Madison v. Garfield Coal Co.
| Decision Date | 15 May 1901 |
| Parties | JOHN MADISON et al., Appellants, v. GARFIELD COAL. CO. et al |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Mahaska District Court.--HON. A. R. DEWEY, Judge.
PLAINTIFFS are the owners of a tract of 80 acres of land (limited however, by reservations to 73 acres), which was, in 1890 leased by them to defendants for the purpose of mining coal. Defendants have been using plaintiffs' land not only to mine coal therefrom, but also for the purpose of running out coal from adjoining land, which they have leased for mining purposes. Plaintiffs having, in 1891, at the time defendants commenced this additional use of plaintiffs' land, served notice on the defendants not to use their land for those purposes, now bring suit for damages in the sum of $ 17,500 for this alleged improper use, including therein the dumping of waste on the surface. Defendants admit the execution of the contract, but deny that there has been any breach thereof, or any use of the premises inconsistent with their rights therein. They also plead a prior adjudication in their favor in an action brought in 1891 by plaintiffs to restrain them from this additional use, in which action plaintiffs' bill was dismissed. The court, before the plaintiffs had finished the introduction of evidence as to the amount of the damage, reached the conclusion that under the contract defendants had the right to make such use of the land as plaintiffs complain of, and therefore directed a verdict for defendants, and from the judgment against plaintiffs for costs the plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
J. C Williams, George W. Seevers, and B. W. Preston for appellants.
J. F. & W. R. Lacey, and J. O. Malcolm for appellees.
OPINION
I. Although a prior adjudication, if it involved the construction of the contract now before us, would be conclusive in this case, we prefer to consider first the construction of the contract itself. Without setting it out in full, we may collect the provisions which are involved in this controversy as follows: By its terms the plaintiffs lease to defendants, for the purpose of mining coal, the said coal lands, and give them the power to mine and remove all coal underlying said lands. The defendants are to pay for all coal taken out of said mine at a specified royalty per ton payable monthly, but the royalty for each year is to be not less than $ 250, and if, during any year, the royalties paid have not amounted to that aggregate sum, then the balance of such sum is to be paid at the end of the year. This minimum royalty per year is to continue "as long as said mine is operated, not to exceed twenty-five years, but, if the coal is sooner mined out, then the royalties are to cease when the coal is exhausted." The defendants are given the right to secure necessary air and water shafts, and to place "the refuse from said shafts upon said surface in the usual way as is done in operating coal mines; and they shall have the right to dump the waste from the main shaft on the surface, as is done in operating coal mines." The defendants are " With reference to such rental for right of way it is stipulated that, "if the second party desires to use the right of way upon the land after the coal has been exhausted from the first parties land, they may continue to do so at a rental of $ 20 per year during the continuance of the use, to be paid on or before the first day of January of each year." The first party "reserves the surface, except as herein granted, and the right to farm the same, or use it in any manner that he desires, subject to the rights herein granted." It is to be noticed that the lease is "for the purpose of mining coal." Nowhere in the lease is there any language used involving an express limitation of the use to the mining of coal from the land itself. It appears, therefore, that the situation of the parties at the time of making the lease was this: That plaintiffs had an 80-acre tract of land at least partially underlaid with coal, which they desired to have removed on payment of royalty. The removal of this coal would involve the construction of shafts, of underground entries, and of some sort of track on the surface by which the coal could be taken away from the mouth of the shafts; also the dumping on the surface of refuse. The reservation of the surface for agricultural purposes would indicate that the plaintiffs attached some importance to the occupancy of the surface, and in harmony with this idea it is stipulated that for right of way over the surface the defendants are to pay the additional rental of $ 20 per year. It may be that, without other provision in the lease, it ought to be construed as relating entirely to the removal of coal from the plaintiffs' land, although no such express limitation is specified; but the parties went further, and expressly provided that the second party might use the right of way upon the land after the coal had been exhausted from the land in question, the rental for the use of the surface right of way being continued during such additional use. What could have been the object of this provision if no coal was to be taken from the shaft on plaintiffs' land except coal from the land itself? Plaintiffs' counsel has not suggested any occasion possibly arising from the taking of coal from plaintiffs' land which would require the use of this right of way after such coal should be exhausted. The parties must, therefore, have contemplated some use for the shaft and the right of way other than the use for the removal of plaintiffs' coal, and it is reasonable to suppose that the parties considered that the continued use of this shaft for the removal of other coal, and the transportation of it over plaintiffs' land, would be sufficiently compensated by the payment of the yearly rental of $ 20 for the surface right of way while defendants continued to use it. The plaintiffs may very well have considered that such an annual rental for the use of the surface right of way would adequately compensate them for all damages which they would suffer in view of the fact that the surface of the land was suitable for agricultural purposes only, and as to such purposes the continued use of the underground entries for the removal of other coal would be no detriment whatever. It appears from the evidence of John Madison, one of the plaintiffs, who, by the way, had had at the time this contract was made, long experience in coal mining, that plaintiffs were to receive a considerably greater royalty for the coal removed from their land than was paid by defendant for coal from adjoining land which was leased from other owners at about the same time; and plaintiffs may well have thought that, on the whole, they would be sufficiently compensated for all the use which defendants could make of the land in question. The only possible inconsistency which we find in the lease is that the minimum royalty is to "continue as long as said mine is operated, not to exceed 25 years, but, if the coal is sooner mined out, then the royalty shall cease when the coal is exhausted"; whereas the surface right is to continue after the coal is exhausted. But, taking these two provisions together, it is clearly the intention that, after the coal is exhausted, and the payment of the minimum royalty ceases, the defendants are still to have the use of the surface right of way, and, as we think, impliedly, the use of the underground...
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