals. We affirm.

¶ 2 We restate the issues as follows:

¶ 3 1. Did Councilman Bob Kensinger's participation in the Town Council's deliberation and vote on R.V.'s subdivision proposal constitute error?

¶ 4 2. Were the Town Council's findings of fact and order timely and thus properly part of the record for the District Court's review?

¶ 5 3. Did the court err in upholding the Town Council's denial of R.V.'s application?

¶ 6 4. Did the court err in ruling that R.V. has not stated a claim for inverse condemnation for which relief could be granted?

¶ 7 In April of 1998, R.V., a Montana corporation, applied to the Town of Ennis, Montana, for preliminary plat review and approval of its plans to build a campground with space for 73 recreational vehicles on the bank of the Madison River at the east end of town. The first step in the Town's review of the preliminary plat was a public hearing before the Ennis Planning Board. At the hearing, which was continued to a second date to allow more information to be collected, the Planning Board heard testimony from the project engineer, the project proponent, and the County Planner. The Board also heard testimony from the Madison County Sanitarian regarding the project's potential effect on the Town's sewer system, and considered a letter from the Montana Department of Transportation concerning potential traffic problems posed by a relocation of the bridge spanning the Madison River adjacent to the proposed project.

¶ 8 The Planning Board unanimously recommended that the application be denied. It deemed the application incomplete in several respects. Planning Board members also cited concerns over the project's incompatibility with the primary goals of the Ennis Comprehensive Plan, the possible effects of formaldehyde entering the Town's sewer system from the dump station proposed as part of the project, and traffic safety problems.

¶ 9 The application was then considered by the Ennis Town Council. Before a public hearing was held, R.V. requested in writing that Councilman Bob Kensinger recuse himself from proceedings relative to the application. This request was based upon Kensinger's alleged bias against the proposed project. However, Kensinger did not recuse himself, and the other Town Council members did not object.

¶ 10 The Town Council considered the minutes of the Planning Board meeting, additional testimony by the project engineer and others, and public comments and letters. At the end of the hearing, the Town Council voted three to one to deny the application.

¶ 11 R.V. petitioned for appeal in District Court pursuant to § 76-3-625(2), MCA. Fifteen days later, and thirty-six days after the Town Council voted to deny the application, the council members signed written findings pursuant to the requirement of § 76-3-620, MCA, which provides that "a governing body may not deny or condition a subdivision approval under this part unless it provides a written statement to the applicant detailing the circumstances of the subdivision denial or condition imposition." Those findings were included in the record considered by the District Court.

Issue 1

¶ 12 Did Councilman Bob Kensinger's participation in the Town Council's deliberation and vote on R.V.'s subdivision proposal constitute error?

¶ 13 R.V. alleges that the Town Council should have disqualified Kensinger from voting and that the District Court should have vacated the Council's decision as a result of Kensinger's participation. R.V. states that "[t]he record is replete with evidence of councilman Kensinger's prejudice, bias, and predetermination of the issue of this application." It alleges, moreover, that Kensinger may have had an economic interest in assuring that the project would not be approved.

¶ 14 R.V. cites the principle that one who makes decisions in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity must be free from bias, prejudice or preconceived determination of the issues. It cites no authority, however, that this principle applies to elected members of a city council. In fact, this principle is the antithesis of our political process, in which candidates run for election based on espoused political platforms and on promises of what they will do—if elected—concerning various issues of public interest.

¶ 15 To prevail on a claim of prejudice or bias against an administrative decision maker, a petitioner must show that the decision maker had an"irrevocably closed" mind on the subject under investigation or adjudication. See Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute (1948), 333 U.S. 683, 701, 68 S.Ct. 793, 803, 92 L.Ed. 1010, 1034

. In FTC, the Court upheld a ruling that members of the Federal Trade Commission, who entertained views as a result of their prior ex parte investigations that a cement pricing system was the equivalent of price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, were not thereby disqualified from presiding in an unfair trade proceeding concerning the cement pricing system.

¶ 16 Here, the District Court thoroughly reviewed the transcript of the hearings before the Planning Board and determined that nothing Kensinger said indicated that his mind was irrevocably closed on the subject of the proposed subdivision. The court noted that at the first Planning Board meeting, Kensinger stated he had "uncertainties" about the project. He "questioned" whether the Town sewer system could support the proposed 73-vehicle recreational vehicle park, whether the developer would pay for problems he guaranteed would never occur, and whether the subdivision could ultimately result in a higher tax burden for the people of Ennis. The District Court stated, "While Commissioner Kensinger did express doubts about the subdivision's effects on Ennis, these expressions of uncertainty are evidence that his mind was anything but irrevocably made up on the subject."

¶ 17 R.V. also claims that Kensinger may have had a financial interest in the denial of its application. It has attached to its brief a copy of a letter from a Bozeman, Montana, attorney addressed to its own attorney. The letter stated that the Bozeman attorney had been retained by "a group of individuals who are interested in making an offer to purchase the river property," and inquired as to R.V.'s interest in such an offer. A handwritten note at the bottom indicated that a copy of the letter had been sent to Kensinger. However, the writer of the handwritten note is not identified and nothing in the letter or the handwritten note states or implies that Kensinger is a member of the group interested in purchasing the property. Thus, R.V. has not supported its contention that Kensinger had a financial interest in the denial of its application.

¶ 18 We agree with the District Court that Kensinger's statements do not indicate that he had an irrevocably closed mind on the subject of the park application. R.V. has not established in any other way that Kensinger had an irrevocably closed mind on the subject. We affirm the District Court's determination that the Town Council was not required to disqualify Kensinger from voting and the court's decision not to vacate the Town Council's decision because of its failure to disqualify Kensinger.

Issue 2

¶ 19 Were the Town Council's findings of fact and order timely and thus properly part of the record for the District Court's review?

¶ 20 Section 76-3-625, MCA, provides the basis for R.V.'s appeal. The statute provides, in pertinent part:

A party ... who is aggrieved by a decision of the governing body to approve, conditionally approve, or disapprove a proposed preliminary plat or final subdivision plat may, within 30 days after the decision, appeal to the district court in the county in which the property involved is located. The petition must specify the grounds upon which the appeal is made.

Section 76-3-625(2), MCA.

¶ 21 R.V. asserts that the Town Council's findings should not be included in the record on appeal because they were prepared 15 days after it filed the appeal and "four days beyond the time for appeal." R.V.'s time calculations are flawed. As stated above, § 76-3-620, MCA, requires that a decision to deny a subdivision application must include a written statement giving the reason for the denial. The thirty days allowed for appeal under § 76-3-625(2), MCA, did not begin to run until the Town Council members signed the written findings required under § 76-3-620, MCA. The fact that R.V.'s notice of appeal to District Court was prematurely filed does not render untimely the written statement of reasons for the denial of R.V.'s application for preliminary plat approval.

¶ 22 We hold that the Town Council's findings were timely and were properly a part of the record for the District Court's review.

Issue 3

¶ 23 Did the court err in upholding the Town Council's denial of R.V.'s application? ¶ 24 Under this issue, we have grouped several arguments raised by R.V. The first deals with R.V.'s complaint that it was denied due process as a result of the failure of the District Court to hold a hearing.

¶ 25 Early on in the District Court proceedings, R.V. argued that neither discovery nor jury...