Madison Two Associates v. Pappas

• Decision Date: 22 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 104322.,No. 104321.,No. 104333.,104321.,104322.,104333.
• Citation: 884 N.E.2d 142,227 Ill.2d 474
• Parties: MADISON TWO ASSOCIATES et al., Appellants, v. Maria PAPPAS, Treasurer and ex officio Collector of Cook County, Appellant (The City of Chicago et al., Appellees).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

884 N.E.2d 142

227 Ill.2d 474

MADISON TWO ASSOCIATES et al., Appellants, v. Maria PAPPAS, Treasurer and ex officio Collector of Cook County, Appellant (The City of Chicago et al., Appellees).

No. 104321.

No. 104322.

No. 104333.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

February 22, 2008.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Michael C. Prinzi, Marie E. Smuda, Tatia Gibbons, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for appellant Maria Pappas, Cook County Treasurer.

Mark R. Davis, of O'Keefe, Lyons & Hynes, LLC, Chicago, for appellant Madison Two Associates et al.

Vincent J. Getzendanner, Jr., Glenn E. Schreiber, of Madigan & Getzendanner, Chicago, for appellant Shorenstein Realty Advisors et al.

Patrick J. Rocks, Lee Ann Lowder, Chicago, for appellee Board of Education of the City of Chicago.

Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, Chicago (Benna Ruth Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, Julian N. Henriques, Jr., of counsel), for appellee City of Chicago.

Ares G. Dalianis, Michael J. Hernandez, Kory A. Atkinson, of Franczek Sullivan P.C., Chicago, for amici curiae Palatine Community Consolidated School District No. 15 et al.

OPINION

Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

The issue in this case is whether taxing districts have the right to petition for leave to intervene in real estate tax objection cases filed by taxpayers in the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-1 et seq. (West 2002)). The circuit court held that such intervention was not permitted as a matter of law. It therefore denied petitions filed by the City of Chicago and the Chicago Board of Education under section 2-408 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-408 (West 2002)) seeking leave to intervene in 30 Cook County tax objection cases. In so doing, the court made an express written finding under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill.2d R. 304(a)) that there was no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal. The cases were then consolidated for review, and the appellate court reversed and remanded. 371 Ill.App.3d 352, 308 Ill.Dec. 981, 862 N.E.2d 1184.¹ The county collector of Cook County and two groups of taxpayers led, respectively, by Madison Two Associates and Shorenstein Realty Advisors, petitioned our court for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315. We consolidated the three petitions and allowed them. We also allowed a consortium of 41 public school districts to file an amicus curiae brief in support of respondents, the City and the Board of Education. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed, and the matter will be remanded to the circuit court for a determination as to whether the petitions for leave to intervene filed by the City and the Board of Education should be granted.

The circumstances giving rise to the appeal are straightforward. Petitioner Madison Two Associates (Madison Two) holds an interest in certain real property located at 70 West Madison Street, in the City of Chicago, which is located in Cook County. The Cook County assessor's office determined that the property had a certain market value for the year 2001. Believing that this assessed value was too high, Madison Two filed a complaint with the Cook County board of review under section 16-95 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-95 (West 2002)) asking that the assessment be reduced. Madison Two was entitled to seek such relief because it was a taxpayer with an interest in the property. By law, however, the assessment could also have been challenged by any taxpayer or any taxing district that has an interest in the assessment. 35 ILCS 200/16-95, 16-115 (West 2002).

After the board of review rendered its decision on Madison Two's complaint, Madison Two believed that the value at which its property was assessed for 2001 remained too high. Under the Property Tax Code, it had two options for challenging the board of review's decision: (1) it could have filed an appeal with the Property Tax Appeal Board (Board) (see 35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 2002); 86 Ill. Adm.Code § 1910.60(a) (2007) (amended at 31 Ill. Reg. 16222, eff. November 26, 2007)), or (2) it could have paid the real estate tax due on the property (see 35 ILCS 200/23-5 (West 2002)), and then filed a "tax objection complaint" with the circuit court of Cook County (see 35 ILCS 200/23-10 (West 2002)).² Where valuation is at issue, as is the case here, these options are mutually exclusive. If a taxpayer seeks review before the Property Tax Appeal Board, he or she is precluded from filing objections based upon valuation in the circuit court.³ In the same way, if a taxpayer files objections based upon valuation in the circuit court, the taxpayer cannot file a petition contesting the assessment of the subject property with the Property Tax Appeal Board. 35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 2002); 86 Ill. Adm.Code §§ 1910.50(f), (g) (2007) (amended at 31 Ill. Reg. 16222, eff. November 26, 2007).

As with a challenge to the assessor's valuation in the board of review, the right to seek review of the board of review's decision through the Property Tax Appeal Board or by means of a tax objection suit is not limited to taxpayers with an interest in the property. Appeals to the Board may also be brought by "any taxing body that has an interest" in the board of review's decision (35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 2002); 86 Ill. Adm.Code § 1910.10(c) (2007) (amended at 21 Ill. Reg. 3706, eff. March 6, 1997); 86 Ill. Adm.Code § 1910.60(b) (2007) (amended at 31 Ill. Reg. 16222, eff. November 26, 2007)), while tax objection complaints in circuit court may be filed by "any person [who] desires to object to all or any part of a property tax * * * for any reason other than that the property is exempt from taxation." (Emphasis added.) 35 ILCS 200/23-5 (West 2002); see 35 ILCS 200/23-10 (West 2002). Under the Property Tax Code, the term "person" is defined to include a "corporation, company, firm, society, singular or plural number." 35 ILCS 200/1-125 (West 2002).

Proceedings before the Property Tax Appeal Board are governed by rules of practice and procedure promulgated by that body. See 35 ILCS 200/16-165, 16-170 (West 2002). These rules are set forth at 86 Ill. Adm.Code § 1910.5 et seq. Under the Board's rules, participation in the appeal is not limited to the party who initiated it. Where an appeal has been filed by a taxpayer with respect to a decision pertinent to his or her own property, a taxing body with a revenue interest in the appeal may intervene. 86 Ill. Adm. Code § 1910.60(d) (2007) (amended at 31 Ill. Reg. 16222, eff. November 26, 2007). Conversely, where the appeal has been brought by a taxing body with a revenue interest in the decision of the board of review, the owner or taxpayer whose property is involved may intervene. 86 Ill. Adm.Code § 1910.60(c) (2007) (amended at 31 Ill. Reg. 16222, eff. November 26, 2007).

While the Board's rules and regulations apply to proceedings before that body, the procedures followed in circuit court on tax objection complaints are governed by the Property Tax Code itself and, where it is silent, by article II of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-101 et seq. (West 2002)) and the rules of our court. Just as the rules and regulations governing appeals to the Board provide a mechanism for allowing additional parties to participate in such appeals, the Property Tax Code permits additional parties to participate in tax objection proceedings in circuit court. They may do so through either joinder or intervention. Section 23-15(a) of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/23-15(a) (West 2002)) governs joinder. It provides that joinder of additional parties as plaintiffs in the tax objection proceeding "shall be permitted to the same extent permitted by law in any personal action pending in the court and shall be in accordance with Section 2-404 of the Code of Civil Procedure [735 ILCS 5/2-404 (West 2002)]." 35 ILCS 200/23-15(a) (West 2002). Section 2-404 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in turn, states that

"[a]ll persons may join in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, whenever if those persons had brought separate actions any common question of law or fact would arise." 735 ILCS 5/2-404 (West 2002).

Unlike joinder, the Property Tax Code does not specify when intervention is permissible. As we have indicated and as has long been established, when the Property Tax Code is silent on a matter of procedure, the procedures specified by article II of the Code of Civil Procedure and the rules of our court apply instead. 735 ILCS 5/1-108(b) (West 2002); People ex rel. Southfield Apartment Co. v. Jarecki, 408 Ill. 266, 272, 96 N.E.2d 569 (1951); see ABN Ambro Services Co. v. Naperville Park District, 325 Ill.App.3d 7, 10, 258 Ill.Dec. 463, 756 N.E.2d 445 (2001). The Code of Civil Procedure includes a provision governing intervention. See 735 ILCS 5/2-408 (West 2002). That provision has been held to apply to tax objection proceedings brought in circuit court under the Property Tax Code. See ABN Ambro Services Co. v. Naperville Park District, 325 Ill.App.3d at 11, 258 Ill.Dec. 463, 756 N.E.2d 445. It has, in fact, been followed by our own court in tax objection proceedings. In re Application of the County Collector of Du Page County for Judgment for Delinquent Taxes for the Year 1992, 181 Ill.2d 237, 247-48, 229 Ill.Dec. 491, 692 N.E.2d 264 (1998) (rejecting objectors' argument that trial court erred in allowing intervention by park districts); see People ex rel. Skidmore v. Anderson, 56 Ill.2d 334, 307 N.E.2d 391 (1974) (allowing and resolving appeal brought by intervening school districts). The provision states, in pertinent part:

"(a) Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted as of right to...